The Subchapter S Revision Act: An Analysis and Appraisal by Coven, Glenn E.
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans
1983
The Subchapter S Revision Act: An Analysis and
Appraisal
Glenn E. Coven
William & Mary Law School
Copyright c 1983 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs
Repository Citation
Coven, Glenn E., "The Subchapter S Revision Act: An Analysis and Appraisal" (1983). Faculty Publications. Paper 490.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/490
TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW 
Volume 50 Summer 1983 Number 4 
THE SUBCHAPTER S REVISION ACT: 
AN ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL 
GLENN E. COVEN* 
AMY MORRIS HESS** 
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 571 
II. A QUESTION OF SEMANTICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 573 
Ill. QUALIFICATION, ELECTION, AND TERMINATION ...... 574 
A. Eligibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 575 
1. Maximum Number of Shareholders ........ 575 
2. Permissible Shareholders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 578 
3. One Class of Stock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 584 
a. Voting Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 584 
b. Consequences of Reclassifying 
Purported Indebtedness . . . . . . . . . . . . 585 
c. Other Issues ....... ·. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 592 
4. Ineligible Corporations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 592 
B. Election . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 593 
C. Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 596 
1. Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 596 
2. Passive Investment Income. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 599 
3. Other Terminations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 604 
4. Effective Date of Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . 605 
5. Inadvertent Terminations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 609 
D. New Planning Possibilities .................... 613 
IV. COMPUTATION OF INCOME ......................... 616 
A. Prior Law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 616 
B. Under the Revision Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 622 
1. Overview: Subchapter S's Place in the Sun. 622 
* B.A., Swarthmore College; L.L.B. Columbia University; Professor of 
Law, University of Tennessee. 
** B.A., Barnard College; J.D., University of Virginia; Associate Professor 
of Law, University of Tennessee. 
569 
570 TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50 
2. Computing S Corporation Income . . . . . . . . . 624 
a. In General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 624 
b. Separate Statement .................. 628 
c. Characterization of Income ............ 630 
d. Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 632 
e. Ceilings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 635 
f. Foreign Income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 636 
3. Timing and Shifting of Income ............ 638 
a. In General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 638 
b. Special Allocations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 647 
c. Allocations of Income Among 
Family Members . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 651 
d. Related Taxpayer Transactions . . . . . . . 657 
v. LOSSES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 660 
A. Prior Law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 660 
B. Under the Revision Act. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 662 
1. In General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 662 
2. Effect of Corporate Debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 665 
3. Shareholder Guarantors .................. 669 
4. Section 465 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 670 
VI. CAPITAL GAINS AND "ONE-SHOT" ELECTIONS ....... 673 
VII. CORPORATE DISTRIBUTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 676 
A. Prior Law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 676 
B. Under the Revision Act. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 679 
1. In General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 679 
2. Non Pro Rata Distributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 686 
3. Distributions of Pre-1983 Subchapter S 
Income ............................... 689 
4. Tax-Exempt Income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 692 
5. Planning for Shareholder Retirements ..... 694 
6. Critique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 698 
C. Eliminating Accumulated Earnings and Profits . . 699 
D. Distributions of Appreciated Property .......... 702 
E. The "Post-Termination Transition Period" . . . . . . 706 
VIII. RELATIONSHIP OF SUBCHAPTER S TO SUBCHAPTER C. 711 
A. Dividend Equivalence and Stock Attribution ..... 712 
B. Redemptions Subject to Section 311(d) ........... 714 
C. Liquidation of S Corporations .................. 715 
1. Section 337 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 716 
2. Section 333 ............................. 719 
D. S Corporations as Stockholders in Liquidating 
Corporations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 720 
IX. OIL AND GAS AND OTHER NATURAL 
RESOURCE ACTIVITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 722 
X. OTHER CHANGES AFFECTING S CORPORATION STATUS 726 
A. Qualified Deferred Compensation Plans . . . . . . . . . 727 
1983] SUBCHAPTER S REVISION ACT 571 
B. Other Employee Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 728 
C. Tax Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 731 
XI. ENTITY AUDITS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 733 
A. Prior Law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 733 
B. The New Entity Audit Provisions .............. 734 
XII. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 40 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1958 Congress enacted a wide range of legislative changes 
designed to encourage the growth of small businesses.1 That 
legislative package included a variety of amendments to the In-
ternal Revenue Code (the "Code") designed to reduce the burden 
of taxation on new or relatively small business units.2 Perhaps the 
most widely known of these provisions was Subchapter S.3 Con-
gress' primary objective in passing Subchapter S was to eliminate 
the double tax burden on closely held corporations on an elective 
basis.4 Secondarily, some of the attributes of partnership taxation 
were to be applied to a Subchapter S corporation, including the 
ability of its shareholders to claim corporate losses directly on their 
individual returns and the ability to make distributions to share-
holders without the imposition of tax. 
Although a substantial number of corporations elected to be 
taxed under these new provisions,5 Subchapter S could not be 
regarded as an unmitigated success. The pattern of taxing Sub-
chapterS corporations fell somewhere between the taxation of cor-
porations and the taxation of partnerships, creating a third system 
for the taxation of business enterprises that in many respects was 
more confusing than either. Furthermore, both Congress and the 
Treasury Department remained somewhat suspicious of their new 
creation. In order to prevent an undue extension of the relief pro-
1. For non-tax legislation, see, e.g., Small Business Investment Act of 1958, 
Pub. L. No. 85-699, 72 Stat. 689; Act of July 18, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-536, 72 Stat. 
384 (amending the Small Business Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-163, tit. II 67 Stat. 
232); and Act of Aug. 28, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-800, 72 Stat. 966. 
2. The Small Business Tax Revision Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, tit. 
II, 72 Stat. 1676, added to the Code the following sections, among others: § 1244 
(losses on small business stock), § 179 (first year depreciation) and § 6166 (exten-
sion of estate tax). The Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, 
tit. I, 72 Stat. 1606, added I.R.C. §§ 1242-43 and 341(e) as well as Subchapter S. 
3. Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 64, 72 Stat. 
1606, 1650. 
4. See text accompanying notes 153-67 infra. 
5. In 1980, 545,389 corporations filed tax returns as Subchapter S cor-
porations. U.S. TREAS. DEPT., STATISTICS OF INCOME, CORPORATION INCOME TAX 
RETURNS 63 (1980). 
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vided by Subchapter S, Congress and the Treasury Department 
enacted a series of statutory and regulatory provisions which tight-
ly restricted the definition of a Subchapter S corporation and its 
operation. In practice, however, these provisions made it enormous-
ly complex, and thus expensive, to operate a business under Sub-
chapter S. Indeed, Subchapter S became a virtual minefield, and 
an unacceptably large number of taxpayers encountered disaster 
in attempting to negotiate its boundaries. It was not at all uncom-
mon for businesses, even acting with the advice of tax professionals, 
to emerge from an encounter with Subchapter S having paid more 
tax than would have been imposed had the election not been made. 
Over the last decade, the definitional sections of Subchapter 
Shave been repeatedly amended in order to expand the availability 
of its provisions and to eliminate several of the more pointless 
"traps for the unwary."6 At the same time, Congress began to study 
the operational provisions of Subchapter S with a view towards 
simplifying their application.7 All of this activity has now culminated 
in the Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982 (the "Revision A_ct").8 
All aspects of Subchapter S corporations have been completely 
changed under the Revision Act. It has expanded and liberalized 
the definitional requirements of a Subchapter S corporation, thus 
making it far more desirable for a large number of small businesses. 
In addition, the Revision Act has brought the taxing of Subchapter 
S corporations far closer to the pattern of taxing partnerships and 
has eliminated many of the needless traps and restrictions. Without 
question, the normal operation of a Subchapter S corporation will 
be far simpler than under prior law. On the other hand, the Revi-
sion Act retained some of the most significant differences that ex-
isted under prior law between partnerships and Subchapter S cor-
porations, thus perpetuating, albeit in diminished form, its hybrid 
character. Moreover, the substantive simplification achieved was 
only at the price of a substantial increase in both the length and 
complexity of the statutory provisions themselves. 
This article will explore the changes effected in the taxation 
of Subchapter S corporations by the Revision Act. In many cases, 
however, the new provisions are ambiguous and, occasionally, ap-
6. See notes 19-21, 33-46, and 58 irifra and accompanying text. 
7. See JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 96TH CONG .. 2ND SESS., STAFF 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION OF TAX RULES ON SUBCHAPTER S CORPORA-
TIONS (Comm. Print 1980) (hereinafter cited as STAFF REPORT). The STAFF REPORT 
contains in an appendix the comments of the Treasury Department on the recom-
mendations. See also Chang, Recommendations for Restructuring of Tax Rules 
Relating to Subchapter S Corporations: A Comparative Summary, 34 TAX LAW. 
403 (1981). 
8. Pub. L. No. 97-354, 96 Stat. 1669. 
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parently misdrafted. The legislative history is surprisingly sparce 
and, at some points, inconsistent with the enacted legislation. 
Moreover, no significant regulations have been issued yet under 
the new provisions. As a result, many of the interpretations that 
we will offer must be regarded as tentative at best. 
As this Article was being completed, the Chairman of the House 
Ways and Means Committee introduced the Technical Corrections 
Bill of 1983 ("TCB").9 Such legislation is normally enacted with few 
modifications. The TCB retroactively would amend the Revision 
Act, and other recent legislation affecting Subchapter S, in several 
minor respects. Unfortunately, the TCB leaves untouched the 
substantive inadequacies created by the Revision Act. The more 
significant provisions of the TCB are briefly described in the follow-
ing pages. 
II. A QUESTION OF SEMANTICS 
Under prior law, the Code referred to a corporation that met 
certain of the requirements for electing to be taxed pursuant to 
Subchapter S as a "small business corporation"10 and referred to 
a corporation that actually elected to be taxed pursuant to those 
provisions as an "electing small business corporation."11 This ter-
minology was confusing in part because the simultaneously enacted 
section 1244 was entitled "Losses in Small Business Stock." Un-
fortunately, the definition of the small business referred to in sec-
tion 1244 bore no resemblance whatsoever to the definition of the 
small business corporation referred to in Subchapter S. Perhaps 
for that reason, practitioners insisted on referring to an electing 
small business corporation as a "Subchapter S corporation." In some 
circles, however, such a corporation was referred to as a "tax op-
tion corporation." Under the Revision Act, Congress has made a 
partial bow to commercial usage but not without adding some 
modifications of its own. Henceforth, corporations electing under 
Subchapter S are "S corporations" 12 and all other corporations are 
"C corporations."13 This article will refer to electing corporations 
as "S corporations" but will not use the designation "C corpora-
tion." Non-electing corporations will simply be so described. 
9. H.R. 3805, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (Aug. 4, 1983). 
10. Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 64(a), 72 Stat. 
1606, 1650 (enacting I.R.C. § 1371(a) (repealed)). Hereinafter, all provisions of the 
Internal Revenue Code, as they appeared prior to amendment by the Revision 
Act, are referred to as "Former I.R.C. §." 
11. Former I.R.C. § 1371(b). 
12. I.R.C. § 1361(a)(1). 
13. I.R.C. § 1361(a)(2). 
574 TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50 
Ill. QUALIFICATION, ELECTION, AND TERMINATION 
When Congress somewhat tentatively introduced Subchapter 
S in 1958, it imposed excessively restrictive limitations upon the 
character of the corporations that were eligible to elect this new 
pattern of taxation. Those restrictions remained for almost two 
decades until the Tax Reform Act of 1976 initiated a landslide of 
liberalizing amendments.14 Since 1976, the definition of an eligible 
corporation has been expanded repeatedly in incremental steps, 
some of which, while expanding the definition of a Subchapter S 
corporation, also introduced substantial additional complexity to 
that definition. In the Revision Act, Congress has indicated its con-
tentment with the present configuration of the definition of an S 
corporation for, in sharp contrast to the complete revision of the 
provisions governing the taxation of such corporations, little fun-
damental change has been made in the eligibility requirements. 
Notwithstanding this legislative inactivity, the definition of an S 
corporation cannot be regarded as fully matured. The requirements 
for the making of a Subchapter S election remain more restrictive 
than is necessary to accomplish the statutory objectives. It seems 
probable, therefore, that Congress will continue to expand the class 
of corporations eligible to make the election, and to simplify the 
eligibility requirements. 
A second reason exists for anticipating a continuing liberaliza-
tion of the definitional requirements of Subchapter S. In recent 
years, a growing consensus has emerged among tax specialists that 
the double taxation of corporations is both improper in principle 
and excessively distorting of economic behavior in practice.15 While 
political support for some measure of integration of the individual 
and corporate income taxes fluctuates/ 6 the respectability of 
eliminating the second level of tax at the election of the taxpayer 
has grown enormously since 1958. That Congress did not dramat-
ically expand the availability of Subchapter S in 1982 is somewhat 
surprising. It seems probable that Congress will continue to sup-
port ad hoc expansions of the availability of Subchapter S. 
While the basic structure of the definitional requirements of 
an S corporation has been continued largely intact from prior law, 
those definitions have been amended in a number of important 
14. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976). 
15. See, e.g., C. MCCLURE. MUST CORPORATE INCOME BE TAXED TWICE 
(Brookings Institute 1979), and Comm. on Corporations, Report on the Integration 
of Corporate and Individual Income Taxes, 31 TAX LAW. 37 (1977). 
16. Interest in integration has diminished since the adoption of the Ac-
celerated Cost Recovery System of I.R.C. § 168. See Auerbach, Whither the Cor-
porate Tax?: Reform After ACRS, 35 NAT"L. TAX J. 275 (1982). 
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respects. Among the most significant are the declaration of an in-
terim cease fire in the war over the treatment of debt as a second 
class of stock and the elimination of the passive income restric-
tion for newly formed corporations that elect to be treated as S 
corporations from the date of their organization. At the same time, 
unfortunately, new distinctions have been drawn between newly 
formed and preexisting S corporations. 17 
A. Eligibility 
Following the somewhat confusing pattern of prior law, the 
Revision Act continues to distinguish between requirements for 
eligibility to elect Subchapter S status and circumstances that can 
cause a Subchapter S election to terminate18 and that distinction 
is followed here. Thus, under section 1361(b) five types of re-
quirements are imposed upon a corporation's eligibility: a maximum 
number of shareholders, the type of permissible shareholders, a 
single class of stock, not belonging to an affiliated group, and not 
constituting a corporation entitled to certain special tax provisions. 
1. Maximum Number of Shareholders 
The most frequently amended provision of Subchapter S is that 
imposing a maximum limitation on the number of shareholders that 
an electing corporation may have. Beginning with a strictly defined 
limit of ten in 1958/9 the permissible size of an S corporation had 
expanded to a relatively liberally defined twenty-five under prior 
law.20 The Revision Act increased the permissible number of 
shareholders to thirty-five.21 
The Committee Reports22 suggest that Congress selected the 
number thirty-five because it conformed to the maximum number 
of public offerees that may be included in an unregistered sale 
17. For another description of the Revision Act, see Meale, Eligibility, Elec-
tion and Termination under the Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982, 11 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 93 (1983). 
18. Governed by I.R.C. § 1362(d). 
19. Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 64(a), 74 Stat. 
1606, 1650 (enacting I.R.C. § 1371 (a)(1)). The provision was first expanded in 1959. 
Act of Sept. 23, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-376, § 2(a), 73 Stat. 699. See also Tax Reform 
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 902(a)(1), 90 Stat. 1520, 1608, and Revenue Act 
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 341(a), 92 Stat. 2763, 2843. 
20. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 233(a), 95 
Stat. 172, 250. 
21. I.R.C. § 1361(b)(l)(A). 
22. H.R. REP. No. 826, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 7 (1982)(hereinafter cited as 
HOUSE REPORT), and S. REP. No. 640, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 7 (1982)(hereinafter 
cited as SENATE REPORT), reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3253. 
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of a security under Regulation D.23 Obviously, however, a deter-
mination by the Securities and Exchange Commission as to when 
the public interest requires that a securities offering be registered 
has no relevance whatsoever to the proper size of an S corpora-
tion. Since the present ceiling, like its predecessors, is an arbitrary 
one, and appears needlessly restrictive, it is not unlikely that the 
thirty-five shareholder limitation, along with other eligibility re-
quirements, will be liberalized further. Furthermore, as currently 
enacted, the definitional requirements do not, in fact, have the ef-
fect of limiting to thirty-five the number of shareholders an S cor-
poration may have. As under prior law, husbands and wives are 
treated as a single shareholder for this purpose (regardless of 
whether they have a joint interest in the stock or file a joint in-
come tax return) as are the estates of deceased spouses (regardless 
of the identity of their beneficiaries).24 Moreover, section 1361(c)(2) 
permits a variety of trusts to be shareholders of an S corporation, 
either permanently or for limited periods of time. The trust itself, 
however, is not treated as the shareholder of the S corporation; 
either the creator or beneficiary of the trust is so treated.25 Thus, 
if that individual is an S corporation shareholder in his individual 
capacity, the presence of one or more such trusts as shareholders 
does not increase the number of shareholders of the corporation 
for the purpose of the computation of the thirty-five shareholder 
maximum. As a result, while under the Revision Act an S corpora-
tion may not be owned by a great deal more than thirty-five 
separate economic interests, the actual maximum number of 
shareholders to whom income and loss must be allocated is in theory 
unlimited and may easily be double or even triple that number. 
All of this elaborate computational detail in order to impose 
a not very onerous restriction, which itself has been repeatedly 
expanded, may be sharply contrasted with the definition of a part-
nership for income tax purposes which, of course, contains no limita-
tion on the number of partners. The rationality of retaining any 
ceiling on the number of shareholders of an S corporation is doubt-
ful. The original reason for limiting eligibility to elect under Sub-
chapter S to corporations having a small number of shareholders 
is not entirely clear. In the same legislative package, Congress 
extended ordinary loss treatment to stock in another classifica-
tion of small businesses which, in this case, was defined with 
reference to the corporate net worth and contained no limitation 
23. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.506 (1982). Significantly, the number of offerees 
permissible under the various Rules in Regulation D is considerably larger than 
35 and, under certain circumstances, is unlimited. See Rule .504. 
24. I.R.C. § 1361(c)(1). 
25. I.R.C. § 1361(c)(2)(B). 
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upon the number of shareholders.26 Presumably Congress concluded 
in 1958 that the pattern of taxation provided by Subchapter S was 
uniquely appropriate for "incorporated partnerships" in which 
substantially all of the owners of the business also participated 
in management.27 In addition, it appears that Congress regarded 
Subchapter S as an erosion of the tax base that was justified only 
insofar as it implemented a national policy of encouraging small 
business enterprise. Finally, Congress undoubtedly feared that the 
process of auditing Subchapter S shareholders would be sub-
stantially more complicated than was the auditing of a single cor-
porate entity subject to the regular income tax at the entity leveJ.28 
It is unclear whether any of these policy justifications for 
limiting S corporations are valid today. The expansion of the max-
imum number of shareholders to over thirty-five economic interests 
and perhaps over 100 individual shareholders has far surpassed 
any conception of an "incorporated partnership." This restric-
tiveness appears particularly inappropriate since publicly offered 
limited partnerships, which not uncommonly have more than 100 
limited partners, are not only permissible but also can offer sub-
stantially greater tax reduction advantages to their limited part-
ners than can an S corporation. Furthermore, the Commissioner's 
administrative difficulty in auditing Subchapter S corporations has 
been eliminated, as it has been in widely owned partnerships, by 
the adoption of an entity level audit procedure the results of which 
are binding on all shareholders unless they specifically notify the 
Commissioner of their intention to adopt an inconsistent position. 29 
Finally, many would argue that the second level income tax imposed 
upon regular corporations constitutes an improper distortion of 
the allocation of taxation and that the pattern of taxation imposed 
under Subchapter S would be more appropriate for all corporations. 
Furthermore, eliminating any ceiling on the permissible number 
of shareholders of an S corporation would not have the effect of 
making the option available to widely held corporations. The specter 
of an automobile manufacturing corporation making a "one shot" 
election in order to pass through a gigantic loss to thousands of 
shareholders could not occur. Other restrictions upon the making 
of a Subchapter Selection, such as the requirement of unanimous 
shareholder consent and the inability to have corporations and most 
trusts as shareholders, together with the difficulty in most states 
of effectively restricting transfers of S corporation stock for the 
26. I.R.C. § 1244(c)(3). 
27. S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess. 68 (1958), reprinted in 1958 
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4791, 4876. 
28. STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 9. 
29. See text accompanying notes 479-503 infra. 
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purpose of preventing disqualification,30 effectively preclude the 
use of Subchapter S by widely owned corporations. Indeed, it is 
unlik~ly that the managers of many corporations in the intermediate 
range of 100 to 200 shareholders would choose to proceed under 
Subchapter S. No reason appears, however, why those relatively 
few corporations should not be entitled to avail themselves of the 
advantages offered by Subchapter S. 
2. Permissible Shareholders 
As under prior law, an S corporation may have among its 
shareholders only individuals, estates, and certain specified trusts 
and may not have a non-resident alien stockholder.31 To prevent 
avoidance of the rule excluding nonresident alien stockholders, the 
Revision Act expressly excludes foreign trusts from the category 
of permissible shareholders of an S corporation.32 
The provisions of present law governing the types of trusts 
that constitute permissible shareholders of an S corporation have 
undergone a virtual explosion of statutory detail since 1976, when 
trusts were first permitted to become shareholders of Subchapter 
S corporations.33 The Revision Act continues the description of the 
types of trusts that are eligible shareholders of an S corporation 
from prior law without modification, except for several minor 
changes in the definition of the "Qualified Subchapter S Trust" 
set forth in section 1361(d).34 Since the trust provisions appear ex-
cessively restrictive, and are of relatively recent origin, it is prob-
able that this aspect of the definition of an S corporation will also 
undergo further amendment. The types of trusts that are permitted 
to be shareholders consist of: (a) a grantor trust,35 including, for 
a limited period of time, a trust which was a grantor trust on the 
date of the death of the grantor;36 (b) any trust that receives stock 
30. Some states permit such restrictions by statute. See, e.g., DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 7, § 202(d)(1974). 
31. I.R.C. § 136l(b)(1). 
32. I.R.C. § 1361(c)(2)(A)(flush language). 
33. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 902(c)(2), 90 Stat. 1520, 
1609 (1976). 
34. See text accompanying notes 38-46 infra. 
35. I.R.C. § 1361(c)(2)(a)(i). To qualify, the entire trust must be treated as 
owned by an individual. The provision include trusts, the income of which is tax-
able under I.R.C. § 678 to an individual other than the settlor. 
36. I.R.C. § 1361(c)(2)(a)(ii). The period is 60 days unless the entire corpus 
of the trust is includible in the estate of the grantor in which event the period 
is two years. The special two-year period was added by the Revenue Act of 1978, 
Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 701(y), 92 Stat. 2763, 2921, and apparently was intended 
to conform the grace period to the average length of time necessary to administer 
an estate for those trusts that the grantor likely intended to be testamentary 
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of an S corporation pursuant to a will, but only for a sixty-day 
period;37 (c) a voting trust; and (d) a "Qualified Subchapter S Trust" 
as defined in section 1361(d). 
Only the last described trust constitutes a significant expan-
sion of the limitation on permissible shareholders to individuals. 
Originally enacted as part of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 
1981/8 the provision creating the "Qualified Subchapter S Trust" 
allows certain trusts to qualify as shareholders of S corporations 
at the election of the income beneficiary. For the trust to qualify, 
the income beneficiary must elect to be treated as the owner pur-
suant to section 678(a) of that portion of the trust consisting of 
the S corporation stock.39 The effect of such an election, of course, 
is to substitute the beneficiary for the trust as the shareholder 
of the S corporation. The beneficiary, thus, must report an allocable 
share of the income and deductions of the S corporation on his 
tax return. Since the failure to elect40 renders the trust ineligible 
to be an S corporation shareholder, and thus prevents or terminates 
the corporation's selection, the mechanics of this election are criti-
cized below in connection with the S election itself.41 
Section 1361(d) is excessively restrictive. While the Revision 
Act contains several minor liberalizing amendments to the defini-
tion of Qualified Subchapter S Trust, the class of trusts that can 
qualify remains quite small. Only a trust that distributes, or is 
required to distribute,42 all of its trust accounting income43 currently 
substitutes. H.R. REP. No. 700, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1977). 
Of course, the estate of a deceased shareholder may remain a shareholder 
for an unlimited period of time. However, the Commissioner does have the power 
to treat the estate as terminated for federal income tax purposes if its administra-
tion is unreasonably prolonged. Treas. Reg. § 1.641(b)-3(a) (1960). 
37. I.R.C. § 1361(c)(2)(A)(iii). 
38. Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 234(b), 95 Stat. 172,251 (1981)(enacting former I.R.C. 
§ 1371(g)). 
39. I.R.C. § 1361(d)(l). 
40. I.R.C. § 1361(d)(2)(D) renders any election made pursuant to I.R.C. § 
1361(d)(l) effective up to 60 days before the date of the election, in effect, giving 
the income beneficiary a 60-day grace period during which to elect. The TCB 
§ 20l(f)(l) would increase this grace period to seventy-five days. 
41. See notes 109-11 infra and accompanying text. 
42. The Revision Act added a clause to I.R.C. § 1361(d)(3)(B) to make it 
clear that a trust can qualify as a Qualified Subchapter S Trust so long as the 
trust instrument requires that all of its trust accounting income be distributed 
currently, even though all of the income is not, in fact, distributed. Thus, the 
S election of the corporation will not be jeopardized by the failure of the trustee 
to make the appropriate distribution. TCB § 20l(f)(2) would limit qualification to 
those trusts that are required to distribute income currently, thus eliminating 
the possibility that, as long as all income was distributed currently, a trust would 
qualify even if the trust instrument granted the trustee authority to accumulate 
income. See text accompanying notes 49-50 infra. 
43. The Revision Act added a clause to I.R.C. § 1361(d)(3)(B) to make clear 
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and has a single current income beneficiary may qualify. Moreover, 
the trust instrument must not permit trust assets to be 
distributable to any individual other than the income beneficiary 
during the beneficiary's life.44 The provision, as originally enacted, 
precluded election by a trust that had more than one beneficiary 
following the death of the income beneficiary.45 The Revision Act 
amended section 1361(d)(3)(C) to require a single beneficiary only 
during the lifetime of the current income beneficiary. Thus, the 
possibility of multiple beneficiaries after the death of the current 
income beneficiary no longer will disqualify the trust during the 
income beneficiary's lifetime.46 
that the word "income" for purposes of that subparagraph was to be defined 
by I.R.C. § 643(b). 
44. I.R.C. § 1361(d)(3). 
45. Former I.R.C. § 1371(g)(3). 
46. SENATE REPORT, supra note 22, at 9. Such a trust would cease to be 
a Qualified Subchapter S Trust, and therefore, cease to be an eligible S corpora· 
tion shareholder upon the death of the income beneficiary. Thus, the question 
arises whether any of the grace periods granted to other eligible trusts when 
their deemed owners die apply to allow the former Qualified Subchapter S Trust 
time to distribute or otherwise dispose of the S corporation stock before its owner-
ship of the stock causes a termination of the corporation's Subchapter S election. 
Congress apparently intended that at least the 60-day grace period allowed to 
such trusts by I.R.C. § 1361(c)(2)(A)(ii) apply to a Qualified Subchapter S Trust. 
Indeed, the Senate Report states that it does apply. Unfortunately, while such 
a grace period is clearly desirable it is not entirely clear that the statute, as 
enacted, grants it. 
Under the Revision Act, the trust will become disqualified following the death 
of the income beneficiary if it no longer meets the definitional requirements of 
I.R.C. § 1361(d)(3). That would result, for example, if it had more than one cur-
rent beneficiary. Further, I.R.C. § 1361(d)(4) unequivocally states that the trust 
ceases to qualify immediately when it no longer meets the requirements of I.R.C. 
§ 1361(d)(3). This provision seems excessively harsh, since it will cause the trust 
immediately to become an ineligible shareholder, which, in turn, will cause an 
immediate termination of the corporation's Subchapter S election. The comment 
in the Senate Report seems to be a reference to I.R.C. § 1361(d)(l)(A), which pro-
vides that a Qualified Subchapter S trust, as to which a valid election has been made, 
is to be treated as a trust described in I.R.C. § 1361(c)(2)(a)(i), the provision dealing 
with grantor trusts. The grace periods of I.R.C. § 1361(c)(2)(A)(ii) expressly apply 
to such trusts on the death of the grantor or other deemed owner. However, 
the statute does not expressly provide that the grace period provision supercedes 
I.R.C. § 1361(d)(4) when the two conflict. Nor is it clear that this ambiguity can 
be resolved without further legislation. 
Similar language appeared in the legislative history of the Economic Recovery 
Tax Act of 1981, which first added the Qualified Subchapter S Trust to the law. 
S. REP. No., 144, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 91 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S. CoDE 
CONG. & AD. NEWS 105, 195. However, under the 1981 provisions the election 
terminated at the death of each income beneficiary and had to be made again 
by the successor beneficiary. Thus, the statement could have been intended only 
to grant a 60-day grace period to the new beneficiary to make a new election 
as to a trust that continued to meet the requirements of I.R.C. § 1361(d)(3). Such 
an interpretation would cause no conflict between the grace period provision and 
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It is regrettable that Congress did not go further in eliminating 
the restrictions on the Qualified Subchapter S Trust. The legislative 
history of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 indicates only 
that the predecessor to section 1361(d) was added to facilitate the 
use of Subchapter S corporations by more businesses.47 The provi-
sion does, in fact, permit the making of gifts of S corporation stock 
to individuals to whom the transferor-shareholder would not want 
to give the stock outright, either because the shareholder wishes 
to place voting power and legal title in the hands of a trustee (for 
example, if the beneficiaries were minor children or grandchildren)48 
or because the shareholder wishes to give one donee an income 
interest in the S corporation stock, but wishes the stock itself 
ultimately to pass to others.49 In order to preserve the corpora-
tion's Subchapter Selection, however, the shareholder must create 
a separate trust for each current income beneficiary. Furthermore, 
while the tr,ust instrument apparently may give the trustee discre-
tion to accumulate income without precluding an election under 
section 1361(d), the exercise of such discretion while the trust 
owns S corporation stock will terminate the corporation's election 
under Subchapter S. Since the trust no longer will be one that 
either distributes, or is required to distribute, all of its fiduciary 
I.R.C. § 1361(d)(4). Under the new law, however, such a grace period is unnecessary 
since the initial election remains in effect unless the successor beneficiary affir-
matively refuses to consent. I.R.C. § 1361(d)(BXii). 
The statement in the Senate Report to the Revision Act raises another ques-
tion. I.R.C. § 1361(c)(2)(A)(ii) provides for two grace periods, the 60-day period 
referred to in the Report and a two-year period for trusts the entire corpus of 
which is includible in the estate of the deemed owner. The statute clearly mandates 
application of the two-year grace period when the entire corpus of the Qualified 
Subchapter S Trust is includible in the estate of the income beneficiary, as would 
be the case, for example, if the income beneficiary had a general power of 
appointment over the corpus. The reference in the Senate Report to the 60-day 
grace period leaves unclear whether Congress intended the two-year period to 
apply. 
47. S. REP. No. 144, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 91 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S. 
CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 105, 195. 
48. It appears that a trust created pursuant to I.R.C. § 2503(c) is eligible 
to be a Qualified Subchapter S Trust, provided, of course, that a legal represen-
tative is appointed for the minor beneficiary and the representative makes the 
election required by I.R.C. § 1361(d)(2). However, under the Revision Act there 
is some risk in granting the trustee discretion to accumulate income during the 
minority of the beneficiary, a standard aspect of such trusts. But, under the TCB, 
granting the trustee such discretion would preclude qualification of the trust as 
a Qualified Subchapter S Trust. See note 42 supra. 
49. One of the laudable results of the change permitting multiple 
beneficiaries following the death of the current income beneficiary is that the 
new qualified terminable interest trust permitted under the federal estate tax 
marital deduction provisions (I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)) is eligible to be a Qualified Sub-
chapter S Trust. Of course, the surviving spouse must make the appropriate 
election pursuant to I.R.C. § 1361(d). 
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accounting income currently, it no longer will be a Qualified Sub-
chapter S Trust. Section 201(f)(1) of the TCB would eliminate even 
this flexibility by limiting qualification to those trusts that are re-
quired to distribute their income currently. The drafters of the 
TCB undoubtedly introduced this provision to eliminate the power 
of the trustee of an accumulation trust to terminate unilaterally 
the corporation's S election. Such a device permits termination of 
the Subchapter S election without compliance with the revocation 
procedures of section 1362(d)(1) and therefore should not be per-
mitted. While section 201(f)(1) of the TCB thus renders the qualifica-
tion and termination provisions internally consistent, it does so 
at the cost of an additional undesirable restriction on the class 
of trusts that may be S corporation shareholders. The beneficiary 
must elect to be treated as the owner for purpo~es of section 678(a) 
of the S corporation stock held by the trust before the trust can 
be a Qualified Subchapter S Trust;50 therefore, the income therefrom 
will be taxed to him whether or not it is distributed to him. It 
is unclear why the power to accumulate should preclude qualifica-
tion. Lastly, the limitations on accumulation and discretionary 
distributions to other beneficiaries apparently are not confined to 
the portion of the trust composed of S corporation stock. In this 
respect, paragraphs· (1) and (3) of section 1361(d) appear inconsis-
tent. The income beneficiary clearly is to be treated as the owner 
of only that portion of the trust that consists of S corporation stock. 
The paragraph defining a Qualified Subchapter S Trust, however, 
speaks in terms of the whole trust. 
The difficulty with the Qualified Subchapter S Trust as thus 
restricted is that it does not comport with the normal estate plan-
ning desires of most individuals who would wish to place their S 
corporation stock in trust.51 A trust that permits discretionary 
distributions among beneficiaries according to their needs rather 
than according to a preconceived formula provides the greatest 
flexibility in family estate planning. The restriction applicable to 
Qualified Subchapter S Trusts prohibits placing the stock of an 
S corporation in such a trust and, thus, creates an unnecessary 
inflexibility in family estate planning. Since Congress could have 
achieved its legitimate objectives without imposing such severe 
50. I.R.C. § 1361(d)(l)(B). 
51. The estate planning opportunities available to S corporation 
shareholders through the use of trusts under current law are discussed in Huffaker 
and Doering, Opportunities and Problems with SubS Holdings of Estates and Trusts, 
J. TAX 130 (1983); Kanter, To Elect or Not To Elect Subchapter S-That Is a Ques-
tion, 60 TAXES 882, 885-906 (1982); and Report of the Committee on Pre-Death 
Estate Planning, Estate Planning After 1982 For the Subchapter S Shareholder, 
17 REAL PROP. PROB. AND TR. J. 724, 731-36 (1982). 
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restrictions, it is hoped that the definition of Qualified Subchapter 
S Trust will be expanded in time. 
Apparently, there are two purposes for this series of restric-
tions. Requiring a single beneficiary effectively prevents using the 
trust device to expand the beneficial ownership of an S corpora-
tion beyond the thirty-five shareholder limitation. Of course, 
Congress could have prevented that result in a more flexible man-
ner by counting each beneficiary of the trust as a shareholder as 
is done with respect to voting trusts.52 Secondly, requiring a single 
beneficiary of the trust prohibits the use of a trust to accomplish 
a special allocation of items of income and expense incurred by 
the corporation. One of the restrictive features of prior law that 
is continued under the Revision Act is the prohibition against an 
s corporation specially allocating items of income and expense 
among its shareholders although either a partnership or a trust53 
may do so. That aspect of the Revision Act is criticized below;54 
nevertheless, it remains a feature of the pattern of taxing S cor-
porations. S corporations could easily circumvent the prohibition 
against their allocating expenses by causing the stock of the cor-
poration to be held by a trust having multiple beneficiaries. 
The justification for prohibiting special allocations in S corpora-
tions and, a fortiori, through Qualifying Subchapter S Trusts is 
tenuous. Special allocations generally are criticized on two grounds: 
they introduce needless complexity into the computation of the 
taxable income of the S corporation and they are abusive and, 
therefore, should be eliminated as a matter of tax policy. A special 
allocation permitted in a trust instrument, however, affects only the 
computation of trust income and, thus, would not increase the com-
plexity of the computation of income and expense by the S cor-
poration itself. Secondly, because it prohibits special allocations, 
the S corporation is unique among conduit taxation entities. Given 
appropriate restrictions on such abusive allocations as the retroac-
tive allocation popularized by the tax shelter industry,55 special 
allocations are not improper as a matter of income tax policy. Per-
mitting the flexibility normally incident to trust taxation would 
introduce desirable flexibility in the taxation of S corporations. 
If Congress remains adamantly opposed to the avoidance of 
the prohibition against special allocations, it could prohibit trusts 
which have multiple beneficiaries and also require, or grant the 
trustee discretion to make, special allocations, from being 
52. I.R.C. §§ 1361(c)(2)(A)(iv) and (B)(iv). 
53. I.R.C. § 704(a); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.652(b)-2, -3(1960), and 1.662(b}-1(1960). 
54. See text accompanying notes 267-73 infra. 
55. I.R.C. § 706(a) has established such restrictions for partnerships. 
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shareholders in S corporations. It was not necessary to bar trusts 
having multiple beneficiaries from being shareholders at all. 
3. One Class of Stock 
The seemingly straightforward requirement for electing Sub-
chapter S status that the corporation have outstanding only a single 
class of stock56 in order to elect Subchapter S status has precipitated 
the most extended and heated battle between taxpayers and the 
Commissioner under Subchapter S.57 For no apparent reason, the 
Commissioner always has displayed an extraordinary inflexibility 
in the construction of the one class of stock requirement notwith-
standing that the consequences of an unintentional violation of the 
requirement were extraordinarily harsh. The presence of a second 
class of stock not only would preclude a Subchapter S election but 
also would cause its termination. 
Under the Revision Act, Congress liberalized the one class of 
stock requirement in two significant respects: disparities in voting 
rights are to be ignored, and some restrictions have been imposed 
upon the treatment of purported indebtedness as a second class 
of stock. 
a. Voting Rights 
Under prior law, a series of statutory56 and regulatory00 changes 
in the Commissioner's original position ultimately established that 
disparities in voting rights produced by the voluntary action of 
the shareholders did not create a second class of stock. Disparities 
mandated by the certificate of incorporation, however, did create 
a second class. Therefore, shareholder agreements, voting trusts 
and irrevocable proxies all became permissible and effectively 
emasculated the general prohibition. Since the apparent purpose 
of the one class of stock limitation was to prevent undue complex-
ity in the allocation of corporate income among shareholders with 
differing economic interests,60 there was no justification for the 
retention of the prohibition against disparities produced by the 
certificate of incorporation. This limitation has now been abandoned 
under section 1361(c)(4) and differences in voting rights among other-
wise identical shares of common stock are to be ignored for the 
56. I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(D). 
57. See, e.g., Bravenec, The One Class of Stock Requirement of Subchapter 
S-A Round Peg in a Pentagorw,l Hole, 6 Hous. L. REv. 215 (1968). 
58. Former I.R.C. § 137l(e)(1)(D)(voting trusts). 
59. Rev. Rul. 73-611, 1973-2 C.B. 312. But see Rev. Rul. 71-522, 1971·2 C.B. 
316. 
60. S. REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 453-54 (1954). 
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purposes of the one class of stock requirement. The legislative 
history does not elaborate upon this new provision but there is 
no reason for the Treasury Department to construe it narrowly. 
Thus, it should be permissible either for specified classes of other-
wise identical stock to bear a differing number of votes per share 
or for the corporation to establish different classes of stock with 
each class having the right to elect a specified number of the direc-
tors of the corporation. Indeed, it appears permissible to issue non-
voting common stock and to vary the voting strength of the S cor-
poration stock over time either by a recapitalization or by provid-
ing for the shift upon a contractually specified contingency. 
b. Consequences of Reclassifying Purported Indebtedness 
As described in greater detail below,61 under prior law, Sub-
chapter S corporations, even more commonly than corporations 
subject to the regular income tax, issued debt instruments to their 
stockholders. Not uncommonly, the indebtedness arose as a result 
of a reinvestment of earnings only recently distributed to the 
shareholders and thus the holdings of the S corporation indebted-
ness often were roughly proportionate to stockholdings. Not too 
surprisingly, this configuration of investment in a closely held cor-
poration precipitated frequent attacks by the Commissioner upon 
the purported indebtedness. The Commissioner alleged, under the 
usual debt-equity analysis,62 that, for tax purposes, the debt in-
strument should be reclassified as stock. If that reclassification 
prevailed, the Commissioner would argue further that because the 
reclassified indebtedness bore characteristics that differed from 
the corporation's common stock, the indebtedness constituted a 
second class of stock producing a termination of the Subchapter 
S election as of the beginning of the year in which the indebtedness 
was issued. The judicial attitude towards the Commissioner's argu-
ment was markedly unsympathetic, presumably because of the 
severity of the consequences of finding a second class of stock. 
Thus, some courts held that even though the purported indebted-
ness should properly be regarded for income tax purposes as a 
form of equity investment, it nevertheless would not be regarded 
as a second class of stock.63 Even the Commissioner began toques-
tion the propriety of his position and announced that he no longer 
would litigate the issue of whether indebtedness constituted a se-
cond class of stock for the purpose of the definition of a Subchapter 
61. See text accompanying note 348 infra. 
62. Now embodied in I.R.C. § 385. 
63. See, e.g., Gamman v. Comm'r, 46 T.C. 1 (1966), and Portage Plastics 
Co. v. United States, 486 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1973). 
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S corporation.64 As a result of that concession, a peculiar de facto 
recognition was extended to investments in S corporations that 
quite closely resembled preferred stock. 
The extended debate over the proposed regulations under sec-
tion 385 has complicated the controversy over the proper treat-
ment of reclassified indebtedness in an S corporation.65 Section 385 
expressly grants the Treasury Department the authority to issue 
regulations governing the circumstances under which purported 
indebtedness might be reclassified as stock. After repeatedly re-
vising the regulations under that section, the Treasury Depart-
ment recently proposed withdrawing them. Presumably, when 
regulations under section 385 are issued, they will be applicable 
to all corporations, including S corporations. Unfortunately, 
however, the Revision Act was fashioned while the proposed regula-
tions were being hotly contested between taxpayers and the 
Treasury Department and their final form remained very much 
in doubt. As a result, the steps taken by Congress towards resolv-
ing the treatment of debt in an S corporation are both tentative 
and incomplete, and the full consequences of the issuance of debt 
by an S corporation will remain uncertain until regulations under 
both sections 385 and 1361 and, quite likely, further legislation, 
are adopted. 
Notwithstanding the lingering uncertainties, Congress has taken 
a significant step towards preventing the loss of Subchapter S 
status by virtue of the issuance of debt by an S corporation. Under 
section 1361(c)(5), a debt instrument meeting the safe harbor re-
quirements is not to be treated as a second class of stock even 
though under normal rules it would be reclassified as an equity 
investment. Fortunately for taxpayers, the safe harbor definition 
is both relatively simple and relatively liberal. Congress, in de-
fining safe harbor debt in section 1361, borrowed the concept from 
the regulations to section 385 that straight debt should be relatively 
free from reclassification.66 The definition of safe harbor debt con-
tained in section 1361(c)(5)(D) appears similar to the definition of 
straight debt under section 385. For the purposes of the Subchapter 
64. T.I.R. 1248 (July 27, 1973). 
65. After over a decade of delay, final regulations to I.R.C. § 385 were 
issued on December 31, 1980 (T.D. 7747, 1981-1 C.B. 141). However, through a 
series of amendments to Treas. Reg. § 1.385-1(a)(1)(1980), the effective date of 
the regulations was postponed repeatedly. See T.D. 7744, 1981-1 C.B. 360; T.D. 
7801, 1982-1 C.B. 60; and T.D. 7822, 311.R.B. 6. In the meantime, an entirely revised 
set of regulations was proposed on January 5, 1982. Finally, on July 6, 1983, 
the Treasury Department issued a proposed withdrawal, effective August 5, 1983, 
of both sets of proposed regulations. 
66. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.385-3(£) and 5(dX1980). 
67. See text accompanying notes 274-82 infra. 
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S rule, therefore, safe harbor debt includes any written uncondi-
tional indebtedness requiring repayment of a fixed sum of money, 
whether on demand or upon a specified maturity date. The interest 
rate and payment dates, however, must not be contingent on the 
profitability of the S corporation nor subject to change in the discre-
tion of the S corporation, and the debt must not be convertible 
into S corporation stock. 
Because no other factors pertaining to the indebtedness are 
to be taken into account in determining compliance with the safe 
harbor test, relative certainty that a second class of stock has not 
been created can be achieved. The safe harbor test contains no 
reference to the debt-to-equity ratio of the corporation, to the pro-
portionality of the holdings of the debt to stock ownership in the 
corporation, to the degree of subordination, to the consideration 
for which the indebtedness was issued or to whether the interest 
rate payable is reasonable. The last enumerated omission is, of 
course, of substantial importance. While the interest rate specified 
presumably must be paid (absent, perhaps, insolvency) in order 
to comply with the requirement that the rate not be subject to 
the borrower's discretion or geared to profitability, an S corpora-
tion apparently remains free to establish an unreasonably low rate 
of interest without jeopardizing the availability of the safe harbor 
rule. The establishment of an unreasonably high or low interest 
rate, however, is not insulated by the safe harbor rule from attack 
under other provisions of the Code. For example, under section 
1366(e), described below,67 the Commissioner is empowered to make 
reallocations of income in the event a member of a shareholder's 
family furnishes capital to the corporation "without receiving 
reasonable compensation therefor." 
If debt issued by an S corporation meets the safe harbor test, 
the Subchapter S election cannot be terminated for the reason that 
the indebtedness constitutes a second class of stock. That much, 
at least, is clear. On the other hand, because of the liberality of 
the safe harbor test, in some instances, debt meeting that test will 
nevertheless be regarded as equity under the more general rules 
of section 385.68 The status of safe harbor indebtedness for other 
purposes under the Code remains highly uncertain. Both committee 
reports recognized this potential inconsistency and suggested that 
the Treasury Department issue regulations that would treat safe 
harbor indebtedness as indebtedness for other purposes of Sub-
68. The extent of this discrepancy depends upon the final form of the section 
385 regulations. Under the proposed revision of those regulations, straight debt 
may be treated as stock because of the combined effect of an inadequate interest 
rate, an excessive debt to equity ratio, having been issued for property, being 
payable on demand, and being proportionately held. See Prop. Reg. § 1.385-6 [1983] 
STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) , 8904. 
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chapter S in addition to the second class of stock requirement even 
though the indebtedness would be treated as equity under section 
385. Both reports contain the statement that "it is anticipated that 
the safe-harbor instruments will be treated as debt under Sub-
chapter S,. so that rio corporate income or loss will be allocated 
to the instruments."69 That statement in effect instructs the 
Treasury to create an exception to the general application of the 
regulations to section 385 for debt instruments meeting the safe 
harbor test of section 1361 for the purposes of the rules govern-
ing the allocation of income and expense to shareholders. Quite 
likely, the exception will be even broader. For example, because 
the Subchapter S rules governing distributions are related to the 
income allocation rules, it seems probable that the retirement of 
safe harbor debt will not be recharacterized as a dividend. In ad-
dition, it seems likely that interest paid on safe harbor debt will 
be deductible by the S corporation and thus by its shareholders. 
On the other hand, there is no basis whatsoever for any predic-
tion of the position the Treasury Department will take on the treat-
ment of such safe harbor debt instruments under provisions of the 
Code of general application. 
If the debt instrument does not comply with the safe harbor 
rule, its characterization is to be determined under the general 
rules of section 385.70 If under those rules the instrument would 
be reclassified as stock, the question would be renewed under pres-
ent law of whether that reclassified indebtedness should be treated 
as a second class of stock. Although nothing in the Revision Act 
expressly overrules prior case law holding that a debt instrument 
that would be treated as stock under general reclassification rules 
nevertheless was not to be treated as a second class of stock, the 
Committee Reports imply that Congress intended its new safe har-
bor rule to be the exclusive avenue for avoiding that result.71 While 
a court might not regard itself as bound by such a statement in 
the Committee Report, Congress has provided a relatively liberal 
safe harbor rule for avoiding the consequences of a second class 
of stock and it is reasonable to anticipate that the courts will be 
inclined far more favorably towards treating reclassified indebted-
ness as a second class of stock under the present statutory scheme 
than they were under prior law. Accordingly, a substantial premium 
has been placed upon compliance with the safe harbor rules that 
Congress has provided. 
At one stage in the one class of stock battle, the regulations 
69. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 8, SENATE REPORT, supra note 22, 
at 8. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
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provided that if a purported debt instrument was held in substan-
tially the same proportion as stockholdings, even if the debt instru-
ment was reclassified, it would not be regarded as a second class 
of stock.72 The safe harbor rule of section 1361(c)(5) has not incor-
porated this approach. If a class of indebtedness does not meet 
the safe harbor rule but, nevertheless, is held proport.ionately to 
shareholdings, the debt instrument apparently will be treated as 
stock and as a second class of stock if it is so classified under sec-
tion 385. 
The exclusion of convertible debt from the safe harbor rule 
apparently was copied from section 385. However, the exclusion 
also impedes evasion of the general inability of an S corporation 
to specially allocate items of income and expense. In the case of 
partnerships, it has long been common for the interest of various 
classes of partners to shift upon the occurrence of a specified event, 
such as obtaining a pre-specified level of profitability.73 This so called 
"flip-flop" permits allocation of all the losses of partnership to a 
specified class of investors until they have received a recovery 
of their investment whereupon the interests of other classes of 
partners, typically the promoters of the venture, automatically in-
crease. Such a shifting of participation percentages is not permissi-
ble in an S corporation; however, the result of such a flip-flop can 
be approximated through the use of convertible securities. The 
promoters could obtain convertible indebtedness which they would 
be obligated not to convert until a specified level of losses had 
passed through from the S corporation to the public investors. At 
that time, the promoters could convert their securities and obtain 
their desired degree of participation in further S corporation pro-
fits and losses. Under present law, that device can be used only 
if the indebtedness passes the general requirements of section 385. 
In enacting its safe harbor debt rule, Congress evidently concluded 
that it did not wish to expand the circumstances in which conver-
tibility could be used to achieve this objective. 
It is unclear to what extent the prohibition upon convertibility 
may be avoided through the use of warrants. Section 1361(c)(5)(b)(ii) 
specifies that there may be "no convertibility (directly or indirectly) 
into stock." The legislative history does not explain the significance 
of the reference to indirect convertibility. Under prior law, the 
Commissioner ruled that a Subchapter S corporation could issue 
warrants to acquire its stock without jeopardizing its Subchapter 
72. Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-l(g)(1960)(before amendment by T.D. 7747, 1981-1 
C.B. 141). 
73. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2) (Example (5)) (1964) and W. McKEE, W. 
NELSON AND R. WHITMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF P ARTNERSIDPS AND PARTNERS 
(1977) [hereinafter cited as MCKEE), , 10.02[1). 
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S election.74 Presumably, that rule will continue to be valid under 
present law.75 Accordingly, if a corporation wishes to avoid the 
restriction on convertibility, it might issue straight debt accom-
panied by a warrant and provide that the debt instrument will 
be accepted in payment of the exercise price under the warrant. 
It is not clear why such a device would be regarded as inconsis-
tent with Subchapter S status but the Commissioner might well 
attempt to bar the use of such an investment unit under the "in-
direct" language. 
Viewed as a safe harbor rule of the classification of in-
debtedness, the restrictions that are imposed by section 1361(c)(5) 
are not unreasonable. However, in commenting upon the proposals 
developed by the Joint Committee on Taxation that ultimately 
formed the basis for much of the Revision Act, the Treasury Depart-
ment opposed resolving the second class of stock dispute by over-
riding the general rules to be issued under section 385.76 The 
Treasury acknowledged the impropriety of producing a termina-
tion of a Subchapter S election because of a recharacterization of 
a purported debt instrument; however, it suggested that the dif-
ficulty stemmed, not from the impropriety of the reclassification, 
but rather from the limitation upon the issuance of a second class 
of stock. Furthermore, the Treasury recognized that the effect of 
case law decisions refusing to treat reclassified debt as a second 
class of stock had already created a de facto Subchapter S pre-
ferred stock. As a result, the Treasury Department suggested that 
Subchapter S corporations be permitted to issue a class of pre-
ferred stock that would have characteristics essentially identical 
to the definition of safe harbor straight debt that was ultimately 
enacted. 
The Treasury alternative, while not altering greatly the 
character of the securities that could be issued by an S corpora-
tion, had the distinct advantage of greater rationality because the 
alternative would not have required treating a purported debt in-
strument differently depending upon the identity of the issuer. 
That greater rationality would have translated into a greater 
coherence in the application of certain Code provisions. For exam-
ple, under the approach ultimately adopted by Congress, prior to 
making a Subchapter S election a corporation may have outstand-
ing a debt instrument that would be treated as stock under sec-
74. Rev. Rul. 67-269, 1967-2 C.B. 298. 
75. Both Committee Reports mention this Revenue Ruling in their state-
ment of prior law (SENATE REPORT, supra note 22 at 7; HOUSE REPORT, supra 
note 22 at 7), but make no reference to it in their discussion of I.R.C. §§ 1361(c)(4) 
and (5). 
76. STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 23. 
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tion 385. If that instrument complies with the safe harbor rules 
of section 1361, the election to be taxed under Subchapter S will 
cause the instrument to be treated as indebtedness for some, and 
perhaps all, purposes of the Code. The Subchapter S election, 
therefore, might be treated as an exchange of stock for debt and 
thus a taxable transaction. Congress appeared to recognize this 
possibility and in a somewhat confused statement in the Committee 
Reports77 appears to indicate that the making of a Subchapter S 
election should not produce a tax in this situation. On the other 
hand, the Report also suggests that distributions with respect to 
the instrument (which by hypothesis is treated as a debt instru-
ment for Subchapter S purposes) might be treated as dividend 
distributions to the extent of accumulated earnings and profits. 
If these suggestions from the Committee Reports are accepted, 
the result will fall just slightly short of chaos; the Treasury will 
determine on a section by section basis whether the instrument 
is stock or debt. All of that complexity would have bei:m avoided 
if S corporations had remained subject to the general rules of sec-
tion 385 and had been permitted to issue preferred stock rather 
than safe harbor "debt." 
Furthermore, the flexibility of an S corporation would have 
been substantially increased if such corporations had been granted 
the ability to issue a class of preferred stock. The primary finan-
cial difference between the safe harbor debt instrument that Con-
gress approved and the class of preferred stock suggested by the 
Treasury Department lies in the requirement that an annual return 
be paid on the security regardless of the profitability of the cor-
poration. A debt instrument imposes a fixed charge on corporate 
earnings that in some years may seriously impair the corporation's 
cash flow. Preferred stock, by contrast, is more flexible; dividends 
are payable only as declared by the board of directors and in 
general may not be declared if their payment would impair the 
corporation's solvency. In many closely held corporations, the flex-
ibility provided by preferred stock is highly desirable. Secondly, 
the ability to issue preferred stock greatly expands the ability of 
the present owners of an S corporation to transfer control of the 
corporation to succeeding generations of managers without incur-
ring undue tax consequences. Preferred stock has a distinct advant-
age over indebtedness because it may be exchanged for outstanding 
common stock without immediate tax consequences.78 As a result, 
the stockholder-managers of a corporation, by exchanging their 
common stock for preferred stock, can transfer both the residual 
equity in the corporation and control over the corporate affairs 
77. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22 at 8; SENATE REPORT, supra note 22 at 8. 
78. For example, in a recapitalization pursuant to I.R.C. § 368(a)(l)(E). 
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to the next generation of corporate managers without incurring 
a prohibitive income tax liability.79 
Apparently, the only justification for limiting the availability 
of Subchapter S to corporations having one class of stock is the 
desire to avoid the complexities of allocating corporate income to 
different classes of stock.80 As the Treasury recognized,81 however, 
those difficulties could have been overcome if Congress had desired 
to enhance the flexibility of S corporations by permitting the 
issuance of preferred stock. In this respect, therefore, the Revi-
sion Act is unduly restrictive. Congress would do well to recon-
sider the propriety of permitting an S corporation to issue a class 
of preferred stock. 
c. Other Issues 
Other than permitting a disparity in voting rights, the Revi-
sion Act does not change the prohibitions of prior law against the 
issuance of more than one class of stock in an S corporation. One 
of the more difficult problems posed under prior law was the effect 
of restrictions imposed administratively, pursuant to a state 
securities law, upon making distributions upon stock held by pro-
moters or other inside groups. Although in one case the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals held that such a restriction effectively created 
a second class of stock,82 substantial doubts exist with respect to 
the correctness of that decision. Under prior law, the regulations 
contemplated a possible dividend waiver by a shareholder and pro-
vided that the Commissioner could, in appropriate circumstances, 
reallocate the S corporation income to prevent the avoidance of 
tax through such a device.83 The regulation contains no suggestion 
that such a temporary waiver would constitute the creation of a 
second class of stock. By remaining silent, Congress has neither 
accepted nor rejected the decision of the Ninth Circuit and, thus, 
has left the development of a proper rule to further litigation. 
4. Ineligible Corporations 
The Revision Act introduces a new concept into the require-
ments for eligibility to elect under Subchapter S. New section 
1362(b)(2) lists five categories of corporations that are generically 
79. This technique is explained in greater detail in text accompanying notes 
149-52 infra. 
80. STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 10. 
81. STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 23-24. 
82. Paige v. United States, 580 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1978). See also Rev. Rul. 
71-522, 1971-2 C.B. 316. 
83. Treas. Reg. § 1.1375-3(d) (1960). 
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ineligible to make the election. Under prior law, an S corporation 
could not be a member of an affiliated group within the meaning 
of section 1504.84 Section 1361(b)(2)(A) continues this prohibition in 
a slightly expanded form. Under this section, membership in an 
affiliated group is to be determined without reference to the ex-
ceptions contained in section 1504(b). Accordingly, if a corporation 
directly or indirectly owns 80% or more of the stock of another 
corporation, the parent corporation will be barred from electing 
under Subchapter S regardless of whether the corporations actually 
are entitled to file ·consolidated returns. The remaining four 
categories of ineligible corporations described in section 1361(b)(2) 
consist of corporations that compute their income pursuant to 
unique rules and thus could not comply easily with the require-
ment that an S corporation compute its income as an individual. 
The four enumerated ineligible corporations are: banks and other 
financial institutions that use the reserve methods of accounting 
for loan losses provided by sections 585 or 593; insurance companies; 
possessions corporations that elect the section 936 credit; and 
DISCs or former DISCs. 
B. Election 
The Revision Act continues the requirements of prior law that 
a corporation affirmatively elect S corporation status,85 and that 
all persons who are shareholders on the date of the election con-
sent to the election for it to be valid.86 In general, the rules of 
prior law will continue to apply to these procedural requirements.87 
Additionally, shareholders holding nonvoting stock under the new 
provision authorizing issuance of such a security also must con-
sent to the election. On the other hand, persons holding safe harbor 
debt instruments presumably are not required to consent to the 
election even if the purported indebtedness would be reclassified 
as stock under the general rules of section 385 and, in fact, may 
have been so reclassified prior to the Subchapter S election. The 
Temporary Regulations to section 1362(a) have failed to deal with 
either of these questions, but the Temporary Regulations dealing 
with revocation of the election provide that holders of nonvoting 
stock must consent to a revocation.88 The election is valid for the 
year in which it is made and all subsequent years until it is 
terminated. 89 
84. Former I.R.C. § 1371(a). 
85. I.R.C. § 1362(a). 
86. I.R.C. § 1362(a)(2). 
87. See Temp. Reg.§§ 18.1362·1, -2, 48 Fed. Reg. 3591 (1983) (to be codified 
at 26 C.F.R. pt. 18). 
88. Temp. Reg. § 18.1362-3, 48 Fed. Reg. 3592 (1983) (to be codified at 26 
C.F.R. pt. 18). 
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The new law slightly alters the time in which the election must 
be made. Under prior law, the election had to be made during the 
taxable year preceding the year for which it was to be effective 
or within the first seventy-five days of the taxable year for which 
it was to be effective.90 The Revision Act replaces the seventy-
five-day rule with the requirement that the election be made on 
or before the fifteenth day of the third month of the year for which 
it is to be effective,91 the date upon which corporate income tax 
returns are due. 
Under prior law, there was some ambiguity concerning the ex-
tent to which a corporation and its shareholders must meet the 
eligibility requirements for making a Subchapter S election dur-
ing that portion of the year for which the election was first effec-
tive, but prior to the time upon which the election was filed.92 Sec-
tion 1362(b)(2)(B) eliminates these ambiguities by imposing the more 
stringent interpretation. The corporation must meet all of the 
eligibility requirements of section 1361(b) on each day of the tax-
able year for which the election is effective, including days prior 
to the filing of the election. In addition, the new provision 
specifically requires that all persons who own stock in the cor-
poration during the taxable year for which the election is to be 
effective consent to the election even though they had completely 
disposed of their interest in the corporation prior to the filing of 
the election. 
The requirement that shareholders who have disposed of their 
stock prior to the making of the Subchapter S election must con-
sent to that election is somewhat harsh. Contrary to prior law, 
Subchapter S income is now allocated to all shareholders on a daily 
basis. Under present law, making the Subchapter S election will 
allocate some portion of the S corporation income to the withdraw-
ing shareholder who must include that income in his individual 
return. Making the election, therefore, subjects the shareholder 
to a tax that would not have been imposed upon him in the absence 
of the election. Since that shareholder will be affected directly by 
the making of the Subchapter S election, it is not unreasonable 
to require him to consent to that election. The difficulty with the 
provision is that it permits an individual who no longer has an 
economic stake in the corporation to control for an entire year 
the ability of individuals who continue as shareholders of the cor-
90. Former I.R.C. § 1372(c)(l). 
91. I.R.C. § 1362(b)(l). 
92. Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-l(a) (1960) indicated that the eligibility requirements 
did not have to be met until the election was filed although there was no statutory 
basis for that position. 
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poration to obtain the benefits of a Subchapter S election. The 
Congressional solicitude for the withdrawing shareholder, thus, may 
have a substantially adverse impact upon the far larger number 
of continuing shareholders. Furthermore, the Congressional in-
<Sistence upon unanimous consent for the making of a Subchapter 
S election is inconsistent with the present ability of a mere majority 
of the shareholders of an S corporation to revoke the election.93 
The revocation of an election has an immediate financial impact 
upon the shareholders of the corporation that may be as signifi-
cant as the making of the election. If it is reasonable to subject 
the minority shareholders in a corporation to an undesired revoca-
tion of the election, it would seem equally reasonable to subject 
a shareholder who withdraws during the first two and a half months 
of the corporation's taxable year to the consequences of the mak-
ing of an election.94 Indeed, it seems odd to treat a single withdraw-
ing shareholder more favorably than the holders of 49% of the 
corporation's stock. 
As under prior law,95 if a corporation attempts to elect under 
Subchapter S for a taxable year but the election is not effective 
for that year, the election nevertheless will be effective for the 
following and all succeeding taxable years.96 Thus, if the election 
is filed following the two and a half month grace period or is filed 
during the grace period but the corporation fails to meet the 
requirements of section 1362(b)(2) for the pre-election period, the 
election will be treated as effective for the following year. The 
Regulations, under prior law, qualified this provision with the 
requirement that the corporation must have been eligible to make 
an effective election both on the date the election was filed and 
on the first day of the taxable year for which it was to be effective.97 
Thus, temporary ineligibility during the year of election but subse-
quent to the election date did not render the election ineffective 
as long as the corporation resumed eligibility by the first day of 
the year for which the election was to be effective. The Temporary 
Regulations under section 1362 continue this rule.98 
93. I.R.C. § 1362(d)(1), discussed in text accompanying notes 103-07 infra. 
94. The allocation of income to such a shareholder would result in an 
increase in the basis for his stock, thus reducing any gain on the disposition of 
the stock. The allocation of income, therefore, would result only in the possible 
conversion of some capital gain to ordinary income. In the alternative, Congress 
could bar the allocation of any income to a shareholder who withdrew prior to 
the filing of an election. 
95. Former I.R.C. § 1372(c)(2). 
96. I.R.C. § 1362(b)(2). 
97. Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-l(a) (1960). 
98. Temp. Reg. § 18.1362-l(b), 48 Fed. Reg. 3591 (1983) (to be codified at 
26 C.F.R. pt. 18). 
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An election made under prior law remains in effect and is 
treated as an election made under section 1362(a);99 it is not 
necessary for the corporation to file a new election. Under prior 
law, the invalidity of an election attributable to the failure to file 
timely consents could be avoided if the corporation obtained an 
extension of time for the filing of a shareholder's consent.100 The 
Temporary Regulations have continued that practice.101 In appeal-
ing cases, courts occasionally granted extensions years following 
the date upon which the consent should have been filed. 102 
C. Termination 
With the Revision Act, Congress has improved greatly the pro-
visions of Subchapter S governing both deliberate and inadvertent 
terminations of the election, and the consequences of those 
terminations. 
1. Revocation 
Under prior law, a Subchapter S election could be revoked 
voluntarily only with the unanimous consent of the corporate 
shareholders.103 On the contrary, and somewhat inconsistently, a 
new shareholder of the corporation could affirmatively refuse within 
a sixty-day period of time to consent to the Subchapter S election.104 
Thus, a single continuing shareholder could force the corporation 
to continue as a Subchapter S corporation while a single new 
shareholder could cause the election to terminate. Under the Revi-
sion Act both of these features of prior law now have been 
eliminated. Section 1362(d)(l) now provides that a Subchapter S 
election may be revoked only if shareholders owning more than 
one-half of the number of shares of stock in the corporation con-
sent to the revocation. With respect to the making of an election, 
the statute apparently contemplates that the vote be computed 
with reference to the number of shares outstanding, not to the 
voting power of those shares, and the Temporary Regulations so 
provide.105 Thus it appears possible that a valid consent to a revoca-
tion can be made by shareholders who possess less than a majority 
99. I.R.C. § 1379(a). 
100. Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-3(c) (1964). 
101. Temp. Reg. § 18.1362-2(c), 48 Fed. Reg. 3591 (1983) (to be codified at 
26 C.F.R. pt. 18). 
102. Hicks Nurseries, Inc. v. Comm'r, 62 T.C. 138 (1974), rev'd, 517 F.2d 
437 (2d Cir. 1975)(consent of new shareholder). 
103. Former I.R.C. § 1372(e)(2). 
104. Former I.R.C. § 1372(e)(1). 
105. Temp. Reg. § 18.1362-3, 48 Fed. Reg. 3592 (1983) (to be codified at 26 
C.F.R. pt. 18). 
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of the voting power of all outstanding stock, a questionable result. 
Revocation itself, however, is a corporate act that generally re-
quires shareholder approval and the approval, of course, must be 
obtained from shareholders possessing a majority of the voting 
power of the corporation's stock. In practice, therefore, revoca-
tion will require the effective consent of both the holders of a major-
ity of the voting power in the corporation and the holders of a 
majority of the number of shares of stock in the corporation. 
These new "corporate democracy" features of Subchapter S 
represent substantial improvements; the elimination of the ability 
of the new shareholder to cause a termination of the election is 
particularly worthy of note. When Subchapter S was first enacted 
in 1958, the prevalent belief was that a new shareholder should 
not be forced to accept the unusual method of income taxation pro-
vided by Subchapter S as part of the price of an interest in the 
business venture. The original statute provided that the election 
terminated unless the shareholder timely filed a consent to the 
election.106 By 1976, Congress recognized that the original provi-
sion resulted in many inadvertent terminations and changed the 
law to provide that the election would continue in effect unless 
the new shareholder filed a refusal to consent.107 The 1976 provi-
sion, however, has been criticized because it allows a new 
shareholder to extort additional consideration from the continu-
ing shareholders as the price for not filing a refusal. Under the 
Revision Act, new shareholders must take the corporation "as they 
find it" with respect to its tax status. 
Unfortunately, Congress was not consistent in its attempt to 
prevent a single shareholder from preventing and causing the termi-
nation of a Subchapter S election. As noted above, the requirement 
of unanimous consent for the making of an election has not only 
been continued but has been expanded by the requirement that 
a shareholder who withdraws from the corporation prior to the 
filing of the election must also consent.108 In addition, the initial 
income beneficiary of a trust that is eligible to become a Qualified 
Subchapter S Trust is required to elect that treatment,109 and each 
successive income beneficiary may affirmatively refuse to consent 
to continuation of Qualified Subchapter S Trust treatment.110 
106. Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 64, 72 Stat. 
1606, 1650 (enacting former I.R.C. § 1372(e)(1)). 
107. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 902(c), 90 Stat. 1520, 
1608-09 (1976) (amending former I.R.C. § 1372(e)(1)). 
108. See text accompanying notes 85-94 supra. 
109. I.R.C. § 1361(d)(2). 
110. I.R.C. § 1361(d)(2)(B)(ii). An interesting question arises as to when the 
successor beneficiary's refusal to consent will be considered timely. The statute 
can be read as allowing the successor beneficiary to refuse to consent at any 
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Withdrawing an election, of course, renders the trust an ineligible 
shareholder of the S corporation, thereby terminating the Sub-
chapter S election. The provision dealing with the initial election 
to qualify as a Qualified Subchapter S Trust was originally enacted111 
when each new shareholder had the power to terminate the cor-
poration's Subchapter S election by filing a refusal to consent, and 
has been reenacted, unchanged, in the Revision Act. The require-
ment that a successor beneficiary make an affirmative election 
merely has been transformed from a requirement that the successor 
beneficiary elect anew to have the trust treated as a Qualified Sub-
chapter S Trust112 into an automatic continuation of the election 
unless the new income beneficiary affirmatively refuses to con-
sent to the election. Thus, the new rule governing initial income 
beneficiaries corresponds to the rule dealing with new shareholders 
prior to 1976, while the rule governing successor beneficiaries is 
identical to the rule governing new shareholders immediately prior 
to the Revision Act. 
It is not clear whether the retention of this more favorable 
treatment of an income beneficiary was inadvertent. Perhaps Con-
gress deliberately concluded that income beneficiaries of a trust 
should not be forced to accept the consequences of an election to · 
treat the trust as a Qualified Subchapter S Trust, namely, the direct 
inclusion of an allocable portion of the S corporation income and 
expense in the beneficiary's income tax return.113 There is, of course, 
a basis for distinguishing such a beneficiary from a new shareholder 
who purchased the stock in the S corporation; a new shareholder 
presumably could have declined to purchase the stock while an 
income beneficiary is not provided that choice. In almost every 
instance, such concern for the plight of an income beneficiary is 
time; however, that would seem to be inconsistent with the provision that the 
election, once made, is irrevocable. I.R.C. § 1361(d)(2)(C). Presumably, the Regula-
tions will provide a grace period following the initial income beneficiary's death 
before the election will become. irrevocable with respect to the successor 
beneficiary. 
Congress may have intended to supply some guidance on this matter by noting 
that the 60-day grace period applicable to grantor trusts following the death of 
the grantor would be applicable to a Qualified Subchapter S Trust that becomes 
disqualified by reason of the death of the income beneficiary. SENATE REPORT, 
supra note 22 at 9. While, as was stated above in note 46, the exact scope of 
this comment is unclear, a 60-day grace period in this context would correspond 
to that granted to new shareholders under former I.R.C. § 1372(e)(l) and to that 
which apparently was intended to apply to a successor beneficiary's election under 
former I.R.C. § 1371(g)(2). See S. REP. No. 144, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. at 91. 
111. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981. Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 234(b), 95 
Stat. 172, 251 (enacting former I.R.C. § 1371(g)(2)). 
112. Former I.R.C. § 1371(g)(2)(B)(ii). 
113. See text accompanying note 39 supra. 
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misplaced. Such trusts are family planning devices which serve 
as an alternative to a direct gift of the S corporation stock be-
tween family members. In the case of an outright gift, the donee 
is required to include Subchapter S income and loss in his individual 
return. The same fate should befall an income beneficiary. The 
general effect of this provision simply is to give an unwarranted 
leverage to a disgruntled family member. Furthermore, as to the 
initial income beneficiary, the transferor-shareholder who is ad-
vised properly will make his transfer conditional upon the timely 
filing of the appropriate election by the income beneficiary. Thus, 
the requirement that the initial beneficiary make an election will 
become another "trap for the unwary" of just the type that the 
Revision Act was designed to eliminate. Clearly, it would be prefer-
able to require successor beneficiaries to take the trust and the 
corporation as they find them as must other transferees. In addition, 
the grantor of a trust, as well as the initial income beneficiary, should 
be entitled to make the initial election. Indeed, if the trust meets 
the definition of a Qualified Subchapter S Trust, the election should 
be deemed made unless the income beneficiary affirmatively 
objects. 
In a further liberalization of prior law, section 1362(dXl)(C) pro-
vides that a revocation for a taxable year will be effective if filed 
within the first two and a half months of that taxable year. 
2. Passive Investment Income 
Under prior law, a Subchapter S election was terminated for 
any year in which more than 20% of the corporation's gross receipts 
consisted of passive investment income.114 For S corporations that 
do not have any accumulated earnings and profits attributable to 
years in which a Subchapter S election was not in effect under 
either present or prior law, this restriction on S corporations has 
been eliminated entirely. 115 As a result, corporations that have been 
S corporations under either present or prior law since their incor-
poration are free to derive any proportion of their income from 
passive sources without penalty. On the other hand, the Revision 
Act has liberalized only slightly the passive income rule for those 
S corporations that do have earnings and profits accumulated dur-
ing nonelection years. 
Although in the early stages of the drafting of the Revision 
Act Congress contemplated that the elimination of the restriction 
on passive investment income would be applicable to all corpora-
tions, it became concerned that such a degree of liberalization would 
114. Former I.R.C. § 1372(e)(5). 
115. See I.R.C. § 1362(d)(3). 
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open substantial avenues of tax avoidance.116 One of the concerns 
that surfaced was the potential for deferring, and quite possibly 
avoiding, gain on the complete disposition of the business activities 
of a corporation subject to the regular income tax.117 Under prior 
law, a corporation planning to dispose of its entire business was 
faced with two basic choices. It could sell those assets and liquidate 
in which event the sale at the corporate level would be sheltered 
from tax under section 337, but the shareholders would be subject 
to tax on the entire amount of the appreciation in their stock. Alter-
natively, the corporation, by disposing of the assets and retaining 
the proceeds at the corporate level, could become a private invest-
ment company. Under the second alternative, a tax would be in-
curred at the corporate level but no tax would be imposed upon 
the shareholders. If the corporation had been owned by the same 
shareholders for a substantial period of time and had reinvested 
a substantial amount of its earnings, a not unlikely scenario, the 
gain at the corporate level would be substantially less than the 
gain that would be subject to tax at the shareholder level upon 
a liquidation. However, if the corporation chose to remain in ex-
istence and it was relatively closely held, the corporation would 
become a personal holding company. In order to avoid the punitive 
tax on undistributed personal holding company income, 118 the cor-
poration would be required to distribute the entire amount of its 
ordinary income. Since the overall rate of tax imposed upon per-
sonal holding companies and their shareholders typically exceeds 
the tax that would be imposed upon the same amount of income 
derived by the shareholders in their individual capacity, the tax 
advantage of keeping the corporation in existence often would be 
eliminated quickly. Consequently, most corporations, when dis-
posing of their businesses, chose to eliminate tax at the corporate 
level by liquidating. If those corporations were given a third option, 
of remaining in existence and electing to be taxed pursuant to Sub-
chapter S, the balance would shift radically. The overall rate of 
tax that would be imposed upon the continuing incorporated ven-
ture would be the same as the tax that would be imposed on the 
shareholders had the corporation distributed the proceeds of sale 
and liquidated. By remaining in existence, the corporation could 
defer indefinitely the tax on the appreciation in the shareholder's 
stock. If the shareholder died without disposing of the stock, tax 
on the appreciation would be forgiven permanently.119 Obviously, 
116. STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 11. 
117. Lang, Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982: Dealing with Transition Rules, 
60 TAXES 928, 930 (1982). 
118. See I.R.C. §§ 541-47. 
119. I.R.C. § 1014. 
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this tax avoidance should not be permitted. This problem is just 
one aspect of a fundamental question of our system of taxation, 
namely, what should constitute the taxable event with respect to 
appreciation in corporate stock. Under an ideal income tax the 
shareholders' gain would be subject to tax, preferably upon the 
sale of the business assets regardless of a liquidation or, at least, 
upon the death of the shareholder. In the context of the Revision 
Act, however, Congress sought to address the more limited goal 
of preventing this tax avoidance through the use of Subchapter S. 
One obvious remedy would be to bar a corporation that was 
subject to the regular corporate income tax from electing under 
Subchapter S if that corporation had both a substantial amount 
of investment assets and earnings and profits. That prohibition 
would be tailored relatively well to the tax avoidance potential 
of the transaction. A corporation subject to the regular income 
tax that has a substantial investment portfolio would either have 
avoided the accumulated earnings tax120 for a substantial period 
of time or acquired that investment portfolio immediately before 
the Subchapter S election, presumably through a disposition of 
a substantial amount of its business assets. The Revision Act ef-
fectively adopts that prohibition but adds a grace period for 
eliminating the accumulated earnings and profits. Under section 
1362(d)(3), an S corporation election will be terminated if, in each 
of three consecutive years, a corporation has both earnings and 
profits accumulated during nonelection years and passive invest-
ment income in excess of 25% of the corporation's gross receipts. 
In effect, a corporation deriving the prescribed level of passive 
investment income has three full years of S corporation existence 
in which to distribute the entire amount of its earnings and pro-
fits accumulated prior to the making of the Subchapter Selection. 
If those earnings and profits have not been distributed by the con-
clusion of the three-year period, the S election terminates and the 
corporation becomes subject to the regular corporate income tax 
as of the first day of the following year .121 
120. See I.R.C. §§ 531-37. 
121. I.R.C. § 1362(d)(3)(ii). TCB § 201(h) would permit an S corporation to 
elect to have prior law governing termination for exceeding the passive invest-
ment income limitations apply for taxable years beginning in 1982. Under§ 6(b)(3) 
of the Revision Act, the new passive investment income provisions are effective 
for such taxable years. The effect of § 201(h) will be to permit the corporation 
to elect to lose its status as an S corporation under the stricter passive invest-
ment income termination provisions of former I.R.C. § 1372(eK5), but to avoid the 
new tax under I.R.C. § 1375. However, TCB § 201(h) also provides that the "fresh 
start" rule of § 6(e) of the Revision Act would not apply to the resulting termina-
tion. See note 147 infra. Thus, the corporation could not reelect to be taxed under 
Subchapter S for five years unless it obtained permission of the Commissioner 
pursuant to I.R.C. § 1362(g). 
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Unfortunately, few corporations will be able to take full ad-
vantage of this three-year grace period because of the imposition 
of a new tax on passive investment income added by the Revision 
Act. Under section 1375, an S corporation that fails this passive 
income test for a single year is subject to tax on the amount by 
which its net passive investment income exceeds 25% of its gross 
receipts.122 The tax is imposed at the highest corporate rate, cur-
rently 46%, and is imposed upon the entire amount of the net 
passive investment income in excess of 25% of gross receipts. Thus, 
the amount subject to tax may not be reduced by the dividends 
received deduction normally available to corporations. The 
shareholders of the S corporation also will be subject to tax with 
respect to this income, although the amount taxable to them is 
reduced by the amount of the section 1375 tax imposed at the cor-
porate level.123 Thus, the section 1375 tax effectively imposes double 
taxation on the entire amount of passive income in excess of the 
25% floor. Accordingly, if the corporation has disposed of substan-
tially all of its active business assets and, thus, substantially all 
of its income is derived from passive investment sources, the com-
bined taxes imposed upon this income will be prohibitive. As a 
practical matter, therefore, corporations disposing of substantial-
ly all of their business assets will be forced to liquidate as under 
prior law and will be unable to defer tax on their shareholders 
by electing Subchapter S status. 
As a technique for preventing the deferral and possible elimina-
tion of tax on a disposition of a business activity, terminating the 
Subchapter Selection following a reasonable grace period appears 
to be an appropriate remedy. On the other hand, the imposition 
of a second level tax during this grace period at an effective rate 
substantially higher than would be paid by either a regular business 
corporation or a corporation subject to the personal holding com-
pany tax constitutes legislative overkill. Terminating the Sub-
chapterS election will force the managers of corporations proposing 
to dispose of their business assets to face the same choice presented 
under prior law of either subjecting their shareholders to an im-
mediate tax or operating as a personal holding company. The tax 
imposed by section 1375, however, bears no relationship to either 
the tax avoided by the shareholders or the tax avoided by failing 
to come within the provisions of the personal holding company tax. 
122. The amount subject to tax is defined by I.R.C. § 1375(b)(1)(A) as the 
amount that bears the same ratio to net passive income as passive income in 
excess of 25% of gross receipts bears to passive income. 
123. I.R.C. § 1366(f)(3). In addition, if passive income includes capital gains 
"taken into account" under the I.R.C. § 1374 tax on capital gains, the amount 
of the gain subject to the§ 1374 tax is reduced by the amount of the gain taxable 
under I.R.C. § 1375. I.R.C. § 1375(c)(2). 
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One possible, but not terribly persuasive, justification for the 
section 1375 tax is the relatively liberal definition of the section 
1362 grace period. Before a termination occurs, an S corporation 
having earnings and profits accumulated during nonelection years 
must derive passive investment income in excess of the 25% floor 
in each of three consecutive taxable years. Accordingly, corpora-
tions able to pass that test in one out of every three years will 
be able to prevent indefinitely the termination of the Subchapter 
S election. 
On the other hand, passing the test by reducing the percen-
tage of gross receipts that consist of passive investment income 
will be far more difficult under present law. As under prior law, 
the test is applied to gross receipts and not to gross income. Under 
prior law, taxpayers could prevent terminations of a Subchapter 
S election by churning temporary investments in capital assets. 
Under new section 1362(d)(3)(C), gross receipts from the disposi-
tion of capital assets other than stock and securities are taken into 
account only to the extent that the gains from such sales exceed 
the losses. Thus, the mere buying and selling of property will not 
enlarge the amount of gross receipts attributable to sources other 
than passive investment income. The Revision Act has not altered 
the rule of prior law that, for the purpose of computing passive 
investment income attributable to the sale or exchange of stock 
and securities, gross receipts from such sales include the gain from 
such sales (gross receipts less basis) and are not reduced by losses 
from the sale of securities.124 
Both the taxing and termination provisions appear overbroad. 
Each of them is applicable without regard to the amount of ac-
cumulated earnings and profits or the period of time that has passed 
since those earnings and profits were accumulated. Presumably, 
Congress expected corporations having relatively small amounts 
of accumulated earnings and profits to elect to avoid the tax and 
termination penalties by distributing those earnings and profits 
to their shareholders even though that distribution would 
precipitate immediate ordinary income tax. Practitioners, however, 
are painfully aware of the difficulty of computing accurately an 
earnings and profits account, particularly when that account has 
been accumulated over many changes in the provisions of the Code. 
As discussed below in greater detail, 125 it is highly regrettable that 
Congress did not provide some relief for an inadvertent failure 
to distribute the entire amount of an earnings and profits account. 
These penalty provisions would be applicable even if the earn-
ings and profits of the corporation were accumulated gradually 
124. I.R.C. § 1362(d)(3)(D)(i). 
125. See text accompanying note 401 infra. 
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through normal business operations, rather than through the 
disposition of a business activity, and even though a Subchapter 
S election had been in effect for many years before the corpora-
tion accumulated sufficient investment assets to exceed the 25% 
ceiling. Such a corporation would bear no resemblance to the evil 
that the tax and termination provisions were designed to address. 
For a corporation that has been actively engaged in business under 
a Subchapter S election for 15 years and has accumulated an in-
vestment portfolio only since the enactment of the Revision Act 
to become subject to the tax and termination provisions simply 
is wrong. Indeed, the overbreadth of sections 1362(d)(3) and 1375 
appears particularly irrational in light of the fact that an entity 
incorporating and electing to be taxed under Subchapter S after 
December 31, 1982 may derive 100% of its income from passive 
investment sources from its inception and neither jeopardize its 
election nor become subject to the tax. 
It is regrettable that a more tailored solution to the evil ad-
dressed by sections 1362(d)(3) and 1375 was not devised. In order 
to prevent the inappropriate application of the tax and termina-
tion provisions, Congress should, at a minimum, amend those pro-
visions to permit an S corporation to outlive their potential appli-
cation. Thus, neither the tax nor termination provision should be 
applicable if the corporation has been subject to a Subchapter S 
election for over 5 years and has not had passive investment in-
come in excess of 25% of its gross receipts in any of the 5 preceding 
years. 126 
One felicitous aspect of the Revision Act is that the definition 
of passive investment income has been modified favorably in minor 
respects. Section 1362(d)(3)(D) exempts interest on obligations at-
tributable to the sale by the corporation of inventory or other 
property held for sale to customers in the ordinary course of 
business from the definition of passive investment income. It also 
exempts gross receipts of an active lending or finance business 
within the meaning of sections 542(c)(6) and 542(d)(1) from the 
definition. 
3. Other Terminations 
As under prior law,127 the Subchapter S election automatically 
terminates if the corporation ceases to meet the eligibility re-
126. The power of the Commissioner to waive inadvertent terminations pro-
vides some, but inadequate, relief from the termination provisions but no relief 
at all from the tax. See I.R.C. § 1362(f). 
127. Former I.R.C. § 1372(e)(3). 
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quirements for electing to be taxed pursuant to Subchapter S as 
set forth in section 1361(b).128 On the other hand, the Revision Act 
has eliminated the prior law provision'29 requiring a termination 
of the election if the corporation derived more than 80% of its 
income from foreign sources. 
4. Effective Date of Termination 
Under prior law, terminations of a Subchapter S-election were 
applicable to entire taxable years. A revocation, unless made dur-
ing the first month of the taxable year, was effective only for the 
succeeding taxable year.130 Terminations attributable to such events 
as ceasing to meet the eligibility criteria for making a Subchapter 
S election131 or the affirmative refusal by a new shareholder to 
consent to the election132 produced a retroactive termination of the 
election beginning on the first day of the year in which the event 
occurred. This effective date pattern was entirely unsatisfactory 
in many respects. Notwithstanding the restrictions on voluntary 
revocations, a corporation always could secure retroactive termina-
tion by engineering an event that would produce a retroactive 
termination. Moreover, when the termination was inadvertent, the 
retroactive termination barred the shareholders from harvesting 
the benefits of a Subchapter S election and produced an enormously 
harsh result compared to the generally insignificant event that 
produced the technical loss of Subchapter S status. 
The Revision Act changed these rules radically and quite 
favorably. Section 1362(d)(l)(D) permits S corporations to revoke 
their election as of any day specified in the revocation, even if 
that day does not constitute the end of the corporation's taxable 
year. Similarly, if the termination is attributable to the corpora-
tion's failure to comply with the requirements for eligibility to make 
a Subchapter S election, the termination is effective on the day 
upon which the corporation ceases to constitute a "small business 
corporation" as defined in section 1361(d).133 Finally, if the termina-
tion is attributable to the presence of passive investment income, 
the termination no longer is retroactive but rather commences on 
the first day of the taxable year after the third consecutive tax-
able year taken into account in determining that the passive invest-
ment income tolerances have ·been exceeded.134 
128. I.R.C. § 1362(d)(2). 
129. Former I.R.C. § 1372(e)(4). 
130. Former I.R.C. § 1372(e)(2). 
131. Former I.R.C. § 1372(e)(3). 
132. Former I.R.C. § 1372(e)(l)(C). 
133. I.R.C. § 1362(d)(2)(B). 
134. I.R.C. § 1362(d)(3)(A)(ii). 
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Specifying that the effective date of a termination of a Sub-
chapter S election shall be the date upon which the terminating 
event occurs is obviously a substantial improvement over prior 
law. As a result, the consequences of the termination under the 
Revision Act are tailored far better to the underlying financial 
reality than either the prospective or retroactive rules applied 
under prior law. This advance, however, is necessarily achieved 
at the cost of materially increasing the complexity of accounting 
for a mid-year termination. Under section 1362(e)(1), a mid-year ter-
mination produces two short taxable years: the "S year," subject 
to the Subchapter S election, and the "C year," not subject to the 
election. For the purpose of allocating the income and loss of the 
corporation for its year of termination between these two short 
taxable years, section 1362(e) provides two alternative procedures, 
a general rule and an elective alternative. 
Under the general rule, each item of income and expense of 
the corporation .incurred during the year of termination is prorated 
between the two short taxable years on a daily basis. The amounts 
allocated to the earlier short year then will be allocated to the 
S corporation shareholders under the usual rule applicable to the 
allocation of the income of an S corporation. The amounts allocated 
to the post-termination short year will be subject to tax in accord-
ance with the rules applicable to the taxation of corporations subject 
to the regular corporate income tax. As a result, at least in theory, 
the corporation is not required to close its books by virtue of a 
mid-year termination of a Subchapter S election. 
The operation of this pro rata allocation can be illustrated by 
an example in which it is assumed that an S corporation, which 
reported its income on a calendar year cash basis, revoked its elec-
tion effective September 15th. The corporation would continue to 
record receipts and disbursements without closing its books until 
the end of the S corporation's taxable year on December 31st. Items 
of income, deduction, loss and credit that are required to be 
separately stated, and nonseparately stated income, then would 
be computed under section 1366 for the entire year as though the 
corporation had been an S corporation for the full year. Of each 
such item, 257-365 would be allocated to the short Subchapter S 
year and taxed to the shareholders as in prior years. The remain-
ing 108/365 of each item would be allocated to the second short 
year and taxed to the corporation under the rules generally ap-
plicable to corporations. 
If all persons who owned stock in a corporation at any time 
during the year in which the termination occurs consent, income 
for the two short taxable years may be computed on the basis 
of the actual income for the respective periods according to the 
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corporation's books. 135 That is, the corporation may elect to close 
its books on the date that a termination occurs and compute its 
income for the two short years in accordance with the normal ac-
counting rules under the Code. 
It is not entirely clear why Congress selected the pro rata alloca-
tion as the general rule applicable when shareholders cannot agree 
upon the alternative rule. Perhaps Congress anticipated that the 
pro rata rule would be selected most often because it is simpler. 
Indeed, because it eliminates the administrative burden of com-
puting taxable income twice in a single year, the pro rata alloca-
tion provided by the general rule will be the cheaper and simpler 
procedure in nearly every instance. 
On the other hand, in these days of high tax consciousness, 
most corporations can be expected to make trial computations of 
the relative tax consequences of proceeding under both the general 
rule and the elective alternative. Indeed, corporate managers prob-
ably have a fiduciary responsibility to their shareholders to ex-
plain the varying consequences before asking them to elect or fail 
to elect the alternative procedure. Thus, the simplicity of the pro 
rata rule is largely illusory. Moreover, in most cases, rather than 
choose the general rule, corporations will choose the elective 
method of reporting income on the basis of separate accounting 
periods for the two short taxable years. 
Many terminations of Subchapter S elections are not inad-
vertent but rather are precipitated because the shareholders have 
determined that the income tax consequences of operating under 
the Subchapter S election no longer are desirable. When the deci-
sion is reached, the shareholders will normally wish to become sub-
ject to the regular income tax as quickly as possible. For example, 
one of the reasons for making a Subchapter S election for a new 
business venture is to allow the shareholders the direct benefit 
of the tax losses anticipated during the early years of the business 
while operating the business in corporate form for non-tax reasons. 
When the business begins to produce taxable income that will not 
be distributed, the shareholders may wish to terminate the elec-
tion in order to benefit from the lower rate of progressivity of 
the corporate income tax. If this turn-around in the business's tax-
able income can be identified as it occurs, the corporation can file 
a prospective revocation of the election under section 1363(d)(l) 
as of a date just prior to the anticipated receipt of income. In order 
to maximize the tax benefit of the termination, the shareholders 
will wish to compute the income separately for each of the two 
short taxable years thereby produced, claim the losses incurred 
135. I.R.C. § 1362(e)(3). 
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in the early portion of the year under the usual Subchapter S rule 
and cause the income received later in the year to be taxed to 
the corporation. Therefore, they will choose the elective computa-
tion rather than the general rule. 
That more corporations likely will choose the method that re-
quires an affirmative election rather than the one that is 
automatically applicable ordinarily would not be cause for severe 
criticism. The terminations in which the elective computation is 
likely to be chosen are themselves elective and relate directly to 
the income tax consequences of the Subchapter Selection, therefore, 
shareholders should be able to take action simultaneously to ter-
minate the election and elect to have ordinary accounting prin-
ciples govern the tax consequences of the termination. However, 
there is a distinct incongruity between the two election procedures. 
Unanimous agreement is required to elect the alternative separate 
accounting rule while the Subchapter S election itself may be ter-
minated by majority vote. In almost every situation the decision 
to revoke the election will be the more important and will have 
the more significant financial impact upon the shareholders. If a 
majority rule is regarded as the most equitable to all concerned 
in that context, it is extremely difficult to understand why Con-
gress did not adopt the same rule for determining how the cor-
poration should compute its income for the year of termination. 
Indeed, this disparity in consent procedures may create a serious 
trap for the majority shareholders and reintroduce the very prob-
lem that permitting revocation by majority vote was designed to 
eliminate. While the majority indeed may be able to revoke the 
Subchapter S election, they will not be able to maximize the tax 
benefits of the termination without the consent of all other 
shareholders. Potentially, therefore, a single shareholder having 
little economic stake in the corporation may, for whatever reason, 
obstruct the most favorable method of reporting income by the 
remaining shareholders. The requirement of unanimity is particular-
ly oppressive in view of the requirement that all shareholders who 
have disposed of their stock during the year or have acquired stock 
during the year of termination must also concur in the decision 
to adopt the alternative method of accounting for income.136 1f either 
of the two accounting rules is to be applied in the absence of 
unanimity among the shareholders, it would seem most appropriate 
to apply the rule requiring the actual computation of income for 
the two separate periods rather than a rule that somewhat arbitrari-
ly prorates income over the period. 
Since section 1362(d)(l)(D) permits the filing of a voluntary 
revocation specifying any future date upon which the revocation 
136. I.R.C. § 1362(e)(3)(B). 
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is to be effective, the question necessarily arises whether such a 
revocation itself might be rescinded. There is no apparent reason 
why such a prospective revocation cannot be rescinded prior to 
its effective date; yet, because the revocation need be accompanied 
only by the consents of a majority of the shareholders, it is unclear 
which shareholders must consent to such a rescission, if it is per-
mitted. Would it be sufficient for only a majority of the stockholders 
to consent to the rescission, and, if so, must they be the same 
stockholders who originally consented to the revocation? In order 
to avoid these questions, and because a rescission of a revocation 
more nearly resembles an election to be taxed under Subchapter 
S than a revocation of the election, the Treasury Department would 
be justified in requiring that any such rescission be accompanied 
by the consents of all of those who are stockholders on the date 
on which the rescission is filed. 137 
5. Inadvertent Terminations 
One of the most interesting additions to Subchapter S 
introduced by the Revision Act is the express grant of authority 
to the Commissioner by section 1362(f) to disregard an inadvertent 
termination of a Subchapter S election. Under prior law, inadver-
tent terminations occurred with horrifying regularity and because 
the terminating event frequently was not discovered, or at least 
not conceded, until years following its occurrence, the consequences 
of such terminations were extraordinarily harsh to the relatively 
unsophisticated shareholders who had sought the advantages of 
taxation pursuant to Subchapter S. Many of the provisions of the 
Revision Act are designed to prevent either an inadvertent ter-
mination or the excessively harsh consequences that flowed from 
such a termination under prior law. The requirements for electing 
to be taxed pursuant to Subchapter S remain relatively strict, 
however, and the possibility of an inadvertent termination con-
tinues. Thus, this new provision constitutes a form of catch-all relief 
for the shareholders of S corporations. 
Under section 1362(f), relief may be granted if the termination 
occurs either because the corporation ceases to qualify as a "small 
business corporation" or because the corporation fails the three 
year passive investment income test. The subsection contains three 
prerequisites to the granting of relief: 
(1) the Commissioner must determine that the termination was 
inadvertent; 
(2) steps must be taken within a "reasonable period" after 
137. Contra, Shaw & August, An Analysis of the Subchapter S Revision Act: 
Eligibility, Election, Termination, 58 J. TAX. 2, 7 (1983). 
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discovery of the event resulting in termination to make the cor-
poration a small businss corporation once again; and 
(3) the corporation and each person who was a shareholder dur-
ing a period of time to be specified by regulation must agree to 
make such adjustments as the Commissioner prescribes. 
Each of these three requisites to the exercise of the Commis-
sioner's discretion will, of course, require substantial regulatory 
elaboration. One of the most difficult problems that the regula-
tions need to address is the definition of "inadvertent." Under prior 
law, taxpayers seeking a retroactive termination of a Subchapter 
S election would cause a corporation to violate deliberately one 
of the conditions for eligibility to elect Subchapter S status. It is 
clear that section 1362(f) precludes the granting of relief in such . 
circumstances. Under present law, however, such artifices are un-
necessary; voluntary revocations may specify the date of termina-
tion and there is no action that the corporation can take to make 
the termination retroactive. Accordingly, it seems unlikely that 
any corporation will cause a termination of a Subchapter S elec-
tion under either the small business corporation definition or the 
passive investment income restriction in the sense of willfully per-
mitting the violation to occur in order to terminate the election. 
Short of such clear, and presumably unlikely, cases, the nebulous 
and unavoidably unsatisfying question arises: what state of mind 
on the part of what individuals will constitute inadvertence within 
the meaning of this relief provision? The range of possibilities seems 
infinite. It is probable that the regulations will take the position 
that a termination is inadvertent if it occurs because of an event 
that the managers of the S corporation could not have anticipated138 
or one that they could not have prevented even if they had known 
about it. 139 It is also probable that a termination will be considered 
inadvertent if the managers of the S corporation were aware that 
the terminating event was about to occur but were unaware that 
its occurrence would cause a termination of the Selection because 
138. For example, the passive investment income earned by the corporation 
may unexpectedly exceed the limitations of I.R.C. § 1362(d)(3). The Commissioner 
permitted reelection under former I.R.C. § 1372(f) before the expiration of the 
five year waiting period (see text accompanying notes 146-47 infra) when, because 
of a change in market conditions, a corporation's passive investment income ex-
ceeded the limitations under prior law. Rev. Rul. 78-275, 1978-2 C.B. 221. 
139. Cf Rev. Rul. 78-275, supra note 138. See also, Rev. Rul. 78-333, 1978-2 
C.B. 224, in which the Commissioner granted permission under former I.R.C. § 
1372(f) to make a new election within the five year period when termination of 
the prior election occurred because passive investment income exceeded applicable 
limitations during a year when the corporation's business assets had been leased 
to another while the corporation's manager was disabled and could not be replaced. 
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they were ignorant of the law governing terminations.140 On the 
other hand, it is likely that a termination will not be considered 
inadvertent if it is reasonable to expect the managers of the S 
corporation to have anticipated the event and to have taken steps 
to prevent its occurrence.141 These relatively optimistic speculations 
are based largely upon Congress's admonition to the Commissioner 
to be reasonable in waiving the consequences of an inadvertent 
termination.142 
The second prerequisite, that small business corporation status 
be restored with reasonable promptness, seems relatively unambig-
uous. The provision, of course, is not applicable if the termination 
is the result of a violation of the passive investment income test. 
The elaboration of the third requirement is likely to be highly 
controversial. Section 1362(f)(4) limits the discretion of the 
Commissioner to require adjustments only by a parenthetical ex-
pression which requires that the adjustments be "consistent with 
the treatment of the corporation as an S corporation." However, 
the legislative history indicates that the Commissioner's authority 
would extend beyond merely requiring the shareholders to report 
their income in the same manner as it would have been reported 
had the S election remained in effect. For example, the Committee 
Reports suggest that if the termination is caused by a violation 
of the passive investment income test for the reason that the cor-
poration reasonably believed that it did not have accumulated earn-
ings and profits, the Commissioner might require the shareholders 
to treat the earnings and profits as were determined on audit to 
have been retained by the corporation as ordinary dividend 
distributions.143 If, on the other hand, the termination occurred 
because of an unanticipated receipt of an excessive amount of 
passive investment income, it is not at all clear what adjustments 
might be required. Since that excess passive income already would 
have been subject to the relatively severe section 1375 tax at the 
140. Cf Rev. Rul. 78-274, 1978-2 C.B. 220, in which the Commissioner per-
mitted a corporation to reelect under former I.R.C. § 1372(f) after sale of stock 
to a nonresident alien caused its election to terminate. The selling shareholder 
was unaware that a nonresident alien could not be a shareholder of a Subchapter 
S corporation. He repurchased the stock promptly when his attorney informed 
him of the law. 
The regulations under new I.R.C. § 1362(£) will probably contain an excep-
tion for the relatively rare instances when the taxpayers can be shown to have 
deliberately attempted to remain ignorant of the law. 
141. For example, if the managers of the S corporation attempt to avoid 
the passive investment income limitations by generating active business income 
but have reason to know that their attempt will fail for the third consecutive year. 
142. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 12-13. 
143. Id. 
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corporate level and included in the corporation's taxable income 
allocated to the shareholders, any further adverse tax consequences 
of the receipt of that income would be punitive. 
An inadvertent termination also may occur because a class of 
purported indebtedness that did not comply with the safe harbor 
rules of section 1361(c) (5) was reclassified as a second class of stock. 
The legislative history specifically suggests that, in that cir-
cumstance, the Commissioner should waive the inadvertent ter-
mination if no tax avoidance has occurred.144 Of course, it is not 
clear what might be regarded as tax avoidance in this context. 
If the debt instrument has been retired by the corporation and 
the proceeds treated by the owner of the instrument as a tax-free 
return of capital in circumstances in which a distribution by the 
corporation with respect to its stock would also have been tax free 
but would have reduced the accumulated adjustments account re-
quired by section 1368(e), the potential for a substantial tax reduc-
tion surely would have been obtained. Absent tax avoidance, it 
would not be unreasonable for the regulations to require that the 
offending security be eliminated, and, perhaps, to provide for the 
restoration to income of any deductions claimed by the S corpora-
tion, and therefore its shareholders, for interest paid on the pur-
ported debt instrument.145 
Section 1362(g) continues the provision of prior law146 that bars 
a corporation from electing to be taxed under Subchapter S for 
a five year period following the termination of a previous Sub-
chapter S election unless the Commissioner consents to the second 
election.147 The relatively modest restriction that this revision 
imposes upon the free movement between the regular and the Sub-
chapter S patterns of taxation is considered below in connection 
with the related tax upon capital gains.148 In view of the scope of 
the Commissioner's discretion to waive inadvertent terminations, 
144. Id. 
145. Where the termination occurs because the corporation acquires an in-
eligible shareholder, an adjustment of the income tax liabilities of the S corpora-
tion shareholders would be inappropriate beyond a reversal of any allocation of 
income or expense to the ineligible shareholder. Presumably, the amount of any 
allocation to an ineligible shareholder that the Commissioner orders reversed 
should be reallocated to that shareholder's transferor rather than to the other 
shareholders of the S corporation (unless, of course, the stock was originally issued 
by the corporation to the ineligible shareholder). 
146. Former I.R.C. § 1372(f). 
147. Section 6(e) of the Revision Act enacts a "fresh start" rule that 
eliminates the five-year waiting period for reelection if the termination occurred 
under former I.R.C. § 1372. Pub. L. No. 97-354, 96 Stat. 1669, 1700 (1982). TCB 
§ 201(j) would treat revocations under prior law in the same way as terminations 
for purposes of § 6(e). 
148. See text accompanying notes 335-43 infra. 
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reelecting with the consent of the Commissioner will become far 
less common. If the corporation cannot obtain a waiver of an in-
advertent termination, either because the termination was deter-
mined not to be inadvertent or because the corporation failed to 
take corrective action or to make the adjustments required by the 
Commissioner, the Commissioner is unlikely to consent to the 
reelection within the five year period. Accordingly, the section 
1362(g) reelection will be useful only in those relatively rare 
situations when a corporation experiences a bona fide change in 
circumstances that will make a new Subchapter S election advisable. 
D. New Planning Possibilities 
The elimination of the restriction upon the receipt of passive 
investment income, at least for some S corporations, together with 
the ability to issue stock possessing different degrees of voting 
power and the safe harbor debt rules open up significant new 
planning possibilities for the use of S corporations. Some taxpayers 
prefer to manage the investment portfolios of various members 
of their family through a single business entity. In the past, tax-
payers have employed trusts and partnerships, as well as corpora-
tions, for this purpose. The entity investment vehicle permits 
centralized management of the investment portfolio and the ability 
to spread the risk of speculative investments over a large number 
of investors. In addition, the concentration of economic power that 
the entity creates permits the investors to participate in invest-
ments as a group that would not be available to them individually. 
Moreover, the use of an entity permits the older generation 
members of the family to follow the advice of their estate plan-
ning consultants and make lifetime gifts to younger members of 
the family without sacrificing their investment objectives. The gifts 
are made of ownership interests in the investment vehicle and not 
in its underlying portfolio of investments. It has become increas-
ingly popular to take the planning for this investment vehicle a 
step further. With certain of the entities that are used for this 
purpose, it is possible to have the older generation acquire 
securities in the investment vehicle that lack a growth potential, 
and by issuing the younger generation a different class of security, 
have them receive the appreciation in the investment portfolio. 
Such a technique effectively passes the appreciation potential in 
the investment portfolio to the second generation free of any 
transfer taxes and freezes the size of the estate of the older 
generation. 
When the family's assets consist primarily of an active business 
enterprise, the preferred investment vehicle traditionally has been 
a corporation because of the well-established tax and corporate 
law rules governing the division of ownership into different classes 
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of stock. More recently it has been suggested that similar results 
can be achieved through the use of a partnership.149 Where the 
assets consist of portfolio investments, the corporation would con-
stitute a personal holding company unless the ownership of its stock 
is distributed far beyond a few family groups. If the investments 
held by the personal holding company consist of debt securities 
or dividend paying stock, the company must distribute its ordinary 
income annually in order to avoid the high tax upon personal 
holding company income. As a result, the growth potential of the 
investment company is blunted and the income from the invest-
ments is subject to a higher current rate of tax than would be 
incurred if the investments were owned by the shareholders individ-
ually. To avoid these consequences, many taxpayers employ a part-
nership as the investment vehicle for portfolio investments. That 
format, however, somewhat complicates both annual giving pro-
grams and the ability to freeze the estates of the older generation. 
Under the Revision Act, such taxpayers may use an S corpora-
tion instead of a personal holding company as their investment 
vehicle. Formation of a new corporation and an immediate elec-
tion under Subchapter S will avoid completely the increased tax 
that is created by the use of a personal holding company and will 
permit an unlimited accumulation of earnings without the imposi-
tion of the accumulated earnings tax. In order to permit the freezing 
of the estates of the older generation while not passing control 
over the investment portfolio to the second generation at the time 
such a corporation is formed, S corporations normally will issue 
three types of securities: voting common stock, nonvoting common 
stock, and indebtedness meeting the new safe harbor rules. The 
older generation may hold the indebtedness and either all of the 
voting stock or a sufficient amount to establish control over cor-
porate affairs. The nonvoting stock, or a mix of voting and non-
voting stock, which will possess the right to substantially all the 
appreciation in the corporate assets, may be given immediately 
or over time to younger generation members of the family. A typical 
estate plan would call for a gradual transfer of the voting stock 
in the corporation to the second generation through a lifetime giving 
program. 
In most instances, this estate planning technique will be useful 
only if the corporation can be formed free of tax. That objective 
can be obtained if the incorporation qualifies under section 351. 
If the diversification rules of that section are avoided/50 qualifica-
tion under section 351 is normally routine. 
149. Nelson, The Partnership Capital Freeze: Income, Estate, and Gift Tax 
Consideratians, 1 VA. TAX R. 11 (1981). 
150. I.R.C. § 351(e)(1). 
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The extent to which appreciation in the value of the S cor-
poration can be shifted to the second generation free of transfer 
taxes is largely a function of the rate of interest that must be paid 
on the indebtedness issued to the older generation. To the extent 
that a low rate of interest may be used on safe harbor debt 
instruments, more appreciation may be shifted to the second 
generation through an S corporation than through a corporation 
subject to the regular tax. Of course, in establishing the interest 
rate on any indebtedness, the family and its tax advisors must 
take care not to violate the family group reallocation rules of section 
1366(e)'5' or the Code provisions of general application such as 
sections 385 and 482. 
A Subchapter S investment company may not have any earnings 
and profits accumulated during years in which a Subchapter S elec-
tion was not in effect. The presence of those earnings and profits 
would precipitate both the tax on passive investment income and 
the ultimate termination of the Subchapter Selection. As a result, 
in most instances it will not be possible merely to convert a 
corporation presently subject to the regular income tax to a Sub-
chapterS investment company. Possible techniques for eliminating 
earnings and profits from an S corporation are discussed below .152 
If the use of the S corporation device seems to produce sufficient 
savings of income and transfer taxes, it might be desirable to suffer 
the capital gains tax attributable to the complete liquidation of 
the old corporation and to reincorporate the investment portfolio 
in a new S corporation free of all earnings and profits. 
If an existing corporation subject to a Subchapter S election 
does not have earnings and profits accumulated during nonelec-
tion years but does have earnings and profits accumulated during 
Subchapter S years, there still may be difficulties in implementing 
an estate freeze. The first step in accomplishing an estate freeze 
using a corporation subject to the regular tax is to convert 
outstanding common stock owned by. the older generation into a 
class of preferred stock. Subject to section 305 and the future appli-
cation of section 306, such a conversion is free of tax. Unfortunately, 
however, an S corporation cannot issue preferred stock: the freezing 
security must be a debt instrument. Exchanging outstanding com-
mon stock for such a debt instrument is a taxable transaction and 
in many instances the cost of an accelerated capital gains tax will 
outweigh the prospective benefits of estate tax reduction. The 
alternative is to distribute the debt instrument as a dividend and 
make gifts of the common stock; however, if the corporation has 
any earnings and profits, such a distribution could be subject to 
a prohibitive ordinary income tax. 
151. See text accompanying notes 27 4-82 infra. 
152. See text accompanying notes 399-405 infra. 
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IV. COMPUTATION OF INCOME 
A. Prior Law 
The choice of the form in which to conduct business, with few 
limited exceptions, 153 traditionally has determined the pattern of 
taxation to which the business was subject. Subchapter S was added 
to the Code in 1958 as an exception to a tax structure which 
recognizes, now as then, two major classifications of business enter-
prise, the corporation and the partnership, and subjects them to 
radically different forms of taxation. 
If the business entity is incorporated, it is treated as a taxable 
entity separate from its shareholders and is subjected to the cor-
porate income tax,Is. thus producing a two-level taxing system. With 
the exception of a few provisions that govern the taxation of the 
transmission of property among corporations/55 a corporation is 
required to compute its income in a manner not terribly dissimilar 
from the manner in which individuals compute their income.156 That 
corporate taxable income is then subject to tax in the hands of 
the corporation on an annual basis under a rate schedule that, com-
pared to the rate schedule applicable to individuals, is relatively 
nonprogressive and does not reach rates quite as high as does the 
individual schedule.157 
In order for the owners of such an incorporated business to 
obtain a direct benefit from the corporate earnings, they would, 
in most cases, be required to subject those earnings to a second 
level of tax. For example, if those earnings were distributed cur-
rently, the resulting dividend would be subject to tax at ordinary 
income rates.156 If the profits were realized through the sale of 
corporate stock, the sale would be subject to the second tax, albeit 
153. Between 1954 and 1966, certain partnerships were permitted to elect 
under Subchapter R of the Code to be taxed as corporations. In addition, a business 
trust or limited partnership may be treated as an association taxable as a cor-
poration by Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (1973). 
154. I.R.C. § 11. Cf I.R.C. §§ 56 and 1201. 
155. See e.g., I.R.C. §§ 243 (85% or 100% exclusion for dividends received 
by corporations) and 332 (non-recognition of gain on liquidation of subsidiary). 
156. See generally B. BITTKER and J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 
OF CORPORATIONS AND THEIR SHAREHOLDERS, ch. 1, (4th ed. 1979)[hereinafter cited 
as BITTKER AND EUSTICE). 
157. Under relatively recent legislation, the corporate and individual rate 
schedules have become increasingly similar. Corporate taxable income below 
$100,000 is now subject to five bracket rates ranging from 15% to 46%. In addi-
tion, the maximum individual rate has been reduced to 50%. For a further com-
parison of the corporate and individual rate structures, see text accompanying 
notes 477-78 infra. 
158. I.R.C. § 301(c)(1). 
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at capital gains rates.159 In order to distinquish between a corporate 
distribution of profits and a return of the stockholder's capital, 
the corporate tax provisions employ the concept of earnings and 
profits.160 A distribution from a corporation will be treated as a 
dividend and subject to tax at ordinary income rates only to the 
extent that the distribution does not exceed the corporate accumula-
tion of undistributed earnings and profits.161 
If the owners of the business venture choose not to incorporate 
and to become subject to partnership taxation, the picture changes 
radically.162 Although the existence of a partnership substantially 
affects income tax liability, the partnership itself is not subject 
to tax.163 Rather, specific items of partnership income are allocated 
among the partners pursuant to the terms of the partnership 
agreement.164 The partners then are required to include these items 
of income and expense on their individual returns and are subject 
to tax on those amounts pursuant to the same rate schedule that 
is applicable to their other income.165 In general, the allocated items 
retain the same character on the individual partner's return as 
they had in the hands of the partnership.166 
This two-pronged system was modified, although not as greatly 
as might appear, by the introduction of the Subchapter S corpora-
tion in 1958. While later interpreters of Subchapters S often 
referred to the new provisions somewhat casually as subjecting 
a corporation to tax "like a partnership," Congress' limited objec-
tive for the 1958 legislation was to permit incorporated business 
ventures to avoid having their income subject to tax on two levels, 
the corporate and the shareholder.167 Indeed, the underlying 
philosophy of the 1958 legislation was to change the method of 
taxing corporations only to the minimum extent necessary to 
eliminate the corporate tax. As a result of this highly limited 
objective, Congress created a third form of business taxation that 
in many respects was more complicated than either of the other 
two. . 
The limited nature of Congress' objective in enacting Sub-
159. I.R.C. §§ 1221 and 1202. 
160. See I.R.C. §§ 312 and 316. 
161. Under I.R.C. § 316, a distribution may be taxed as a dividend to the 
extent of either current or accumulated earnings and profits. 
162. See generally MCKEE, supra note 73, and A. WILLIS, J. PENNELL, and 
P. POSTLEWAITE, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION (1981). 
163. I.R.C. § 701. 
164. I.R.C. § 704. 
165. I.R.C. § 702(a). 
166. I.R.C. § 702(b). 
167. S. REP. No. 1983, 85 Cong., 2nd Sess. 68 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S. 
CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 4791, 4876. 
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chapter S is evidenced most clearly in the provisions governing 
the computation of income under prior law. With few exceptions, 
the income of an electing corporation was computed in exactly the 
same manner as taxable income was computed for a nonelecting 
corporation/58 however, the corporation itself was not subject to 
the corporate income tax.169 Instead, its taxable income, as so 
computed, was taxed directly to its shareholders.170 As the 
mechanism for achieving that tax, Congress created the fiction of 
a constructive year-end dividend to the shareholders of an amount 
equal to the corporate taxable income.171 That amount, with certain 
modifications, was referred to under prior law as undistributed 
taxable income and by practitioners as "UTI." Consistently with 
the established corporate pattern, this constructive distribution 
was subject to tax in the hands of the shareholders in precisely 
the same manner as an actual dividend distribution would have 
been. To the extent of the corporate earnings and profits, the 
constructive dividend was subject to tax at ordinary income tax 
rates. As a result, the earnings and profits account of a Subchapter 
S corporation had to be computed accurately in order to determine 
the ceiling on the amount of the constructive distribution that was 
to be taxable to shareholders. Thus, under prior law, Subchapter 
S corporations were required to compute annually not only the 
amount of their taxable income, as modified under Subchapter S, 
but also the amount of their current earnings and profits. 
In principle, every corporation must compute its earnings and 
profits currently. Unfortunately, that computation has always been 
troublesome; the concept is not defined comprehensively 
anywhere.172 Section 312 sets forth a series of circumstances in 
which the computation of earnings and profits is to vary from the 
computation of taxable income but otherwise provides no assistance. 
As a result, earnings and profits computations are notoriously 
168. Former I.R.C. § 1373(d). See generally Lourie, Subchapter S After Six 
Years of Operations: An Analysis of Its Advantages and Defects, 22 J. TAX. 166 
(1965); L. BRAVENEC, TAXATION OF SUBCHAPTER S CORPORATIONS AND 
SHAREHOLDERS (PLI, 1978); and BITTKER AND EUSTICE, supra note 156 at ch. 6. 
169. Former I.R.C. § 1372(b). As under current law, Subchapter S corpora-
tions were subject to tax on certain capital gains. Former I.R.C. § 1378. While 
under I.R.C. § 58(d) items of tax preference incurred by the corporation were 
allocated to its shareholders, if the corporation became subject to the tax on capital 
gains, it also became subject to the add-on preference tax imposed by former 
I.R.C. § 56 with respect to those capital gains. 
170. Former I.R.C. § 1373(a). 
171. Former I.R.C. § 1373(b). 
172. BITTKER AND EUSTICE, supra note 156, at , 7.03. See also Blum, The 
Earnings and Profits Limitation on Dividend Income: A Reappraisal, 53 TAXES 
68 (1975)(suggesting the elimination of the concept for all corporations). 
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inaccurate.173 For corporations subject to the corporate tax, this 
relatively casual approach towards the computation of earnings 
and profits is normally entirely adequate. Unless the corporation 
argues that a current distribution to its shareholders is not subject 
to tax in whole or in part because the distribution exceeds earnings 
and profits, the precise level of the earnings and profits accounts 
is largely academic. For Subchapter S corporations, however, the 
accuracy of the computation was of immediate importance. 
Actual distributions of cash by a Subchapter S corporation, at 
least to the extent of the current earnings and profits of the cor-
poration, were treated in precisely the same manner as dividends 
from regular corporations. To the extent of the current earnings 
and profits, such dividends were fully taxable as ordinary income 
to the recipients.174 At the corporate level, the amount of cash 
dividends were charged against and reduced both the corporation's 
earnings and profits account and the amount of its undistributed 
taxable income. Consequently, the amount of the constructive year-
end dividend to the Subchapter S shareholders was reduced by 
the full amount of the cash distribution. 175 This two stage 
computation did not alter the amount of corporate income that was 
subject to tax to the shareholders but it did affect the identity 
of the shareholders who would be subject to tax. While the con-
structive dividend was taxable to shareholders with respect to their 
holdings on the last day of the corporation's taxable year/76 actual 
distributions were taxable to those who received them.177 
These computations became considerably more complex, 
however, if the Subchapter S corporation made an actual 
distribution of any property other than cash. Regrettably, the 
shareholders of Subchapter S corporations, for reasons discussed 
below,178 had a far greater incentive to cause their corporation to 
make distributions of property, particularly debt obligations of the 
Subchapter S corporation itself, than did shareholders of regular 
business corporations. Prior law dealt with all such property 
distributions quite harshly. Actual distributions in any form other 
than cash did not reduce undistributed taxable income179 nor, at 
least as an initial matter, were the corporate earnings and profits 
173. See Estate of Meyer v. Comm'r, 200 F 2d 592 (5th Cir. 1953)(computation 
of earnings and profits by CPA determined to be in error by nearly $1 million). 
174. Former I.R.C. § 1375(d)(by implication); and Treas. Reg. § 
1.1373-l(d) (1968). 
175. Former I.R.C. § 1373(c). 
176. Former I.R.C. § 1373(b). 
177. Treas. Reg. § 1.1373-l(f) (1960). 
178. See text accompanying note 353 infra. 
179. Former I.R.C. § 1373(c). 
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allocated to such property distributions.180 Rather, notwithstanding 
the property distrib,ution, the constructive year-end distribution 
still comprised the entire corporate taxable income. In determining 
the amount of each of these two distributions that actually was 
to be subject to tax in the hands of the shareholders, the corporate 
earnings and profits were allocated ratably between the fair market 
value of the property and the entire amount of the constructive 
distribution.181 
The earnings and profits that were available to support taxation 
of these distributions included not only the corporation's current 
earnings and profits but also all accumulated earnings and profits;182 
therefore, the net effect of a property distribution often was to 
subject the shareholders to a far greater tax than would have been 
the case if they were subject merely to tax on the corporate taxable 
income. For example, assume that a Subchapter S corporation had 
only a single shareholder and that it derived $100 of taxable income 
for the current year. If the corporation made an actual cash distribu-
tion of $40 during the year, that $40 was subject to tax as was 
any dividend distribution from a corporation. In addition, the cor-
poration's undistributed taxable income, $100 less the $40 actual 
distribution, also would have been subject to tax to the shareholder. 
As a result, the shareholder would be subject to tax on the $100 
of corporate taxable income. Even if the corporation had ac-
cumulated earnings and profits, no greater amount would be sub-
ject to tax. On the other hand, if the $40 distribution were in the 
form of property, the constructive year-end distribution would be 
the full $100. If the corporation's earnings and profits for the year 
were also $100 and it did not have any accumulated earnings and 
profits, the $100 of earnings and profits would be allocated ratably 
between the $40 actual distribution and the $100 constructive 
distribution. The shareholder, then, would have taxable income in 
the amount of $29 attributable to the distribution of the property 
and of $71 attributable to the constructive year-end distribution. 
The computation seems unduly complex but the result, subjecting 
the shareholder to tax on $100, seems essentially fair. If, however, 
the corporation had accumulated earnings and profits in excess 
of $40, the full amount of both the $40 property distribution and 
the $100 constructive distribution would be subject to tax as if 
the shareholder had received a dividend distribution of $140. 
The existence of accumulated earnings and profits in a Sub-
chapter S corporation was not a mere hypothetical possibility. 
180. Treas. Reg. § 1.1373-1(d) and (e) (1960). 
181. Treas. Reg. § 1.1373-1(e)(2) (1960). 
182. Treas. Reg. § 1.1373-1(g)(Example (4)) (1960). 
1983] SUBCHAPTER S REVISION ACT 621 
Unless the corporation had been a Subchapter S corporation since 
its formation, it probably would have an earnings and profits 
account attributable to its preelection years. However, even a 
corporation that elected Subchapter S upon its formation could 
have a substantial accumulated earnings and profits account. In 
order that all taxable income was taxed to shareholders, prior law 
provided that earnings and profits could never be less than taxable 
income.183 Taxable income, however, frequently is less than earnings 
and profits. Tax-exempt interest, derived from the holding of 
municipal bonds, for example, would not produce taxable income 
but does create earnings and profits.184 Moreover, while accelerated 
methods of depreciation reduce taxable income, earnings and profits 
are reduced only by straight-line depreciation. 185 Thus, the 
constructive year-end dividend does not necessarily eliminate 
current earnings and profits every year. 
The use of the corporate tax dividend concept to govern the 
income tax consequences of actual and constructive distributions 
was far less favorable to the shareholders of a Subchapter S cor-
poration than was the pattern of taxing partners. Since both actual 
and constructive distributions were regarded as dividends under 
prior law, they were subject to tax without regard to the underlying 
character of the corporate income that produced the amount subject 
to tax. With the notable exception of capital gains, the character 
of the income earned by the corporation was not retained when 
that income was distributed, actually or constructively, to 
shareholders. As a result, Subchapter S corporations proved to 
be substantially less flexible than partnerships and subjected their 
shareholders to a higher overall rate of tax than would have been 
applicable if the business had been operated as a partnership. 
In retrospect, it seems evident that in 1958 Congress erred 
in setting such limited objectives for its new form of business 
taxation. Corporate conceptions that were suitable for a system 
that contemplated the double taxation of the separate legal entity 
of a corporation were unnecessary to the taxation of the 
shareholders of a Subchapter S corporation and added the pointless 
complexity and inflexibility described above. In the Revision Act, 
Congress has pursued the twin objectives of eliminating from the 
taxation of S corporations unnecessary corporate concepts while 
bringing the taxation of those corporations into greater conformity 
with the taxation of partnerships. 
183. Former I.R.C. § 1377(b). 
184. Treas. Reg. § 1.312-6(b) (1960). 
185. See I.R.C. § 312(k)(1), dealing with traditional accelerated depreciation 
under I.R.C. § 167, and LR.C. § 312(k)(3), prescribing a similar rule for property 
subject to the cost recovery system provided by I.R.C. § 168. 
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B. Under the Revision Act 
1. Overview: Subchapter S's Place in the Sun 
The Revision Act has changed completely the entire system 
of taxing S corporations.186 Indeed, the only important resemblance 
that an S corporation bears to its predecessor, the Subchapter S 
corporation, is that the entity generally is not subject to tax.187 
The Act even affects that generalization, however, by expanding 
the circumstances in which the S corporation may in fact be subject 
to taxation at the corporate level. 188 Congress has attempted to 
correct the defects in prior law by disconnecting the taxation of 
S corporations from the corporate concepts that needlessly plagued 
its predecessor. That attempt was largely successful with respect 
to relatively routine matters, such as the computation of income, 
but was only partially successful with respect to more conceptual 
questions. Under present law, an S corporation computes its income 
in the same manner as does an individual and specific items of 
corporate income and expense are allocated to the shareholders 
for inclusion in their returns in a manner virtually identical to the 
pattern of taxing partnerships. On the other hand, many of the 
old corporate entity concepts persist. Corporate debt is not added 
to the tax basis of the shareholder's investment in the corporation 
and property distributions are reflected at market value rather 
than under the partnership basis rule. As a result, although the 
disconnection from corporate law that the Revision Act did accom-
plish has materially improved Subchapter S, the provisions remain 
complex and often surprising. An S corporation is still subject to 
a unique pattern of taxation, neither entirely borrowed from cor-
porate entity concepts nor entirely embracing the partnership 
conduit approach. 
In many respects, the disconnection of the taxation of S 
corporations from general corporate concepts has worsened the 
problem of relating an S corporation to the pattern of taxing other 
entities. While an S corporation computes its income in the same 
manner as an individual, it remains a corporation. Thus, absent 
186. For other descriptions of the Revision Act, see the series of articles 
by Shaw and August appearing at 58 J. TAX 2, 84, and 300 (1983). 
187. I.R.C. § 1363(a). 
188. As under prior law, an S corporation may be subject to tax on certain 
capital gains. See text accompanying notes 335-43 infra. In addition, the corpora-
tion may be subject to tax on certain passive investment income. See text accom-
panying notes 122-24 supra. Finally, if the corporation disposes of property upon 
which an investment tax credit under I.R.C. § 38 was claimed for a non-election 
year in a manner that produces a recapture tax under I.R.C. § 47, the S corpora-
tion, rather than its shareholders, is liable for the tax so incurred. I.R.C. § 1371(d)(2). 
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further elaboration under the Code, an S corporation would be 
treated as a corporation by those sections that accord different 
tax consequences to transactions entered into by corporations than 
to those entered into by individuals even though the corporate 
income is taxable to individuals. To some extent, Congress 
specifically addressed this entity characterization question in the 
Revision Act. For some purposes under the Code, an S corpora-
tion is treated as an individual while for other purposes it is treated 
as a corporation. Moreover, under other sections of the Act, an 
S corporation is treated as a partnership and in some instances 
its shareholders, and sometimes just some of them, are treated 
as partners. Unfortunately, it is not always entirely clear how an 
S corporation is to be characterized. While in some instances Con-
gress stated explicitly how an S corporation is to be treated for 
the purposes of a specific Code provision, in many other situations 
the question is left either ambiguous or entirely open. While the 
regulations, when issued, may assist in resolving many of these 
ambiguities, the status of an S corporation under the Code is likely 
to remain confused for many years in the future. 
This uncertain, multi-faceted character of an S corporation may 
have been unavoidable. The cost in terms of accelerated income 
taxation of changing from corporate to partnership form is generally 
prohibitive.189 Thus, casual changes in the form in which business 
is conducted in order to secure momentary tax advantages is rarely 
feasible. Properly, Congress did not wish to impose such tax costs 
upon the making of a Subchapter S election.190 Quite the contrary, 
few corporations are subject to any accelerated tax liability by 
virtue of either electing or terminating a Subchapter S election.191 
Moreover, while special provisions of the Code are designed to 
restrict the desirability of making temporary Subchapter S 
189. The liquidation of a corporation is a taxable event which normally sub-
jects the shareholders to tax on the full value of the corporation less their tax 
basis for their stock. I.R.C. § 331. The alternative provided by I.R.C. § 333 sub-
jects the shareholders to ordinary income taxation on the entire amount of the 
corporate earnings and profits and thus is less desirable generally. 
190. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 6; SENATE REPORT, supra note 22, 
at 6. 
191. The numerous questions that a mid-stream Subchapter S election raises, 
under either prior or existing law, are beyond the scope of this Article. However, 
under prior law and apparently under the Revision Act, a Subchapter S election 
does not trigger depreciation recapture under I.R.C. §§ 1245 or 1250, nor, 
apparently, does the election constitute the disposition of an installment obliga-
tion under I.R.C. § 453B. Under I.R.C. § 1371(d)(1), the election does not require 
recapture of the investment tax credit provided by I.R.C. § 38. On the other hand, 
operating losses from pre-election years may not be carried over and claimed 
while the election is in effect although the years during which the election is 
in effect count in determining the number of years to which a loss or credit may 
be carried. I.R.C. § 1371(b). 
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elections, those provisions are not punitive and, except in limited 
circumstances, are not particularly effective.192 As a result, the 
possibility of tax manipulation beyond the remedial purposes of 
Subchapter S remains relatively high. In order to reduce the 
incentive for such tax motivated transactions, Congress concluded 
that it was necessary to retain many of the entity based rules of 
corporate taxation under the Revision Act.193 Had the full pattern 
of taxing partnerships been made available to S corporations while 
permitting a Subchapter S election without significant tax costs, 
corporate managers would have had available too wide a variety 
of tax consequences of transactions between the corporation and 
its shareholders. Preventing the anticipated abuses of Subchapter 
S would have required a lengthy series of complex restrictions 
that would have been inconsistent with the general desire of 
simplifying the operation of Subchapter S corporations. 
Whether Congress could have more closely conformed the 
taxation of S corporations to the partnership conduit model will 
undoubtedly be explored during the coming years. Perhaps ex-
perience under the existing Act will demonstrate that more of the 
entity-based features of Subchapter S can be discarded without 
undermining the integrity of those provisions. For the time being, 
however, the general effect of the compromise reached under the 
Revision Act is evident. While in many respects the operation of 
a Subchapter S corporation has been simplified, the task of its tax 
advisors remains as complex as ever. The intricate and partially 
undefined position of the S corporation as part corporation, part 
individual and part partnership is enormously confusing. 
2. Computing S Corporation Income 
a. In General 
Reversing prior law, section 1363(b) provides that, with minor 
exceptions/94 the taxable income of an S corporation shall be 
192. See text accompanying notes 335-43 infra. 
193. STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 8. 
194. In addition to the separate statement described below, I.R.C. § 1363(b) 
permits S corporations to amortize organization expenses under I.R.C. § 248 and 
bars the deductions that are not allowed to partnerships under I.R.C. § 703(a)(2). 
That section disallows certain deductions because they are allowed at the part-
ner (or shareholder) level, including personal exemptions, depletion of oil or gas 
wells, and the net operating loss deduction. The provision also disallows a partner-
ship deduction for foreign taxes, charitable contributions, and the itemized deduc-
tions for individuals. For both partnership and S corporations, the disallowance 
of these deductions is largely superfluous because those items must be separately 
stated and passed through to the partner or shareholder. For partnerships, Treas. 
Reg. § 1.703-1(a)(2)(vii) (1960) expands this list to include the I.R.C. § 1202 capital 
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computed in the same manner as that of an individual. As a result, 
S corporations are denied deductions and exempted from inclusions 
in income that are applicable only to corporations. For example, 
S corporations may not take the dividends received deduction 
provided by section 243 nor claim the "deemed paid" credit for 
foreign taxes paid by foreign subsidiaries under section 902.195 
Many Code provisions governing the computation of taxable 
income contain different rules for corporate and individual tax-
payers. Absent additional guidance, in many cases it would be 
unclear whether the application of those sections was controlled 
by the general principle of section 1363(b) that an S corporation 
computes its income in the same manner as an individual or by 
the fact than an S corporation remains a corporation. For example, 
in providing for the taxation of corporate distributions, section 301 
distinguishes sharply between corporate and noncorporate recip-
ients of the distribution. Regardless of how an S corporation is 
required to compute its taxable income under section 1363(b), under 
section 30l(d), the amount of a property distribution to be taken 
into account by a corporate shareholder is not the fair market value 
of the property distributed, rather it is the lesser of that value 
or the adjusted basis of the property in the hands of the distributing 
corporation. 
Congress has attempted to address such ambiguities in two 
ways. Under section 1371(a)(2), an S corporation "in its capacity 
as a shareholder of another corporation" is to be treated as an 
individual for the purposes of Subchapter C of the Code, which 
includes the three hundred series of sections governing the conse-
quences of corporate transactions, such as distributions and 
reorganizations. The significance of this provision in determining 
how an S corporation is to be treated for purposes of Subchapter 
gains deductions and the I.R.C. § 1212 capital loss carryover. Since these items 
are computed at the S corporation shareholder level as well, a similar rule most 
likely will be applied to I.R.C. § 1363. 
One possible consequence of the exclusion of these items from the computa-
tion of the income of a partnership is that the limitation of I.R.C. § 704(d) may 
not apply to such items. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-l(d)(2) (1960) and McKEE. supra 
note 73, at, 10.10[1](b). Apparently, partners may deduct their share of charitable 
contributions even though the amount of that expense exceeds the basis for their 
partnership interest. Under the Revision Act, the limitation on the allowability 
of losses to a shareholder's basis imposed by I.R.C. § 1366(d)(1) is expressly ap-
plicable to both charitable contributions and foreign taxes by I.R.C. § 1366(a)(1) 
(last sentence). No explanation for this deviation from partnership taxation ap-
pears in the legislative history. 
195. Because the S corporation is a corporati~n in spite of this provision, 
it may incur expenses of a type that true individuals cannot; for example, ex-
penses incident to the issuance and redemption of stock, liquidations, and tax-
able or tax-free acquisitions. Presumably, the treatment of these expenses will 
be governed by the rules applicable to other corporations. 
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C is considered below.196 With respect to the computation of taxable 
income, however, sections 1371 and 1363 make clear than an S cor-
poration is to include the fair market value of a property 
distribution from a corporation in which it is a shareholder and 
is not entitled to use the corporation basis rule. 
In addition, in the Revision Act Congress has amended several 
sections of the Code to provide specifically for the treatment of 
an S corporation. While it is quite clear that Congress intended 
to provide a needed measure of assistance through this series 
of specific amendments, that effort may prove to be more a source 
of confusion than a source of assistance. The difficulty is that the 
pattern of amendments made by Congress seems almost random. 
In many cases, specific provision is made for an S corporation that 
would appear completely unnecessary in light of the general state-
ment that an S corporation is to compute its taxable income in 
the same manner as an individual. For example, section 447 requires 
certain corporations engaged in farming (and partnerships of which 
a corporation is a partner) to use the accrual method of accounting 
and to capitalize certain expenses. Since the provision directly 
addresses the computation of income, it would seem to follow from 
the general rule of section 1363 that the provision was not 
applicable to S corporations. Nevertheless, subsection (c) of the 
provision specifically so states. On the other hand, section 291, 
added by the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 
("TEFRA")/97 requires that the amount of certain preferential items 
included in a corporate return be reduced by 15%. For example, 
a corporation is entitled to deduct only 85% of the amount of 
intangible drilling expenses that it would have been entitled to 
deduct in the absence of section 291.'98 As orginally enacted, this 
new provision specifically excluded from its application Subchapter 
S corporations.199 In the Revision Act, that specific exclusion was 
deleted and, on its face, the provision is now applicable to all cor-
porations. That pattern of amendment might indicate a Congres-
sional intent that section 291 be applicable to S corporations; 
however, legislative history to the Revision Act makes clear that 
S corporations are not subject to the cut down rules of section 
291.200 Presumably Congress concluded that the general rule of sec-
tion 1363 made this point with sufficient clarity that the specific 
exclusion in section 291 was unnecessary. 
196. See text accompanying notes 429-35 & 448-51 irifra. 
197. Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 204, 96 Stat. 324, 423 (1982). 
198. I.R.C. § 291(b). 
199. Former I.R.C. § 291(e)(2). 
200. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 14; SENATE REPORT. supra note 22, 
at 15. 
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Section 170, permitting a deduction for charitable contributions, 
provides different rules for corporations and individuals at several 
points. In subsection (e)(3) and (4), for example, the section pro-
vides a special rule for determining the amount deductible with 
respect to contributions of certain inventory and of scientific prop-
erty to be used for research. Both of these special provisions are 
applicable only to charitable contributions by corporations. Because 
both provisions relate to the computation of income, an S corpora-
tion might be regarded as excluded from their application under 
the general rule. Nevertheless, Congress specifically provided that 
the special ceilings are not applicable to contributions by S 
corporations.201 On the other hand, no other reference to a corpora-
tion in section 170 was modified similal'ly. In general, corporations 
are subject to a 10% ceiling on the overall amount deductible with 
respect to their charitable contributions and they are subject to 
ceilings that are different from those applicable to individuals with 
respect to contributions of certain appreciated property.202 It is 
clear that neither of these limitations is applicable to S corpora-
tions, but, rather, the full amount of their charitable contributions 
is to be stated separately and allocated to their shareholders.203 
The ceilings on the amount deductible are to be applied at the 
shareholder level. However, it is not at all clear why Congress 
thought it necessary to provide specially for corporations for the 
purposes of some provisions in section 170 but not for others. The 
resulting pattern creates needless confusion. 
In large part, the resulting statutory pattern merely has been 
carried over from prior law. For example, sections 170(e)(3) and 
(4) previously excluded Subchapter S corporations from their scope 
and that exclusion has been continued under current law. In this 
respect, the amendment of section 291 is exceptional. The difficulty, 
of course, is that under prior law, a Subchapter S corporation was 
regarded as a corporation and computed its income as a corpora-
tion; thus, the specific exclusions of Subchapter S corporations were 
necessary to the_ result Congress sought. Under present law, in 
many instances the exclusions do not appear to be necessary and, 
thus, create uncertainty concerning how other sections of the Code, 
lacking such specific references, are to be construed. It is unfor-
tunate that Congress was not able to integrate the new S corpora-
tion more completely into the statutory pattern. 
An S corporation is required to compute its taxable income 
as if it were an individual, yet it remains a corporation for all other 
201. I.R.C. § 170(e)(3)(A) and (4)(D)(i). 
202. I.R.C. § 170(b)(2) and (e)(1). 
203. HOUSE REPORT. supra note 22, at 14; SENATE REPORT, supra note 22, 
at 16. 
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purposes under the Code except to the extent that the Code 
specifically provides to the contrary. As noted above, for certain 
purposes under Subchapter C, an S corporation is regarded as an 
individual and not as a corporation. Similar provisions are contained 
in a series of specific Code sections. These provisions are also car-
ried over from prior law but in general are necessary to the proper 
construction of the Code. For example, an S corporation is subject 
to the hobby loss provisions of section 183 and to the related limita-
tion on the deduction of expenses with respect to a residence im-
posed by section 280A.204 
In other situations, Congress has continued the treatment of 
an S corporation as a corporation when it should have treated it 
as an individual. For example, under section 1244, a loss sustained 
on certain stock is entitled to ordinary, rather than capital, loss 
treatment. That favored treatment, however, is available only when 
the stock is issued to, and held by, an individual or partnership.205 
With the elimination of the passive investment income restriction, 
S corporations are free to invest in other businesses and, indeed, 
may be used as investment companies. The unavailability of ordin-
ary loss treatment under section 1244, however, seriously reduces 
the attractiveness of investing in new or small business ventures. 
There is no reason why the shareholders of S corporations should 
not be entitled to the same benefits under section 1244 that are 
available to partners.206 The failure to amend section 1244 to ex-
tend its benefits to S corporations perpetuates a further unfavor-
able, and unnecessary, distinction between partnerships and S cor-
porations that is inconsistent with the general approach of the Revi-
sion Act.207 
b. Separate Statement 
The mechanics of translating the income derived by an S cor-
poration into the tax liability of its shareholders has been copied 
virtually intact from partnership law. The S corporation is required 
to separately state items of income and expense208 and each 
204. See also I.R.C. §§ 1251(b)(2), 1256(e)(3)(B), and 6661(b)(1)(B). 
205. I.R.C. § 1244(a). 
206. It would be reasonable to condition such an extension upon the cor-
poration's continuous qualifications as an S corporation during the period beginning 
with the issuance of the section 1244 stock and ending on the date the loss is 
incurred. 
207. As under prior law, stock issued by an S corporation may be section 
1244 stock and normally it is desirable to qualify under that provision. However, 
in contrast to the revision of Subchapter S, the passive investment income limita-
tion on corporations issuing section 1244 stock has been retained. I.R.C. § 
1244(c)(1)(C). 
208. I.R.C. § 1363(b)(1). 
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shareholder is required to take into account on his individual return 
his pro rata share of each such item.319 Under partnership tax ac-
counting the number of such items that must be separately stated 
is indeed impressive.210 The Code in section 702(a) enumerates only 
six such items while the regulations,211 issued under express 
statutory authority,212 add many more. The partnership informa-
tion return adds still others. Moreover, the partnership regula-
tions provide that additional items must be separately stated and 
taken into account by all partners if the separate statement would 
result in an income tax liability for any partner that would vary 
from the liability resulting from a failure to state the item 
separately.213 The items specifically enumerated in the Code, in the 
regulations, or on the return, must be separately stated in all events 
but other items are to be stated separately only if that statement 
would affect the tax liability of a partner. Thus, literal compliance 
with the partnership regulations requires that the partnership 
specifically determine in each year, based upon the individual 
characteristics of the partner's return, whether separate statement 
would affect the tax liability of a partner. 
Unlike the partnership approach, new section 1366(a)(1) merely 
provides that the items that must be separately stated are those 
"the separate treatment of which could affect the liability for tax 
of any shareholder." The significance of the different statutory ap-
proach to the S corporation is not clear since no reference is made 
in the legislative history to the deviation from the partnership pro-
visions. Specifically, it is not clear what frame of reference should 
be used in interpreting the meaning of the word "could" in section 
1366. Virtually any item of income could affect the tax liability 
of a shareholder of a Subchapter S corporation under some con-
ceivable configuration of his individual income. If that is the con-
struction that the Treasury places on the new statutory language, 
the number of items that must be separately stated for S corpora-
tion purposes will be even greater than the number of items that 
must presently be separately stated for partnerships. On the other 
hand, the proper frame of reference for interpreting the word 
"could" might be the individual characteristics of the shareholder's 
returns. That is, a separate statement may be required if such 
statement "could" be material to a shareholder in view of his other 
sources of income and expense. In that event, the number of items 
that must be separately stated for an S corporation might be 
materially less than the number that must be separately stated 
209. I.R.C. § 1366(a)(ll. 
210. See McKEE, supra note 73, at , 9.03. 
211. Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1(a)(8)(i) (1972). 
212. I.R.C. § 702(a)(7). 
213. Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1(a)(8)(ii) (1960). 
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by a partnership, although the same problem of individual deter-
minations of shareholders' income and expense situations would 
remain. This uncertainty with respect to the scope of section 1366, 
engendered by the use of the word "could" rather than the word 
"would," should not substantively affect the tax liability of S cor-
poration shareholders. It is clear that if the separate statement 
would make a difference in fact, a separate statement must occur. 
Rather, the doubt pertains to the procedural question of how com-
plex it will be to prepare S corporation information returns. Not-
withstanding the ambiguity of the statutory language, it is prob-
able that in issuing regulations pursuant to this provision the 
Treasury will follow the partnership format. Thus, it can be ex-
pected that through a combination of these regulations and the 
Subchapter S information return, S corporations will be required 
to separately state a specified list of items of income and expense, 
which probably will correspond to the items that must be separately 
stated on a partnership return. In addition, the Treasury undoubted-
ly will require the separate statement of any additional item if 
that separate statement would affect the tax liability of any 
shareholder. 
c. Characterization of Income 
While Congress was unquestionably correct in conforming the 
taxation of S corporations to the existing pattern of taxing part-
nerships, that approach is not an entirely unmixed blessing. The 
conformity thereby achieved necessarily will include the uncertain-
ties that persist in partnership taxation. For example, new sec-
tion 1366(b), governing the characterization of items of income and 
expense allocated to a shareholder, states that the character of 
any item is to be determined "as if such item were realized directly 
from the source from which realized by the corporation." This 
language is quoted directly from the similar provision applicable 
to partnerships.214 Where the characterization of an item of income 
and expense is inherent in the item itself and is unaffected by the 
nature of the recipient, this provision has caused little difficulty 
under partnership taxation. However, it has long been recognized 
that this provision is ambiguous where the character of an item 
is affected by the nature of its recipient.215 For example, gain from 
the sale of property that would be entitled to capital gains taxa-
tion if the property had been owned by some sellers, will be sub-
ject to ordinary income taxation if the seller is a dealer in such 
property. In that event, the character of an item received by the 
214. I.R.C. § 702(b). 
215. MCKEE, supra note 73, at , 9.05. 
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corporation might be very different from the character of the same 
item received by one of the shareholders. The literal language of 
new section 1366(b), as well as the language of the partnership 
taxation predecessor, suggests that the characterization is to be 
made, at the shareholder or partner level. If that were the case, 
different shareholders could be subject to different characteriza-
tions of the same item of income passed through the S corporation 
and that diversity of result would make it impossible for the S 
corporation to allocate separately items of income and expense. 
The corporation would not know whether the item constituted 
ordinary income or capital gains; therefore, it would be unable to 
state separately the total amount of its capital gains and inven-
tory sales income and thus would be required to state separately 
each item of income and expense from each separate transaction 
in which the corporation engages- a totally impossible burden. 
When this question has arisen in the taxation of partnerships, 
the more sensible construction generally has been achieved. The 
Commissioner usually has taken the position that characterization 
is to be determined at the partnership level and the courts usually 
have agreed.216 The legislative history of the Revision Act reflects 
not only this confusion under partnership law but also Congress' 
intention to incorporate that confusion into the new S corporation 
rules. Thus, the House Report states that the characterization rule 
for S corporations will be the same as the partnership rule and 
that "under the partnership rules, this has generally resulted in 
an entity level characterization."217 
In relatively rare circumstances, entity characterization might 
result in improper tax avoidance. For example, a dealer in a cer-
tain type of property might transfer that property in a non-recog-
nition exchange to an entity that he dominated and largely owned 
in an attempt to secure capital gains on the disposition of the prop-
erty. In such a circumstance, the character of the proceeds of the 
disposition should be determined, arguably, by reference to the 
dealer himself and not the entity.218 Absent such transparent tax 
avoidance, however, entity characterization yields the proper result 
and is likely to prevail in the taxation of S corporations. 
216. See, e.g., Barnham v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 43 (M.D. Ga. 1969), 
aff'd per curiam, 429 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1970); Rev. Rul. 67-188, 1967-1 C.B. 216. 
But see Riddell v. Scales, 406 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1969). See generally MCKEE. supra 
note 73, at , 9.05. 
217. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 16; SENATE REPORT, supra note 22, 
at 17. · 
218. To the limited extent of distinguishing ordinary from capital gain, this 
level of characterization problem also existed under the old Subchapter S rules. 
In an attempt to avoid the results described in the text, Treas. Reg. § 1.1375-l(d) 
(1960) provided that while the character of gain was determined ordinarily at 
the corporate level, if a Subchapter S corporation was used to convert ordinary 
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d. Elections 
One feature of partnership taxation that many taxpayers find 
unduly restrictive is the requirement that most elections be made 
at the partnership level. The entity level election requirement has 
been justified on the ground that a partnership must be able to 
compute its items of income and expense in order to allocate those 
items to its partners. On the other hand, the very nature of an 
election contained in the income tax laws implies an understand-
ing that different taxpayers may be affected quite differently by 
a taxing provision and, within the tolerance allowed by the election, 
should be able to arrange their tax position to their best advantage. 
Most elections are contained in provisions in which Congress in-
tended to provide a benefit while recognizing that in certain circum-
stances the "benefit" offered might prove to be a disadvantage. 
A taxpayer already sustaining operating losses, for example, derives 
relatively little benefit from increasingly accelerated methods of 
depreciation. Thus, the new cost recovery system, granted by sec-
tion 168 in lieu of depreciation, permits taxpayers a wide latitude 
in selecting the degree of acceleration they wish to claim. To the 
extent that taxpayers are bound by an election made at the cor-
porate or partnership level, they are denied this flexibility. 
The conflict between aggregate and entity characterization of 
a partnership often reduces to a conflict between flexibility and 
administrative ease. The preference for partnership level elections 
may represent an excessive concern for simplifying the audit of 
partnerships. In some circumstances the added complexity of per- . 
mitting elections at the partner level may be intolerably great, 
not only to the Commissioner, but also to the partnership itself. 
In many other cases, however, this conclusion is far from clear. 
In any event, Congress has followed the partnership format 
in section 1363(c).219 Subject to the same exceptions as are applicable 
to partnerships,220 all elections are to be made by the S corpora-
tion. Unfortunately, the list of exceptions to this general rule con-
tained in section 1363 is not exclusive. Specific sections of the Code 
occasionally provide that elections provided under those sections 
income into capital gain in connection with the contemplated disposition of prop-
erty, the character of the gain might be determined at the shareholder level. 
This "collapsible" provision was not tested and its validity remains in doubt. A 
similar provision probably will be included in the regulations governing S 
corporations. 
219. See I.R.C. § 703(b). 
220. The shareholder level elections provided by I.R.C. § 1363(c)(2) are those 
provided by: (1) I.R.C. §§ 108(d)(4) (discharge of indebtedness) and (d)(5); (2) I.R.C. 
§ 163(d) (investment interest); (3) I.R.C. § 617 (mining exploration expenses); 
and (4) I.R.C. § 901 (foreign tax credit). I.R.C. § 703(b)(1) also includes the election 
under I.R.C. § 57(c) (defining net leases) but that provision is now obsolete. 
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are to be made at the partner or S corporation shareholder level. 
For example, TEFRA added new section 58(i) which permits tax-
payers to amortize the tax benefits attributable to certain 
enumerated preference items over a 10-year period. If that elec-
tion is made, the amortized items are not treated as items of tax 
preference either for the purpose of the alternative minimum tax 
imposed by section 55 on noncorporate taxpayers or the add-on 
minimum tax imposed· by section 56 on corporations. Section 
58(i)(5)(D) provides that an election to claim the benefits of this 
new provision is to be made separately by each partner or 
shareholder of an S corporation. If Congress wished to provide 
an enumeration in section 1363 of exceptions to the entity level 
election provision, it is regrettable that the enumeration could 
not be complete. 
Clearly, it is desirable for the taxation of S corporations to 
parallel the taxation of partnerships to the greatest extent possi-
ble. However, it is not at all clear that elections that can be made 
at the partner level without causing excessive complexity or unfair-
ness can also be made with similar ease at the S corporation 
shareholder level. There are important differences between the 
taxation of S corporations under the Revision Act and the taxa-
tion of partnerships, and those differences, in some circumstances, 
make certain shareholder level elections impractical. For example, 
the election under section 617 to deduct the cost of exploring for 
hard minerals is excessively complex. Section 617 is considered 
below in connection with other Revision Act changes governing 
the treatment of natural resources.221 A second election that does 
not seem to operate properly at the shareholder level is the elec-
tion to defer cancellation of indebtedness income. 
In general, the cancellation of an indebtedness produces a gain 
to the debtor that is taxable as ordinary income.2Z! Under the recent-
ly revised sections 108 and 1017, the recognition of that cancellation 
income, in certain circumstances, may be deferred. To the extent 
that the taxpayer is insolvent or the discharge occurs in the course 
of a federal bankruptcy proceeding under Title 11, the amount of 
the income is automatically applied in reduction of the taxpayer's 
carryovers of operating losses, credits and capital losses in a 
statutorily prescribed order.223 Any remaining income then is ap-
plied in reduction of the basis of the taxpayer's depreciable pro-
perty in the manner prescribed in section 1017.224 In addition, if 
the indebtedness was incurred in a trade or business, the taxpayer 
221. See text accompanying note 462 infra. 
222. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12 (1960). 
223. I.R.C. § 108(b). 
224. I.R.C. § 108(b)(2)(D). 
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may elect to reduce the basis of his depreciable property by the 
amount that would otherwise be taxed currently as cancellation 
income, thus deferring tax on that amount.225 Following the rule 
applicable to partnerships, section 108(d)(6) provides that the pro-
visions of section 108 are to be applied at the shareholder level 
in the case of an S corporation and section 1363(c)(2)(A) provides 
that the elections that may be made under section 108 are to be 
made separately by each shareholder. The key to understanding 
this pattern of section 108 lies in the insolvency exception to 
cancellation of indebtedness income under prior law.226 Since as 
a matter of state law, general partners have unlimited personal 
liability for partnership obligations, it makes little sense to apply 
the insolvency test at the partnership level. If the partners 
themselves were solvent and all of the creditors of the partner-
ship would be repaid fully, there is no justification for failing to 
tax income derived through the cancellation of an indebtedness 
merely because the assets of the partnership itself were insuffi-
cient to discharge the partnership obligations. Applying the in-
solvency test at the partner level, however, produces different 
results to different partners as some may be insolvent while others 
are not. In addition, the elective application of section 108 is ap-
plicable only to the extent that a cancellation causes the taxpayer 
to become solvent.227 Thus, the amount subject to the election may 
well vary for each partner. As a result, it is entirely appropriate 
for section 108, and the elections thereunder, to apply at the part-
ner level. On the other hand, there could have been the potential 
for a substantial unfairness in so applying the basis reduction rules 
of section 108. In many instances, the only depreciable property 
in which a partner may have an interest would be the property 
belonging to the partnership itself. If section 108 relief could be 
elected only by a solvent partner to the extent that the partner 
individually owned depreciable property, the benefits of that pro-
vision would commonly be unavailable to partners. Since the part-
nership, which had originally incurred the indebtedness now can-
celled, might nevertheless own substantial amounts of depreciable 
property, barring a partner from the benefits of section 108 would 
be both irrational and excessively harsh. To prevent this result, 
section 1017(b)(3)(C) provides that the interest of a partner in a 
partnership shall be treated as depreciable property to the extent 
that the property owned by the partnership consists of depreciable 
property. In order for a partner to be entitled to reduce the basis 
of his partnership interest under this provision, the partnership 
225. I.R.C. § 108(c). 
226. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12(b) (1960); Lakeland Grocery Co., 36 B.T.A. 289 (1937). 
227. I.R.C. § 108(a)(2). 
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also must reduce its basis in depreciable property as to that partner. 
The net effect of these provisions is to extend to the partner the 
benefits of section 108 by permitting him to recognize the cancella-
tion income through greater distributions of income from the part-
nership to him in future years. 
While section 108 is also applicable at the shareholder level 
in an S corporation, the rationality of that application is not en-
tirely clear. The shareholders of S corporations do not have 
unlimited personal liability with respect to the obligations of the 
corporation; therefore, insolvency at the corporate level is mean-
ingful. On the other hand, the tax carryovers to be reduced through 
the operation of section 108 do not exist at the corporate level 
but rather are aspects of the computation of the tax liability of 
the respective shareholders. Unfortunately, section 1017 does not 
permit shareholders in S corporations to reduce the basis of their 
S corporation stock in a manner analogous to the reduction of the 
basis of a partnership interest. Accordingly, the unfairness 
described above exists with respect to S corporation shareholders 
and, in many instances, those shareholders will not be able to take 
advantage of the elective deferral of tax on cancellation income 
extended by section 108 to partnerships and other taxpayers. This 
harsher treatment of shareholders of S corporations is wrong and 
should be corrected by permitting a corporate level election to 
reduce the basis of property in order to obtain the deferral benefits 
of section 108. 
Congress appears to have recognized this defect under section 
108 and the TCB has adopted the approach suggested above. 228 
Under the proposed amendment, section 108 is to be applied at 
the corporate, rather than the shareholder, level and the elections 
available under that section are to be made at the corporate level. 
In addition, for the purpose of reducing the tax attributes of the 
S corporation, losses not currently available to the shareholders 
under section 1366(d)(1), because they exceed the basis of their in-
vestment, are to be treated as a net operating loss of the S cor-
poration. That provision may require further development. As 
presently drafted, the TCB amendment could cause the burden 
of section 108 to fall unevenly among the shareholders since dif-
ferent shareholders will have different amounts of non-deductible 
losses. 
e. Ceilings 
Under many provisions of the Code, a ceiling is imposed upon 
a benefit or allowance that is extended to a taxpayer. Neither the 
new statutory provisions for S corporations nor the legislative 
228. TCB § 201(b). 
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history to the provisions address the question of whether those 
limitations are to apply at the corporate or shareholder level. The 
general statements in the committee reports, however, suggesting 
that the computation of S corporation income is to follow the com-
putation of partnership income, probably will control the resolu-
tion of this issue.229 Unfortunately, the treatment of ceilings for 
partnership purposes has never been entirely clear.230 The regula-
tions indicate that the ceilings are to be imposed at the partner 
level without addressing the question of whether they are also 
applicable at the partnership level.231 In addition, many specific sec-
tions of the Code granting allowances contain their own rule. For 
example, the limitation contained in section 48(c)(2) on the invest-
ment tax credit applicable to used property is to be determined 
at both the partner and partnership level. Accompanying the new 
S corporation rules are a series of amendments to other sections 
of the Code that attempt to integrate the new S corporation into 
the complicated scheme of the law. Where the specific section in 
the past addressed whether ceilings were to be imposed at the 
partner or partnership level, the issue has been resolved similarly 
with respect to S corporations. For example, the limitations on 
the investment tax credit for used property applicable to partners 
and partnerships has been extended to S corporations and their 
shareholders.232 Similarly, the Act copied the enormously complex 
partner level ceiling on the depletion allowance for oil or gas 
production.233 
f. Foreign Income 
Section 1363(c)(2)(D) provides that each shareholder make the 
229. See, e.g., HousE REPORT, supra note 22, at 6. 
230. MCKEE, supra note 73, at , 9.08[1]. 
231. Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1(a)(8)(iii) (1972). 
232. I.R.C. § 48(c)(2)(D). Similar rules are contained in I.R.C. §§ 179(d)(8) and 
194(b)(2)(B). I.R.C. § 48(q)(1) requires a corporate level reduction, equal to fifty 
percent of the investment tax credit, in the basis of the asset as to which the 
investment tax credit was taken. Neither I.R.C. § 48(q) nor the Revision Act re-
quires any offsetting adjustment at the shareholder level, although it is clear 
that the credit itself will be allocated to the shareholders under I.R.C. § 
1366(a)(1)(A). TCB § 102(b) would add new I.R.C. § 48(q)(6), that would require 
an "appropriate" adjustment in the basis of the S corporation stock in the hands 
of the shareholders to "take into account" the corporate level reduction in the 
basis of the asset; the provision requires the same adjustment in the basis of 
a partner's interest in a partnership. The appropriate adjustment in a partner's 
basis for his or her partnership interest may have to be determined individually, 
to take into account the effect of any special allocations. Since special allocations 
are not permitted under Subchapter S, the "appropriate adjustment" will always 
be a reduction in the shareholder's basis in the S corporation stock equal to his 
or her pro rata share of the corporate level reduction in basis. 
233. I.R.C. § 613A(c)(13). See text accompanying notes 456-62 infra. 
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election under section 901 to treat his or her share of any foreign 
taxes paid as a deduction or a tax credit; section 1366(a)(1) pro-
vides that the amount subject to the election shall be separately 
stated.234 These rules parallel the treatment of the foreign tax credit 
in partnership taxation.235 In addition, new section 1373(a) provides 
that, for purposes of the provisions ·dealing with the foreign tax 
credit (sections 901 through 908) and controlled foreign corpora-
tions (sections 951 through 964), the S corporation will be treated 
as a partnership and its shareholders as partners. Section 1373(a) 
was apparently added to make clear that source rules, including 
the capital gains source rule of section 904(b), and the limitations 
of sections 904 and 907 will also apply at the shareholder level.236 
These source rules and limitations apply at the partner level by 
virtue of section 901(b). To implement this rule, the legislative 
history contemplates that items of foreign source income and loss 
will also be among the items required to be separately stated under 
section 1366(a)(l)(A).237 In addition, section 1373(a) makes it clear 
that neither the S corporation nor its shareholders are entitled 
to the credit for foreign taxes paid by foreign subsidiaries under 
section 902. 
The election to be taxed under Subchapter Sand the termina-
tion of the election are treated under section 1373(b) as disposi-
tions of the business for purposes of the recapture of foreign losses 
under section 904(f). Thus, when a corporation elects to be taxed 
under Subchapter S, it will have to recapture any foreign losses 
previously taken and not previously recaptured. Similarly, upon 
the termination of the corporation's Subchapter S election, the 
shareholders will have to recapture any foreign losses passed out 
to them and not previously recaptured. This rule seems correct 
234. The flush language following I.R.C. § 1366(a)(1) requires a separate state-
ment of amounts described in I.R.C. § 702(a)(6). That is the section requiring a 
separate statement of a partner's distributive share of foreign taxes paid by the 
partnership. 
235. I.R.C. §§ 703(b)(5) and 702(b)(6). 
236. SENATE REPORT, supra note 22, at 16; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, 
at 15. One author has suggested that this provision will permit special allocation 
of foreign taxes to particular shareholders in charge of the S corporation's foreign 
operations, pursuant to Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2). That regulation deals with the 
extent to which special allocation of foreign source income to particular partners 
will be considered to have substantial economic effect. Fellows, Allocation of 
Foreign Taxes To S Corporation Shareholders Under the Subchapter S Revision 
Act of 1982, 61 TAXES 402 (1983). While a literal reading of the phrase "treated 
as a partnership" might lead to that conclusion, it seems reasonably clear that 
Congress's intent in drafting this provision was only to permit tax treatment 
of foreign taxes to be determined at the shareholder level instead of at the cor-
poration level, rather than to deviate from the general rules of section 1366 with 
respect to allocation among shareholders. 
237. SENATE REPORT, supra note 22, at 16; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, 
at 15. 
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inasmuch as a different taxpayer will be eligible for the foreign 
tax credit before and after an election or termination. However, 
it injects an additional consideration that was not present under 
prior law into the decision to elect or terminate Subchapter S 
treatment. 
3. Timing and Shifting of Income 
a. In General 
In marked contrast to the inflexibility of the computation of 
the income of a Subchapter S corporation, prior law permitted a 
substantial degree of latitude in the timing of the taxation of the 
income of a Subchapter S corporation to its shareholders and in 
the ability to shift that income from one shareholder to another. 
While shareholders were subject to tax on actual distributions from 
the Subchapter S corporation in the taxable year of the shareholder 
in which the distribution was received,238 constructive distributions 
of undistributed taxable income were subject to tax in the taxable 
year of the shareholder in which the taxable year of the corpora-
tion ended.239 Moreover, in contrast to the rules governing the selec-
tion of the taxable year for partnerships, which in general requires 
that partners and partnerships be on the same taxable year,240 there 
were no special restrictions upon the adoption of the taxable year 
for a Subchapter S corporation.241 
The flexibility that these provisions created was not lost on 
practitioners and it was not uncommon for Subchapter S corpora-
tions to adopt taxable years ending on January 31. Under such 
election, income derived by a Subchapter S corporation during the 
period extending from February 1, 1970 to January 31, 1971 would 
be included in the shareholders' taxable income for the year 1971 
for which a return was not due until April 15, 1972. As a result, 
taxpayers were able to defer the payment of tax for substantial 
periods of time. Perhaps even more favorably, the shareholders 
of the Subchapter S corporation could elect whether they wished 
to take advantage of that deferral possibility or whether they 
wished to accelerate tax on the corporate income. For example, 
in a year in which a major Subchapter S shareholder had unusually 
238. Treas. Reg. § 1.1373-l(f) (1960). 
239. Former I.R.C. § 1373(b). 
240. I.R.C. § 706(b)(l). 
241. Like other corporations, a new Subchapter S corporation could adopt 
any taxable year under I.R.C. § 441. However, the regulations imposed greater 
restrictions upon the change of a Subchapter S corporation's taxable year than 
upon the change of a regular corporation's taxable year. Treas. Reg.§ 1.442-l(c)(4) 
(1960). 
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low income outside of the corporation, the shareholders could cause 
the corporation to make an actual cash distribution prior to the 
expiration of the calendar year. Thus, given the availability of cash, 
which of course could always be borrowed, Subchapter S share-
holders had substantial flexibility in selecting the year in which 
they wished to be taxed on income earned by the corporation. 
Even more inconsistent with the normal application of the Code, 
shareholders of a Subchapter S corporation had the opportunity 
to shift the liability for taxes on Subchapter S income even after 
that income had been earned. The rule applicable under prior law, 
that the constructive distribution of undistributed taxable income 
must be included in the return of a stockholder on the last day 
of the taxable year of the Subchapter S corporation, was not altered 
by shifts in the ownership of the corporate stock during the year. 
Thus, as long as the Subchapter S stockholder was willing to make 
a complete and unconditional transfer of his ownership of the stock, 
he could transfer his potential liability for tax with respect to the 
portion of the corporation's undistributed taxable income allocable 
to his stock by making a gift of that stock just prior to the close 
of the corporation's taxable year. By making such gifts in years 
in which the corporation had unusually large amounts of income 
and by transferring the stock to members of his family in materially 
lower income tax brackets, a Subchapter S shareholder could obtain 
quite substantial savings in income taxes. 
Under the Revision Act, Congress has restricted severely the 
ability of taxpayers to manipulate the timing of taxation of S cor-
poration income and has eliminated the ability of taxpayers to shift 
the incidence of tax on that income to transferees. Under new sec-
tion 1378, an S corporation must use, as its period for accounting 
for taxable income, a "permitted" year, which is defined as the 
calendar year, unless it is able to establish to the satisfaction of 
the Commissioner that there is a business purpose for the adoption 
of a different accounting period. 242 This provision follows the 
substance, although not the form, of the partnership rules which 
require a partnership to use the same accounting period as that 
used by all of its principal partners, defined as partners having 
a five percent or greater interest in partnership profits or capital/43 
unless a business purpose is established for the use of a different 
year.244 
In Revenue Procedure 83-25,245 the Commissioner has issued 
relatively liberal rules governing the adoption or retention of a 
242. I.R.C. § 1378(b). 
243. Treas. Reg. § 1.706-1(b)(3) (1973). 
244. I.R.C. § 706(b)(1). 
245. 1983-15 I.R.B. 13. 
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fiscal year other than the calendar year by corporations in con-
nection with the making of an S election.246 The Procedure states 
three situations in which a fiscal year other than the calendar year 
will constitute a permitted year under section 1378. First, a per-
mitted year includes any fiscal year if shareholders owning a major-
ity of the outstanding stock in the S corporation have or adopt 
the same year. 247 In addition, the Procedure indicates that the per-
mitted year requirement is satisfied if the requested year will result 
in a deferral of income for a period of three months or less to 
shareholders owning a majority of the outstanding stock in the 
corporation. 248 Thus, in a corporation the majority of whose 
shareholders are calendar year taxpayers, fiscal years ending on 
the last day of September, October or November will be permitted 
years. Thirdly, the Procedure indicates that a permitted year in-
cludes the natural business year of the corporation, and contains 
a mechanical test for determining whether a proposed fiscal year 
constitutes the natural business year for this purpose.249 
The general effective date of the Revision Act is January 1, 
1983 and, as originally adopted, that general provision also was 
applicable to the new taxable year provisions.250 However, the 
Treasury Department evidently became concerned that too many 
S corporations would attempt to adopt fiscal years prior to the 
first day of 1983 in order to take advantage of the grandfathering 
provision described below. Accordingly, in the Technical Correc-
246. Unfortunately, the Commissioner has not yet indicated whether similar 
rules will apply to corporations that have elected previously to be taxed under 
Subchapter S and now wish to change their fiscal year. However, Congress has· 
expressly indicated an intention that the rules governing whether an S corpora-
tion may have an accounting period other than the calendar year be similar to 
those governing partnerships. H-R REP. No. 986 (Conf. Rep.), 97th Cong., 2nd 
Sess. 22 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4203, 4210. For 
the procedures governing adoption and change of partnership fiscal years, see 
Treas. Reg. § L706-1(b)(4) (1973) and the Revenue Procedures cited in notes 248 
and 249 infra. 
247. Rev. Proc. 83-25, § 4.02, 1983-15 I.R.B. 13, 15. However, in order for 
the S corporation to qualify for this permitted year, any principal shareholders 
who change their accounting year to the one chosen for the corporation first must 
secure the approval of the Commissioner for their change of year under Treas. 
Reg. § 1.442-l(b)(1) (1960). A principal shareholder is one who owns more than 
five percent of the outstanding stock in the corporation. Temp. Reg.§ 18.1378-l(b)(1), 
48 Fed. Reg. 3593 (1983) (to be codified _at 26 C.F.R. pt. 18). 
248. Rev. Proc. 83-25, § 4.03, 1983-15 I.R.B. 13, 15. Rev. Proc. 72-51, 1972-2 
C.B. 832, provides a similar de minimus rule for partnerships as long as the deferral 
is no longer than three months for any principal partner. 
249. Rev. Proc. 83-25, § 4.04, 1983-15 I.R.B. 13, 15-16. Compare Rev. Proc. 
74-33, 1974-2 C.B. 489, which defines the natural business year of a partnership 
and the extent to which it may be used as the partnership's accounting period. 
250. Revision Act, § 6(a). Pub. L. No. 97-354, § 6(a), 96 Stat. 1669, 1697 (1982). 
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tions Act of 1982,251 Congress provided that section 1378, govern-
ing the taxable years of S corporations, should take effect on the 
day following October 19, 1982, the date when the Revision Act 
was approved.252 Therefore, unless the corporation had elected to 
be taxed under Subchapter S prior to October 20, 1982 and had 
adopted a fiscal year other than the calendar ·year prior to that 
date, it will be required to adopt a permitted year in accordance 
with the new rules of section 1378 before it will be eligible to elect 
Subchapter S treatment.253 The Temporary Regulations mitigate 
the retroactive application of this effective date provision through 
the adoption of a generally available de minimus rule consistent 
with Revenue Procedure 83-25. Thus, a corporation that was formed 
prior to January 1; 1982, filed a Subchapter S election after Oc-
tober 19, 1982, and adopted a taxable year ending on the last day 
of September, October or November, will be permitted to retain 
that taxable year.254 
A potential trap exists under section 1378 for taxpayers 
attempting to elect under Subchapter S when, whether through 
ignorance or otherwise, the corporation has not adopted a permitted 
year. In that event, the election will not be effective unless the 
corporation seeks and obtains a determination from the Commis-
sioner that a business purpose exists for the use of the adopted 
fiscal year. The Temporary Regulations255 attempt to prevent such 
ineffective elections first by providing that in most circumstances256 
a corporation may adopt automatically a calendar year if it other-
wise does not have a permitted year and, then, by providing that 
the making of a Subchapter S election by a corporation eligible 
for that automatic change will be treated as an automatic change 
of the taxable year to the calendar year. That relatively imaginative 
regulation will save many elections that otherwise would not have 
become effective. Some taxpayers, however, may be surprised to 
learn that the filing of a Subchapter S election automatically 
changed their accounting period. If such a corporation wishes 
to retain its fiscal year, or to adopt a new fiscal year other than 
the calendar year, the Temporary Regulations provide that such 
251. Pub. L. No. 97-448, 96 Stat. 2365 (1982). 
252. Pub. L. No. 97-448, § 305(d)(1)(A), 96 Stat. 2365, 2399 adding § 6(f) to 
Revision Act. 
253. I.R.C. § 1378(a)(2). 
254. Temp. Reg. § 18.1378-1(c), 48 Fed. Reg. 3593 (1983) (to be codified at 
26 C.F.R. pt. 18); Rev. Proc. 83-25, § 4.03, 1983-15 I.R.B. 13, 15. 
255. Temp. Reg. § 18.1378-l(b), 48 Fed. Reg. 3593 (1983) (to be codified at 
26 C.F.R. pt. 18). 
256. The regulation requires that all shareholders owning 5% or more of 
the outstanding stock of the corporation have or adopt the calendar year as their 
taxable period. 
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a request may accompany the making of a Subchapter S election.257 
If the request is denied, however, the Subchapter S election will 
not become effective unless the election is accompanied by a further 
request to adopt the calendar year in the event that the request 
to adopt a different year is denied. These Temporary Regulations 
apply to all Subchapter S elections made after October 19, 1982. 
Some of the more complicated provisions of the new S corpora-
tion rules are addressed to transitional problems. The general rule 
of section 1378 does not require existing Subchapter S corporations 
that presently use a fiscal year that would not be permissible under 
the new law to change their accounting period. Thus, corporations 
for which a valid Subchapter S election was in effect prior to 
October 20, 1982 may continue to obtain whatever benefits of defer-
ral they obtained previously. The grandfathering of existing cor-
porations obviously created the potential for the development of 
a market in used Subchapter S corporations that could provide 
the benefits of an 11-month deferral of tax to their new owners. 
In order to prevent, or at least retard, that development, section 
1378(c) effectively provides for the loss of grandfathered status 
upon a shift in the ownership of the corporation in excess of fifty 
percentage points subsequent to December 31, 1982. Since the appli-
cation of this rule will require a clear demonstration of the percent-
age of stock in the Subchapter S corporation owned by each 
shareholder on December 31, 1982, any ambiguities in ownership 
should be resolved promptly. In order to make the required com-
putation, the increase in the percentage of the stock of the S cor-
poration owned by each shareholder must be aggregated with the 
similar increases of all other shareholders. When that increase ex-
ceeds 50%, grandfathered status will be lost. Having so provided, 
Congress continued to exclude certain increases in stock owner-
ship from the fatal computation.258 Thus, stock acquired from any 
person who owned it on December 31, 1982 (or who acquired it 
in an exempt transfer) either by inheritance from any person, by 
gift from a family member (within the meaning of section 267(c)(4)), 
or pursuant to certain buy-sell agreements259 from a family member 
257. Temp. Reg. § 18.1378-l(b)(2)(ii), 48 Fed. Reg. 3593 (1983) (to be codified 
at 26 C.F .R. pt. 18). 
258. I.R.C. § 1378(c)(3). 
259. This buy-sell agreement exception of I.R.C. § 1378(c)(3)(A)(ii) (III) is 
defined quite tightly. The agreement must have been continually in force since 
September 28, 1982, and must provide that on the death of a stockholder, his 
stock "will be" sold to those surviving parties to the agreement who were par-
ties on September 28, 1982. The provision suggests that both the obligation to 
sell and the obligation to purchase must be mandatory and unconditional. Oddly, 
however, the provision does not require that the agreement be written. 
Although the definition of a qualified buy-sell agreement refers only to sales 
on the death of a shareholder, the provision exempting this stock exempts ac-
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is not to be treated as acquired after 1982, but rather will be 
regarded as held on December 31, 1982. It should be underscored 
that this dispensation does not extend to all acquisitions of stock 
by one S corporation shareholder from another but only to acquisi-
tions of stock in the manner described above by any person, 
regardless of whether he was a shareholder on December 31, 1982. 
For example, if one individual who was a shareholder on December 
31, 1982 purchases stock in the corporation from another such 
shareholder (other than pursuant to a qualified buy-sell agreement) 
the increase in percentage ownership of the S corporation so pur-
chased counts against grandfathered status. 
The greatest danger of accidental loss of grandfathered status 
will occur when S corporation stock is redeemed, perhaps because 
of death or retirement of a shareholder-employee. Such a redemp-
tion automatically increases the percentage ownership of the S cor-
poration stock by each of the remaining shareholders. If over 
one-half of the stock that remains outstanding following the redemp-
tion is treated under these rules as having been acquired after 
December 31, 1982, grandfathered status will be lost by virtue of 
the redemption. Although many buy-sell agreements commonly used 
by closely held corporations require that a shareholder's stock be 
redeemed by the corporation rather than purchased by the other 
shareholders, such agreements are not covered by the statutory 
exception for newly acquired stock. Presumably, that omission was 
intentional. If shifts in ownership occasioned by a redemption did 
not produce a loss of grandfathered status, the 50% change in 
ownership rule could be circumvented all too easily through a com-
bination of sales and redemptions. Obviously, the application of 
this transitional rule must be monitored carefully. It is not fully 
clear whether buy-sell agreements in effect on September 28, 1982 
may be modified at the present time to replace mandatory redemp-
tion provisions with shareholder purchase requirements and 
thereby obtain the benefit of the grandfathering rule. The defini-
tion of a "qualified buy-sell agreement" contained in section 
1378(c)(3)(D) requires only that the agreement be in existence since 
September 28, 1982 and that the agreement provide that upon death 
stock will be sold to persons who were parties to the agreement 
on that date. The provision does not specifically address amend-
ments to agreements or require that the parties to such agreements 
were bound on September 28, 1982 to purchase the stock. Never-
theless, it would be appropriate for all of the grandfathering pro-
visions to be narrowly construed. On the other hand, buy-sell 
agreements can always be amended to delete mandatory redemp-
quisitions "from a qualified transferor (or his estate) who was a member of' the 
transferee's family. Thus, it is unclear whether inter vivos sales pursuant to a 
buy-sell agreement that also requires transfers at death fall within the exemption. 
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tion features that might result in the loss of grandfathering status. 
In many circumstances, it may be appropriate to convert mandatory 
redemption provisions into options or to provide an exception in 
the event that the redemption could result in the loss of grand-
fathered status.260 
The entire transitional rule provided under section 1378 should 
be criticized harshly. The overriding purpose for the adoption of 
the new S corporation rules was to simplify Subchapter S and to 
eliminate the countless "traps for the unwary" that littered its 
provisions. Complicated transitional rules such as this one govern-
ing the loss of grandfathered fiscal years are inconsistent with that 
objective. Of course, whenever Congress enacts a material change 
in the taxing statute it is appropriate to give due consideration 
to those who have acted in reliance upon prior law. On the other 
hand, that quite legitimate objective must in every instance be 
balanced with the countervailing desire to produce a Code that 
is manageable and comprehensible. From the perspectives of equity 
and complexity, the transitional rule in section 1378 is inappropriate. 
Since every S corporation continues to be eligible to adopt any 
fiscal year for which a business purpose exists, it is difficult to 
make a case for preserving the fiscal year of existing Subchapter 
S corporations on equitable grounds. By definition, such taxpayers 
had garnered a tax adv~ntage that Congress has now determined 
to be inappropriate. A continuation of the benefits that those 
shareholders legitimately received under prior law cannot be 
justified today. On the other hand, it was obviously a complicated 
matter for Congress to address the grandfathering of those benefits. 
On balance, the transitional rule of section 1378 is inappropriate 
and should be deleted.261 
While Congress equivocated with respect to the tax deferral 
potential inherent in the selection of fiscal years, it abruptly ter-
minated the ability of shareholders of S corporations either to affect 
260. If grandfathered status is lost and the corporation does not have a 
permitted year, I.R.C. § 1378 provides that the corporation no longer will be 
treated as an S corporation as of the beginning of its next taxable year. That 
provision raises many questions. Presumably, if a permitted year is adopted before 
the end of the year in which the loss of grandfathered status occurs, the election 
will not terminate at all although that is not certain from the statutory language. 
If Subchapter S status is in fact lost, it is unclear whether the loss constitutes 
a "termination" within I.R.C. § 1362(d); that provision does not refer to I.R.C. 
§ 1378. If the event is not a "termination," then it obviously cannot be an in-
advertent termination eligible for relief under I.R.C. § 1362(£). Presumably, 
therefore, the regulations will treat the loss of grandfathered status as a ter-
mination and as eligible for relief. 
261. For a compelling argument against all such grandfathering, see Graetz, 
Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision, 126 U. PA. 
L. REV. 47 (1977). 
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the timing of their liability for tax on corporate income or to shift 
the incidence of tax on that income to others. As examined more 
fully below,262 actual distributions by S corporations will no longer 
in most instances be subject to tax. Rather, as in the taxation of 
parnerships, S corporation shareholders are subject to tax on their 
allocable portion of the corporate income without regard to whether 
it has been distributed. In calculating each shareholder's allocable 
portion of the corporate income, the Revision Act employs the rule 
that previously was applicable to the allocation of Subchapter S 
losses, a topic also addressed below. 263 Under new section 1377(a), 
each item of S corporation income that must be separately stated, 
and the residual income, is to be allocated to each shareholder on 
a ratable basis determined by the number of days during the year 
in which he was a shareholder and his percentage interest in the 
corporation. If, under present law, a shareholder were to assign 
a portion of his stock in an S corporation to a child on December 
30, the transferor, not the child, would be subject to tax on all 
but the last day's worth of corporate income. While the foregoing 
description clearly is consistent with Congress' intent in enacting 
the new provisions/54 and undoubtedly reflects the manner in which 
it will be interpreted, the statutory language itself is not as 
clear. Section 1366(a)(l) requires that the income of an S corpora-
tion be taxable to shareholders in their taxable year in which the 
taxable year of the S corporation terminates. An individual who 
disposed of his entire interest in the corporation during the tax-
able year would not be a shareholder on the date on which the 
corporation's taxable year terminated. Nevertheless, it is quite clear 
that the statute is referring to any individual who was a shareholder 
at any time during the taxable year of the corporation.265 
Congress recognized that the general rule described above, 
allocating corporate income ratably to each day during the cor-
porate taxable year, would work a hardship in some cases. For 
example, if a shareholder sells his stock in an arm's-length trans-
action in an early part of the corporation's taxable year, he will 
be unable to establish a price for the stock that can reflect ac-
curately the income of the corporation to be earned during the 
balance of the year. Notwithstanding that the price established 
may reflect a projected low level of earnings, the shareholder will 
be subject to tax on a ratable share of the earnings derived 
262. See text accompanying notes 359-85 infra. 
263. See text accompanying note 291 infra. 
264. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 15-16. 
265. If a shareholder dies during the corporation's year, the portion of the 
S corporation income attributable to the period prior to his death is includable 
in the shareholder's final income tax return even though the corporation's year 
does not end within that final year. I.R.C. § 1366(a)(1). 
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throughout the entire year even though that amount is materially 
greater than the amount taken into account in the sale. In some 
situations, shareholders may be able to protect themselves from 
such occurrences by providing for contingent payments in the con-
tract of sale geared to the actual earnings of the corporation 
throughout the balance of the taxable year. Obviously, however, 
such agreements are unwieldy, create the potential for abuses be-
tween the parties, and are not obtainable in all events. Section 
1377(a)(2), therefore, provides an alternative rule for the allocation 
of items of income and expense in any year in which a shareholder 
terminates his interest in the corporation. If all persons who are 
shareholders in the corporation during the taxable year agree, for 
the sole purpose of the allocation of corporate income, the taxable 
year of the corporation shall be regarded as closed on the date 
on which the termination of interest occurs. In that event, income 
earned before and after the termination of interest is to be allocated 
separately as if the corporation had two taxable years. The re-
quirement that all shareholders of the S corporation concur in this 
alternative method for allocating corporate income seems un-
necessary. The alternative method of allocating income should have 
no effect at all upon shareholders who have not altered their in-
terests in a corporation during the taxable year. Since those in-
dividuals have no interest in the outcome of this election, it seems 
unnecessary and perhaps improper to permit them to participate 
in the election. It should have been sufficient for Congress to re-
quire all individuals who either completely terminated their in-
terest in the corporation during the year or acquired stock from 
such a terminating individual to consent to the election. 
As drafted, the alternative method for allocating income ap-
parently applies only in the event of a complete termination of 
interest, and the Temporary Regulations confirm that 
construction.266 Evidently, however, there is little reason to bar 
the application of this more flexible rule to a partial disposition 
of stock by a shareholder. The difficulties in establishing a proper 
purchase price on the sale of stock are just as great as they are 
when the shareholder completely terminates his interest. Perhaps 
in limiting the application of this provision to complete termina-
tions, Congress was concerned about the limited possibilities of 
shifting the tax on previously accrued income, or shifting accrued 
losses created by the elective provision. For example, many 
businesses have cyclical income patterns with substantial incomes 
in one portion of the year and reduced income or even losses in 
266. Temp. Reg. § 18.1377-1, 48 Fed. Reg. 3592 (1983) (to be codified at 26 
C.F.R. pt. 18). 
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other portions of the year. In that situation, a high bracket 
shareholder might wish to make a gift of stock following the low 
point in the business cycle, thus obtaining a loss for the short year 
for himself while shifting the income to be derived in the latter 
portion of the year to his lower bracket children. If the alternative 
method of allocating income is applicable only on a complete ter-
mination of interest, such careful timing of intra-family gifts can 
occur only once for each shareholder in the older generation. If 
partial dispositions invoked the alternative provision, such 
manipulations could occur on an annual basis. Nevertheless, a 
shareholder can dispose of his stock only once. It is difficult to 
see what greater tax avoidance is created by a series of small, 
but well timed, gifts of S corporation stock than would be produced 
by a single di~position by a member of the older generation of 
his entire interest, thus obtaining the entire benefit of splitting 
taxable years at one time. On balance, the need to provide greater 
flexibility in the allocation of income in the case of an arm's-length 
sale would appear to outweigh whatever concern Congress may 
· have had with respect to the shifting of income on the gift of S 
corporation stock. 
In contrast to Congress' careful attempts to prevent the assign-
ment of income by transfers of stock, the Revision Act apparently 
has created a major opportunity to shift the incidence of tax on 
accumulated earnings and profits through non-pro rata distributions, 
a possibility considered below. 
b. Special Allocations 
Two aspects of partnership taxation have proven to be critical 
to the tax shelter industry: the ability to specially allocate items 
of income and expense, and the addition of partnership indebtedness 
to the basis of the individual partners. Not too surprisingly, in 
spite of Congress' general objective to conform the taxation of 
S corporations to partnership taxation, the Revision Act contains 
neither provision. The basis question is considered later;267 the in-
ability to specially allocate items of corporate income and expense 
is analyzed here. 
In the taxation of partnerships, each item of income and ex-
pense is allocated to the partners pursuant to the terms of the 
partnership agreement, including any amendments prior to the date 
of filing the partnership return.266 That single provision gives the 
partnership form much of its enormous flexibility. On the other 
hand, the provision has produced, at least in the past, considerable 
267. See text accompanying notes 313-19 infra. 
268. I.R.C. §§ 704(a) and 761(c). 
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taxpayer abuse.269 Notwithstanding its potential for abuse, the 
ability to allocate specific items of partnership taxable income and 
deductible expense to particular partners, in a manner that varies 
from the general allocation of partnership income and expense or 
from the relative capital accounts of the partners, can serve an 
entirely legitimate business purpose. Perhaps the most appealing 
case for permitting such an allocation occurs upon the contribu-
tion of appreciated property to an existing partnership. Assume, 
for example, an existing partnership, AB, where the partnership 
assets consist of $100 in cash and assume that C has become an 
equal partner upon the contribution of appreciated property hav-
ing a value of $50. In reality, the property contributed to the part-
nership by C does not have a value to the partnership of $50 
because it brings with it the liability to pay federal income tax 
on the element of appreciation. That liability, however, cannot be 
valued accurately. The liability can be deferred indefinitely into 
the future by failing to dispose of the asset and may never be in-
curred if the asset declines in value subsequent to its contribution 
to the partnership. Accordingly, there is no accurate way that 
the parties can value the property contributed by C and 
appropriately reduce his interest in the partnership. Moreover, it 
is entirely appropriate that C should bear the burden of taxation 
with respect to the pre-contribution appreciation in the property. 
If he, in fact, is given a one-third interest in the partnership because 
the liability for income taxes cannot be valued, he will have 
benefited from the appreciation in the value of the property. The 
ideal solution is to permit the partnership to allocate to C the liabil-
ity for any tax attributable to the pre-contribution appreciation 
in the value of the property. Under the rules applicable to part-
nership taxation, such an allocation is permissible.270 Admittedly, 
the need to specially allocate gain or loss attributable to pre-contri-
bution appreciation or depreciation is far greater in a partnership 
than it is in a corporation. The need arises only if gain is not realized 
on the contribution. Under partnership law, a contribution of appre-
ciated property to a partnership does not constitute a taxable 
event.271 In the corporate context, the contribution of appreciated 
property constitutes a nontaxable event only if the transaction falls 
within the scope of section 351. In general terms, that nonrecogni-
tion provision is applicable only on the formation of corporations 
or when the property is contributed by a shareholder who, follow-
269. For example, in the past, year-end tax shelter offerings sought to 
allocate retroactively losses for the entire year to partners joining the venture 
at the end of the taxable year. That abuse is now barred by the combined effect 
of I.R.C. §§ 704(a) and 706(c)(2)(B). 
270. I.R.C. § 704(c). 
271. I.R.C. § 721(a). 
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ing the contribution, owns eighty-percent of the outstanding stock 
of the corporation. Nevertheless, just because the need to specially 
allocate gain attributable to pre-contribution appreciation or 
depreciation will not occur as commonly in the context of an S 
corporation as it will in connection with a partnership, this does not 
alter the importance of such flexibility on the occasions in which 
the need does arise. 
Moreover, it is not uncommon in the conduct of a small business 
that the owners of the business retain a special interest in certain 
of the business assets. A partner may be willing to contribute a 
particular asset such as a building to the partnership for its use 
during the duration of the partnership, but may demand that the 
building be returned to him upon termination of the partnership. 
In addition, the partner may be willing to bear the economic cost 
of the deterioration of that particular asset in return for an en-
titlement to any gain upon its disposition. Although, in law, the 
asset has become partnership property, in reality, the partner has 
merely loaned the property to the partnership. There is nothing 
devious about such a business arrangement and there is no reason 
why the tax laws should not accommodate it. Under partnership 
taxation, the depreciation in that building may be specially allocated 
to the contributing partner as long as he is willing to bear the 
economic deterioration of the asset through a reduction of his 
capital account by the amount of the depreciation claimed.272 
Similarly, any gain on the disposition of the asset may be specially 
allocated to that partner as long as the actual proceeds of sale 
are also allocated to him, thereby increasing his capital account. 
In this respect, partnership taxation recognizes the flexibility of 
small business arrangements and conforms to their quite legitimate 
and non-tax related expectations. 
Under the rules applicable to S corporations, neither these nor 
any other special allocations of corporate income or expense are 
permissible. Under. the rule described above requiring the ratable 
allocation of all items of corporate income and expense to each 
shareholder, special allocations are precluded. As a result, in this 
very material respect, the taxation of S. corporations varies substan-
tially from the taxation of partnerships and is far less attractive 
to taxpayers than the pattern of taxation applicable to partnerships. 
The making of special allocations of items of income and ex-
pense by an S corporation would be made somewhat more com-
plex by the inherent differences between partnerships and cor-
porations under state law. Most special allocations, other than those 
272. I.R.C. § 704(b); Orrisch v. Comm'r, 55 T.C. 395 (1970), affd, 476 F.2d 
502 (9th Cir. 1973); and see Krane and Sheffield, Beyond Orrisch: An AUernative 
View of Substantial Economic Effect Under Section 704(b) (2) Where Nonrecourse 
Debt Is Involved, 60 TAXES 937 (1982). 
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with respect to pre-contribution appreciation or depreciation, must 
be accompanied by an underlying economic effect upon the part-
ners in order to achieve recognition for tax purposes. For exam-
ple, for partnership accounting purposes, the loss attributable to 
depreciation must reduce the capital account of the partner to whom 
the tax loss is allocated and that reduction in capital account, in 
turn, must result in a reduction of the amount of partnership assets 
to which the partner would be entitled upon a liquidation of the 
partnership. Those economic adjustments are accomodated easily 
under partnership law. The allocation of partnership assets upon 
liquidation and adjustments to capital accounts is governed by the 
partnership agreement which may be drafted in whatever man-
ner the partners choose. 
This flexibility is lacking under state corporate law. Corporate 
law contemplates that upon liquidation the assets of the corpora-
tion will be distributed ratably among shares of the same class 
of stock and between classes of stock as provided by the certificate 
of incorporation. While in theory, even assuming that the Revision 
Act had permitted different classes of stock in an S corporation, 
priorities in the application of the proceeds of a liquidating cor-
poration could be altered by annual amendments to its certificate 
of incorporation, in practice such a procedure would be too un-
wieldy. Annual amendments to the certificate of incorporation could 
be avoided if the liquidation preference, as stated in the certificate 
with respect to each share of stock, were such amount as specified 
by the board of directors from time to time. It is doubtful, however, 
that such a provision would be enforceable today in any state.273 
The problem described, however, is a problem of flexibility of state 
corporation laws and not a problem of federal income taxation. 
If through either interpretation or legislative revision, state cor-
poration laws proved sufficiently flexible to accommodate a substan-
tial economic effect in connection with the special allocation of tax 
liabilities, there is no apparent reason why the federal taxing 
statute should bar such an allocation. 
Responsible students of income taxation uniformly would agree 
that the ability to make special allocations has been abused widely 
in the past and remains a matter of concern. However, to the extent 
that businesses organized in partnership form are permitted special 
allocations, the same flexibility should be extended to businesses 
organized in the corporate form and electing to be taxed pursuant 
to Subchapter S. If Congress becomes persuaded that special alloca-
273. Typical state corporation statutes specify that the liquidation preference 
of any class of stock must be stated in the certificate of incorporation. See, e.g., 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-201 (1979). 
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tions in the partnership context should be curtailed further, it 
obviously would be appropriate to extend that curtailment to S 
corporations. In the interim, however, it is disappointing that Con-
gress produced such a substantial disparity in treatment between 
partnerships and the new S corporation. 
c. Allocations of Income Among Family Members 
When more than one member of a family owns an interest in 
any business entity, a high potential exists for shifting income 
among members of that family. While in form a transaction might 
appear to be a failure to act at arm's-length with a non-controlled 
entity, and thus not subject to challenge, in substance it would 
be .a failure to act at arm's-length with a family member and would 
constitute a disguised gift and an impermissible assignment of in-
come. For example, in a partnership or Subchapter S corporation, 
a high bracket partner or shareholder who is also a key employee 
may fail to obtain adequate compensation for his services. The 
amount of the shortage remains the income of the entity to be 
allocated among all of the owners, including lower bracket members 
of the employee's family, and thus, the overall tax on the family 
unit is reduced. In order to blunt this potential for tax avoidance, 
the statutory provisions governing both the taxation of partner-
ships and Subchapter S corporations have contained specific pro-
visions dealing with the allocation of income in such circumstances. 
Under the prior law applicable to Subchapter S corporations, 
the Commissioner was specifically authorized to reallocate 
dividends, whether actual or constructive, among shareholders who 
are members of the same family group if he determined that such 
reallocation was necessary in order to reflect the value of services 
rendered to a corporation by those family member shareholders.274 
Thus, if one shareholder-employee received either excessive or in-
adequate compensation, the liability for tax on the Subchapter S 
income could be allocated either to or from that shareholder. Any 
amount reallocated continued to be treated as a dividend, and not 
as compensation for services, to the affected shareholder. 
The statute did not address directly the possibility that 
dividends themselves might be allocated in a manner not properly 
reflective of stock interests of the shareholders in Subchapter S 
corporations. Presumably, any such disproportionate distribution 
of income could have been regarded as a gift under general prin-
ciples of taxation. The regulations, however, specifically provided 
that should a shareholder receive less than his pro rata share of 
274. Former I.R.C. § 1375(c). 
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a corporate distribution, a proper portion of the amount distributed 
to members of his family could be reallocated to him for income 
tax purposes.275 
The rule applicable to family partnerships is considerably nar-
rower. While reallocation among Subchapter S shareholders was 
authorized regardless of how the stock was obtained, reallocation 
among family partnerships is authorized under section 704(e)(2) only 
when a partnership interest has been transferred from one partner 
to another. When such a transfer has occurred, the Commissioner 
is authorized to reallocate income only when the transferor of the 
partnership interest has received inadequate compensation for ser-
vices or an inadequate return on invested capital. Finally, the alloca-
tion may be made only between the transferor and the transferee 
of a partnership interest. Thus, under a literal application of the 
statute, the Commissioner is not authorized to reallocate income 
should a low bracket donee-family member receive excessive com-
pensation, nor is he authorized to reallocate income in the event 
a high bracket taxpayer receives inadequate compensation but no 
partnership interests have been transferred by that partner to 
another. Of course, the Commissioner's authority to reallocate in-
come in the family partnership context may be broader than the 
specific authority granted by section 704(e)(2). While in a clear or 
abusive case, the Commissioner could be expected to prevail in 
an attack upon the allocation of income among family members 
in a partnership, in practice arrangements falling outside the scope 
of section 704 have obtained substantial insulation from 
reallocation.276 On the other hand, the statutory family partner-
ship provision is broader than prior law applicable to Subchapter 
S corporations because it specifically authorizes a reallocation of 
income in the event the proportion of partnership income in excess 
of reasonable compensation for services (the return on partnership 
capital), is allocated disproportionately to the donee. Again, the 
statute does not authorize an allocation in the event partnership 
income is allocated disproportionately to the transferor relative 
to his capital interest. 
New section 1366(e) continues the Commissioner's authority to 
reallocate income among family members owning stock in S cor-
porations in a somewhat strange synthesis of prior law provisions 
governing partnerships and Subchapter S corporations. Under sec-
tion 1366(e), if an individual who is a member of an S corporation 
shareholder's family receives inadequate compensation from the 
corporation for either performing services or furnishing capital, 
the Commissioner may adjust the items taken into account by the 
275. Treas. Reg. § 1.137~3(d) (1960). 
276. McKEE, supra note 73 at , 14.05. 
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family members in order to reflect the value of the services or 
capital. In contrast to the partnership provisions, but following 
prior law applicable to Subchapter S corporations, section 1366(e) 
applies whether or not there has been a transfer of a stock in-
terest between family members. However, in an extension of prior 
law governing Subchapter S corporations, the provision is express-
ly applicable even if the family member employee is not himself 
a stockholder in the S corporation. Thus, if inadequate compensa-
tion is paid to a nonshareholder employee, S corporation income 
may be reallocated by the Commissioner to him and away from 
shareholder members of his family. 
Reallocations of S corporation income are permitted under sec-
tion 1366(e) when there is a failure to pay either adequate com-
pensation for services or an adequate return on "furnished capital." 
In one important and highly questionable respect, this provision 
appears to go further than either its Subchapter S or partnership 
predecessors. Apparently, section 1366(e) is intended to apply not 
only to inadequate return on an equity investment of capital in 
the corporation, but also to inadequate return on capital lent to 
the corporation. Thus, if a nonshareholder member of a 
shareholder's family loans money to the corporation but does not 
obtain an adequate rate of interest, the statute apparently grants 
the Commissioner authority to make an allocation of income from 
the shareholder members of his family to the family member 
creditor. In isolation, this provision is as reasonable as is granting 
the Commissioner authority to make a reallocation in the event 
of an inadequate return on labor. However, the authority of the 
Commissioner to, in effect, increase the rate of interest payable 
on a debt obligation must be viewed in context of the extended 
battle over the form of the regulations to section 385.277 At this 
writing, the final form that those regulations will take remains 
in doubt. As originally issued, the regulations gave the Commis-
sioner extensive power to adjust the rate of interest payable on 
corporate debt obligations through the creation of original issue 
discount.Z78 If that aspect of the regulations survives, it should be 
the exclusive remedy available to the Commissioner in the event 
of an inadequate rate of interest and it would be improper to grant 
a further, and slightly different, authority under the provisions 
applicable to Subchapter S. On the other hand, if the final regula-
tions under section 385 do not grant the Commissioner this author-
ity, it would seem highly questionable to grant the Commissioner 
similar authority, but only with respect to S corporations under 
the very general language of section 1366(e). At present, therefore, 
277. See note 65 supra. 
278. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(a) (1980). 
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the scope of this new provision as applicable to loans from either 
stockholders or members of their families remains in doubt. 
Somewhat surprisingly, but in common with partnership taxa-
tion, the new S corporation provision is not applicable in the event 
the family member employee receives excessive compensation for 
services or an excessive return on capital. It does not necessarily 
follow, of course, that if one shareholder receives excessive compen-
sation, other shareholders must have received either an inadequate 
compensation or an inadequate return on capital. It is entirely con-
ceivable that the Commissioner would be able to demonstrate that 
one shareholder employee had obtained excessive compensation 
for services but that the corporation could demonstrate that no 
other shareholder employee received inadequate compensation and 
that the residual return on capital was entirely adequate. 
The absence of a specific reference in the statute to the possi-
bility that an employee of the corporation may receive excessive 
compensation creates troublesome problems of interpretation. The 
Commissioner has general authority under section 162 to disallow 
any deduction for excessive compensation for services and there 
is no reason to suppose that this general authority does not ex-
tend to S corporations. Should the Commissioner disallow such a 
deduction to an S corporation, the effect would be to increase the 
income immediately subject to tax of all of the shareholders of 
the corporation, not merely members of the family of the employee 
who received the excessive compensation. Such a result would be 
strangely at variance with the specific authority granted the Com-
missioner under section 1366(e) in the event of an inadequate com-
pensation. Moreover, in a corporation subject to the regular tax, 
such a disallowance has no effect upon a shareholder employee 
who receives excessive compensation. He remains subject to the 
same amount of income tax, albeit with respect to dividend rather 
than salary income. In an S corporation, however, the reclassifica-
tion of a portion of the salary as a distribution of cash with respect 
to stock normally will have no immediate income tax consequences 
other than a reduction of the shareholder's tax basis for his stock. 
Thus, the effect of such a disallowance would be to convert the 
cash distribution to the excessively compensated shareholder from 
immediate ordinary income into a deferred capital gain while 
penalizing the other shareholders of the corporation in a manner 
more harsh than Congress apparently sanctioned under section 
1366(e). One solution to this anomaly would be to construe new 
section 1366(e) broadly to grant the Commissioner authority to make 
a reallocation of S corporation income in the event of excessive 
compensation as well as in the event of inadequate compensation. 
The validity of a regulation so construing the new provision, 
however, would be dubious in light of the express statutory 
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language and its origin in prior law, which clearly limited realloca-
tions to the payment of inadequate compensation. It would seem, 
therefore, that section 1366(e) should be amended to extend the 
scope of the Commissioner's authority to the payment of excessive 
compensation with respect to labor or capital, as well as inade-
quate compensation. 
If a reallocation is required under section 1366(e), it is not en-
tirely clear how the adjustment is to be made. The statute provides 
only that the Commissioner is authorized to "make such ad-
justments in the items taken into account by [the family members] 
as may be necessary in order to reflect the value of such services 
or capital." Logic would suggest that inadequate compensation for 
services or inadequate interest on borrowed capital should be cor-
rected by imputing income to the individual and a correlative deduc-
tion to the members of his family. Indeed, when the individual who 
is compensated inadequately is not a shareholder, it is difficult to 
see what other solution would be rational. Section 1366(e), however, 
does not appear to sanction such an approach. Rather, the provi-
sion contemplates a reallocation of specific items of corporate in-
come and, perhaps, expense among the family members. This plainly 
less rational approach appears borrowed from the partnership rule 
that authorizes a reallocation of distributive shares in the event 
of inadequate compensation.219 That partnership approach, however, 
is entirely unsuited to an S corporation in which special alloca-
tions are not permitted and all items of income and expense are 
allocated ratably to shareholders in proportion to their 
stockholdings. As a result, section 1366(e) will require either 
creative regulatory interpretation or, preferably, legislative 
correction. 
Both Committee Reports contain the statement that the Com-
missioner has authority under this section to adjust the timing 
of compensation.2~ Section 1366(e), as enacted, does not reflect Con-
gress' intent to give the Commissioner such authority inasmuch 
as it grants him power to make adjustments to reflect more 
accurately the "value" of services or capital. Furthermore, such 
authority has no precedent under either the partnership tax pro-
visions or the prior law governing S corporations. However, the 
Treasury might, based upon this comment in the legislative history, 
adopt regulations interpreting the Commissioner's authority under 
section 1366(e) to include adjustments to the taxable year in which 
compensation must be taken into income by a member of a 
shareholder's family and deducted by the shareholders. 
279. I.R.C. § 704(e) (2). 
280. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 16; SENATE REPORT, supra note 22, 
at 17. 
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The Commissioner has explicit authority to deal with matters 
of timing under a number of other sections of the Code. Even if 
the reference to timing in the legislative history were held to 
justify, as a general matter, regulations concerning timing under 
section 1366(e), it seems highly unlikely, absent express statutory 
authorization, that the reference could justify granting the Com-
missioner broader authority under section 1366(e) than he has under 
the other provisions. Moreover, in most cases the Commissioner 
does not need additional authority. Obviously, the only power a 
regulation concerning timing could give the Commissioner is the 
power to require that a particular item be included in income or 
deducted in a different taxable year from that in which it is actually 
received or paid. If the payment of compensation were accelerated 
so that the family member received compensation prior to actually 
rendering services or furnishing capital to the corporation, the Com-
missioner could require an adjustment to "clearly reflect income" 
pursuant to his general authority under section 446. Similarly, if 
payment were deferred, the employee or investor would have 
received inadequate compensation in the earlier year thus invok-
ing the rules of section 1366(e). Furthermore, new section 267(f), 
considered below,281 specifically deals with the deductibility of 
expenses paid to related persons by an S corporation. Clearly, Con-
gress did not intend to give the Commissioner authority to make 
an adjustment under section 1366(e) that would conflict with the 
express statutory rules of section 267(f). 
The reference to timing in the Committee Reports might be 
construed by the Treasury as authorizing the Commissioner to ad-
just the time of the deductibility of payment of compensation to 
family members if such adjustment would change the shareholder 
entitled to the deduction. For example, a high-bracket shareholder 
might arrange for the payment for services performed by a low-
bracket family member to be made early in the corporation's tax-
able year, and subsequently make a gift of his stock to a low-bracket 
taypayer (either the family member employee or someone else). 
Under section 1377(a),282 the transferor may, with the consent of 
all other shareholders, elect to treat the transfer as closing the 
corporation's current taxable year as to himself and the transferee 
so that he will get full benefit of the prepaid deduction. Without 
this election, the deduction would be prorated daily over the cor-
poration's actual taxable year, and the transferee would benefit 
from that part of the deduction corresponding to the fraction of 
the year during which he owned the stock. Such tax manipulation 
should not be permissible. However, because this device would not 
281. See text accompanying notes 283-87 infra. 
282. See text immediately following note 265 supra. 
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alter the S corporation's actual taxable year in which the deduc-
tion was claimed, the Commissioner arguably may lack the authority 
to challenge the accelerated deduction under general accounting 
principles such as section 446(b). Thus, the Treasury may claim 
the authority under the language in the Committee Reports to alter 
the timing of income or deductions in the event of a transfer of 
S corporation stock. 
d_ Related Taxpayer Transactions 
Section 267, one of the oldest tax avoidance provisions in the 
Code, generally denies the normal tax benefit of two specified trans-
actions when the parties to the transaction fall within the strictly 
defined categories of related persons described in section 267(b). 
The two transactions affected by the section are losses from the 
disposition of property and deductions for interest or other business 
expenses unless the expenditure is actually paid, or otherwise in-
cludable in the income of the recipient, within two and a half months 
following the close of the year in which a deduction for the expen-
diture is claimed. There is no question whatsoever that section 
267 is badly in need of revision.283 It was drafted in a far simpler 
era in which the attack against tax avoidance had not become nearly 
as finely tuned as it is today. Thus, the list of relationships con-
tained in section 267(b) is incomplete, particularly with the absence 
of any reference to partnerships, and the definitions of the trans-
actions subject to section 267 are relatively liberal. The two-and-
one-half month tolerance permits a one-year deferral of income; 
a deduction for an accrued expenditure is not disturbed if the 
recipient is subject to tax on the amount in the following year. 
Unfortunately, Congress has made section 267 worse. New 
section 267(f) contains a special rule governing the deduction of 
interest and other expenses by an S corporation when paid to a 
defined category of related persons. Under this new provision, an 
S corporation will not be permitted a deduction for interest or 
expenses deductible under sections 162 or 212 prior to the day 
upon which the amount of the expenditure is included in the gross 
income of the related person- The only difference between this 
special rule and the general rule of section 267 is the elimination 
of the two-and-a-half month leeway and, thus, the deferral of in-
come for one year. There should be no objection to the elimination 
of this deferral possibility; it is entirely consistent with the new 
S corporation provisions governing the adoption of fiscal years. 
On the other hand, it represents the very worst in legislative draft-
283. See Coven, Affinity Provisions of the Internal Revenue Code: A Case 
Study in Nonsimplification, 45 TENN. L. REV. 557 (1978). 
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ing to adopt this new rule only for S corporations. Whatever 
substantive merit such a new provision might have is outweighed 
enormously by the increased complexity of having two similar, but 
slightly different, provisions attacking the same tax avoidance 
technique when undertaken by different taxpayers. Quite obviously, 
if Congress is dissatisfied with section 267, the entire provision 
should be overhauled in its application to all taxpayers. 
The new provision contains a second change from the general 
format of section 267. New subsection (f) contains its own defini-
tion of related taxpayers and that definition is vastly broader than 
any of the definitions contained under the general rule of section 
267(b).284 Thus, the S corporation is regarded as related to any per-
son who owns two percent of its stock or to any person related 
to such a shareholder within the meaning of section 267(b) or sec-
tion 707(b)(l)(A).285 Evidently, the two percent stock ownership is 
to be computed without the application of any stock attribution 
rules. While section 267 contains such rules in subsection (c), those 
rules are applicable only for the purposes of subsection (b), not 
subsection (f). On the other hand, in determining whether an entity 
is related to such a two percent shareholder within the meaning 
of subsection (b), presumably, the attribution rules of subsection 
(c) are applicable. If so, new subsection (f) creates a provision of 
enormous scope. For example, if the brother of a two percent 
shareholder in an S corporation owns fifty-one percent of the stock 
of a second corporation, that corporation is regarded as related 
to the S corporation. 
In addition, the S corporation is regarded as related to all of 
the individuals or entities to whom it would be regarded as related 
under the general rule of section 267(b).286 In general, however, 
all of the subsection (b) relationships will also fall within the special 
rule of subsection (f). It should be noted that section 267 is rendered 
unnecessarily confusing by this use of two overlapping sets of rela-
tionship definitions, but that would merely seem the natural 
consequence of the highly undesirable creation of a special rule 
governing S corporations. 
It would seem excessively harsh to define a two percent 
shareholder of an S corporation as a related person for the pur-
poses of this new provision, particularly if the definition of related 
person is to be expanded to include all persons related to such 
284. Under I.R.C. § 267(b), corporations are regarded only as related to 
shareholders owning 50% or more of their stock. Under the similar rule applicable 
to partnerships, a partnership is regarded only as related to a 50% partner.I.R.C. 
§ 707(b)(l). 
285. I.R.C. § 267(0(2). 
286. I.R.C. § 267(0(2)(c). 
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a stockholder. In general, the holder of only two percent of the 
stock of a corporation will be a mere employee who has received 
compensatory stock and whose interests are quite unrelated to 
those of the majority stockholders. The tax avoidance potential 
in accruing unpaid salary due to such individuals would seem to 
be far outweighed by the enormous complexity of tracing the sec-
tion 267(b) relationships of such a minor stockholder. While the 
tax avoidance potential of S corporations may be greater with 
respect to accrued items than is presented by most of the relation-
ships described in section 267, the two percent requirement is too 
far out of line with preexisting law. Such extreme fine tuning of 
tax avoidance provisions rarely is justified in light of the complex-
ity they create. It would have been preferable for Congress to have 
been content to disallow deductions for accrued expenses between 
S corporations and shareholders having a substantial economic in-
terest in the corporation. Section 1563(e), for example, employs a 
relatively extreme five percent de minimus rule in attributing the 
ownership of stock. If Congress were to insist upon the use of a 
two percent test for the purpose of defining a shareholder who 
is related to the S corporation, it should at least eliminate the pro-
vision that expands that relationship by including other entities 
or individuals related to a shareholder as minor as a two percent 
shareholder. Such an extension of the scope of the defined rela-
tionships should be limited to substantial shareholders. 
By way of contrast, the other substantive transaction governed 
by section 267, the disallowance of losses on the sale of property 
among related persons, is extended to S corporations without the 
special modifications contained in new section 267(f). The category 
of relationships under subsection (b) has been expanded by the 
inclusion of S corporations and other entities but only in the 
presence of fifty percent overlapping ownership.287 
There is one desired change in prior law that the Revision Act 
did not make. Under section 1311, in a variety of tightly defined 
circumstances, the general statute of limitations on both refunds 
and deficiencies is waived. In general, the provision is designed 
to prevent a double inclusion in income, or a double deduction, 
when an adjustment to tax liability is made but the usual statute 
of limitations bars making a correlative adjustment. For no 
apparent reason, S corporations and their shareholders have never 
been brought within the scope of this provision.288 As a result, the 
inequity that section 1311 is designed to prevent can, and occa-
287. I.R.C. § 267(b)(10) (partnerships), (11) (otherS corporations) and (12) (other 
corporations). 
288. I.R.C. § 1313(c). By contrast, trusts and their beneficiaries, and part· 
ners, are included. 
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sionally does, occur in the context of S corporations. For example, 
should the Commissioner successfully contend that a corporation 
was not an S corporation for a year in which it had not made any 
actual distribution to its shareholders but they had nonetheless 
included all of the corporate income in their individual returns, 
the shareholders plainly should be entitled to a refund of tax in 
order to prevent the double inclusion of an item in income. Never-
theless, if the statute of limitations for claiming refunds of tax 
has expired, that refund cannot be obtained and the mitigation 
provision of section 1311 will not be of any assistance. While the 
new relief provisions, described below,289 permitting limited tax 
free distributions following the termination of a Subchapter S elec-
tion at least permit shareholders to withdraw from the corporation 
the amount upon which they have been subject to tax, in many 
instances that relief will not be available because the corporation 
will neither have sufficient cash reserves to make the distribution 
nor wish to incur that amount of indebtedness. Moreover, such 
a distribution will not compensate for what would in effect amount 
to the prepayment of a tax liability by several years. 
V. LOSSES 
For many taxpayers the most favorable aspect of a Subchapter 
S corporation was that a net loss incurred at the corporate level, 
like a net profit, would pass through to the shareholders and could 
be used by them to offset unrelated income in their individual tax 
returns.290 Unfortunately, this feature of Subchapter S corporations 
under prior law was subject to a series of technical and highly 
restrictive provisions that, in far too many cases, caused the loss 
of the pass-through benefit that Congress intended. Indeed, the 
case law under this provision was a virtual chamber of horrors. 
The newS corporation rules eliminate many, but by no means all, 
of the unsatisfactory features of prior law. 
A. Prior Law 
Under prior law, a net operating loss incurred by a Subchapter 
S corporation was prorated over each day in the taxable year and 
allocated to all shareholders during the corporation's year.291 Thus, 
in sharp contrast to prior law provisions governing the allocation 
of Subchapter S income, the benefit of operating losses could not 
be shifted by a transfer of stock. · 
289. See text accompanying notes 423-27 infra. 
290. Former I.R.C. § 1374. 
291. Former I.R.C. § 1374(c)(l). 
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As in the case of the taxation of partnerships,292 the losses that 
could be claimed by shareholders in a Subchapter S corporation 
could not exceed the amount of their investment in the 
corporation.293 Thus, losses could not be claimed in excess of the 
sum of a shareholder's tax basis in his Subchapter S corporation 
stock and in any indebtedness of the corporation held by the 
stockholder. Losses allocated to a shareholder were applied first 
in reduction of the basis of his stock and thereafter in reduction 
of the basis of any indebtedness. Quite unlike partnership taxa-
tion, however, losses in excess of that amount were forfeited per-
manently. Although the basis limitation also applies to partner-
ship losses on an annual basis, excess losses incurred in any year 
could be claimed by a partner in future years when his basis was 
restored either by partnership profits or by further investments.294 
No such loss carryover, however, was available to a shareholder 
in a Subchapter S corporation.295 Moreover, the likelihood of 
operating losses exceeding shareholders' bases in Subchapter S 
corporations was far greater than in partnerships. In a major dif-
ference from the pattern of taxing partnerships, debt incurred at 
the entity level by a Subchapter S corporation did not cause an 
increase in the shareholder's basis. Thus, a corporation that lever-
aged its operations with outside indebtedness could easily incur 
operating losses in excess of the shareholders' investment, but those 
losses could never be claimed by its shareholders. Moreover, a Sub-
chapter S corporation was denied the ability to carry operating 
losses over to other years of the corporation.296 Thus, profits earned 
in future years, in effect a recovery of nondeductible losses, would 
be fully taxable to shareholders. In the taxation of partnerships, 
this inequity is eliminated substantially by increasing the basis 
of a partner's interest in the partnership by an allocable portion 
of any indebtedness incurred at the entity level.297 As a result, near-
ly all losses incurred by a partnership may be deducted currently 
by its partners. 
Furthermore, a shareholder could lose basis in a Subchapter 
S corporation in ways other than by claiming operating losses. For 
example, if the Subchapter S corporation was formed in a transac-
tion subject to the provisions of section 351 and in the exchange 
the corporation assumed liabilities of the business in an amount 
that exceeded the aggregate basis of properties contributed to the 
corporation, the shareholder would obtain a zero basis for his stock 
292. I.R.C. § 704(d). 
293. Former I.R.C. § 137 4(c)(2). 
294. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(d)(1) (1960). 
295. Treas. Reg. § 1.1374-l(b)(2) (1963). 
296. Former I.R.C. § 1373(d)(1). 
297. I.R.C. §§ 722 and 752(a). 
662 TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50 
in the corporation even though the value of the assets transferred 
vastly exceeded the amount of the liabilities assumed.298 As a result, 
the shareholder would not be able to claim operating losses incurred 
by the corporation until such future time as his basis in the cor-
porate stock increased. In addition, if the Subchapter S stock 
became worthless during a taxable year, presumably because of 
operating losses, the Subchapter S shareholders could be denied 
the benefit of losses attributable to the portion of the corpora-
tion's taxable year subsequent to the date on which the stock 
became worthless. In a questionable decision,299 the Tax Court held 
that because worthlessness is treated as a sale or exchange of the 
stock under section 165(g), it must be treated as a disposition of 
stock for purposes of Subchapter S as well, thus terminating the 
shareholder's entitlement to further losses. As a result, a portion 
of the ordinary loss sustained during the year was converted into 
a capital loss on the constructive disposition of the Subchapter 
S stock. 
While income of a Subchapter S corporation increased the basis 
of a shareholder's stock, thus restoring his eligibility to claim future 
losses, no provision of prior law allowed for recovery of the basis 
of indebtedness eroded by losses.300 Thus, a subsequent retirement 
of indebtedness produced a gain to the stockholder. That result 
appeared particularly harsh when the funds used to retire the in-
debtedness were attributable to current earnings that were fully 
subject to tax to the shareholder as a constructive dividend attri-
butable to undistributed taxable income.301 
The loss pass-through was limited to operating losses. Capital 
losses incurred by the corporation did not pass through to 
shareholders; nor did they reduce the amount of the corporate tax-
able income that was taxed to the shareholders. On the other hand, 
Subchapter S corporations were entitled to carry capital losses 
forward to be applied against capital gains incurred in future 
years.302 
B. Under the Revision Act 
1. In General 
Under new sections 1366(a) and 1377(a), losses are allocated to 
298. I.R.C. §§ 358(a)(1)(A)(ii) and (d)(1). See Wiebusch v. Comm'r, 59 T.C. 777, 
aff'd, 487 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973). 
299. Abdalla v. Comm'r, 69 T.C. 697 (1978). 
300. Former I.R.C. § 1376. 
301. See Cornelius v. Comm'r, 494 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1974). 
302. In these respects, a Subchapter S corporation was treated like any 
other corporation. I.R.C. §§ 1211 and 1212. 
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S corporation shareholders pursuant to the same daily proration 
formula that is applicable to the allocation of S corporation income 
(and which under prior law was applicable to the allocation of 
operating losses). As noted above in connection with the alloca-
tion of S corporation income, the new law does not provide clearly 
that losses may be allocated to an S corporation shareholder who 
disposes of all his stock during the taxable year although prior 
law was explicit on the point.303 Nevertheless, the legislative history 
to the Revision Act apparently contemplates such an allocation304 
and there is no indication that Congress intended any change in 
this respect. Because new section 1366(a) requires the allocation 
of specific items of income and expense, all such items incurred 
by an S corporation, including capital losses, are now allocated to 
S corporation shareholders. As under prior law, losses allocated 
to a shareholder are applied first in reduction of the basis for his 
stock in the corporation305 and thereafter in reduction of the 
adjusted basis of any indebtedness of the S corporation held by 
the shareholder.306 Although any loss in excess of that amount in-
curred during the taxable year may not be claimed by the taxpayer 
in that year,307 in contrast to prior law, that excess loss is not 
forfeited permanently. New section 1366(d)(2) adopts the rule ap-
plicable to partnership taxation and provides that any loss dis-
allowed to a shareholder because it exceeds his aggregate basis 
in the S corporation stock and debt may be carried forward and 
claimed as a loss by him in a future year in which his basis has 
been increased either by corporate income allocable to him or by 
a contribution to capital. 
In addition, Congress anticipated that the new ability to carry 
forward losses could result in the carry-over of unused losses to 
a taxable year of the corporation in which the S corporation elec-
tion had terminated. A forfeiture of losses in that manner would 
seem particularly inequitable when the termination of Subchapter 
S status was not desired by the affected shareholder and perhaps 
occurred without his knowledge. That possibility quite commonly 
occurs when the termination results from the corporation ceasing 
to qualify as a small business corporation, in which event (under 
present law) the Selection terminates upon that date. To minimize 
the possibility of such a forfeiture of losses, section 1366(d)(3) pro-
vides that the unused loss can be claimed by the shareholder as 
a loss incurred on the last day of the so-called "post-termination 
303. Former I.R.C. § 1374(c)(2)(A). 
304. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 16; SENATE REPORT, supra note 22, 
at 17. 
305. I.R.C. § 1367(a)(2)(B). 
306. I.R.C. § 1367(b)(2)(A). 
307. I.R.C. § 1366(d)(1). 
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transition period" ("PTTP") to the extent of the shareholder's basis 
in the corporation's stock on that day even though the Subchapter 
S election has been terminated. This grace period for the claiming 
of carried over losses, which is used for other purposes under the 
new law as well, should eliminate much of the harshness incurred 
under prior law upon involuntary terminations of Subchapter S 
elections. Unfortunately, the definition of the "post-termination tran-
sition period" contained in section 1377(b) is ambiguous and does 
not appear to conform to the description of the provision contained 
in the legislative history. As a result, it is not entirely clear how 
the grace period is intended to operate. Since these ambiguities 
are more significant with respect to post-termination corporate 
distributions, the PTTP is analyzed in that context below.308 
The seeming unfairness under prior law of prohibiting the 
restoration of the basis of indebtedness in a Subchapter S corpora-
tion that had been eroded by losses has been reversed. Under sec-
tion 1367(b)(2)(B), if the basis of any such indebtedness has been 
reduced through the claiming of losses, any increase in basis to 
which the shareholder is entitled must first be allocated to a restora-
tion of the basis of the indebtedness. Only after the basis of the 
indebtedness has been restored to its initial level will the basis 
in the shareholder's stock be increased. While this provision is pro-
perly designed to mitigate the harshness of prior law, it will re-
quire regulatory elaboration. For example, further advances by 
the shareholder to the corporation presumably will be ignored in 
determining when the basis of the indebtedness has been returned 
to its initial level. Similarly, it may be presumed that if the 
shareholder no longer owns the indebtedness at the end of a year 
in which he is entitled to an increase in basis, the increase in basis 
will be allocable to the shareholder's stock and neither lost nor 
allocated to the transferee of the indebtedness. 
In most instances, a shareholder either will be indifferent to 
whether the basis of his stock or of his indebtedness is increased 
because the basis in either security will support the claiming of 
losses, or he will prefer the rule specified in section 1367 requiring 
a restoration first of the basis of the indebtedness. Notwithstand-
ing the liberalization of the rules governing the consequences of 
distributions from S corporations,309 in many situations a greater 
amount can be withdrawn from the corporation free of tax upon 
the retirement of indebtedness than by a distribution with respect 
to stock.310 On the other hand, there may be situations in which 
308. See text accompanying notes 423-27 infra. 
309. See text accompanying notes 359-91 infra. 
310. That would be the case, for example, if an S corporation had ac-
cumulated earnings and profits and sought to make a distribution in excess of 
accumulated Subchapter S income. 
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a taxpayer would prefer a restoration of the basis of his stock to 
a restoration of the basis of his debt. For example, a loss on the 
worthlessness or disposition of stock in an S corporation is eligi-
ble for the ordinary loss treatment provided by section 1244 but 
a loss on a disposition of indebtedness is not. Section 1244 treat-
ment is barred for losses attributable to increases in the basis of 
stock, including increases in the basis of S corporation stock at-
tributable to the allocation of corporate profit to the shareholder.311 
Section 1244 treatment, however, may be available to the extent 
of the initial basis of S corporation stock, even though that initial 
basis has been reduced by losses but subsequently restored to its 
initial level. In such a situation, a shareholder may wish to dispose 
of indebtedness before a restoration in basis occurs. 
A further problem of construction is presented by the making 
of a donative transfer of both S corporation stock and indebtedness. 
Post-transfer income of the S corporation will produce an increase 
in basis to the donee, but it is not clear whether that increase 
in basis is to be allocated to the donated stock or the donated debt. 
The basis of the indebtedness would have been reduced by prior 
S corporation losses, but, at the time of the reduction, it was not 
the donee's indebtedness. The unfairness that this new provision 
addresses is not altered by whether the reduction in the basis of 
the indebtedness occurred while the debt was held by its present 
owner or by a predecessor in interest. Accordingly, the relief that 
new section 1367(b)(2)(B) extends should be available when the tax-
payer holds indebtedness, the basis of which is determined by the 
basis it had in the hands of his transferor, if that basis was reduced 
by losses allocated to that transferor. It is not entirely clear, 
however, whether the Treasury would consider such a regulation 
consistent with the statutory language which refers to a reduc-
tion in "the shareholder's basis."312 
The Revision Act also has coordinated the loss pass-through 
with the worthless stock loss provision contained in section 165(g). 
Under section 1367(b)(3), losses allocated to an S corporation 
shareholder for any taxable year in which the stock of the cor-
poration becomes worthless may be claimed by the shareholder 
without regard to the worthlessness loss. Any basis in the stock 
remaining after reduction attributable to those losses may then 
be claimed as a worthless stock loss. 
2. Effect of Corporate Debt 
The Revision Act has eliminated many of the unsatisfactory 
311. Treas. Reg. § 1.1244(d)-2(a) (1960). 
312. I.R.C. § 1367(b)(2)(B). 
666 TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50 
features of prior law and in many material respects conformed the 
new S corporation provisions to partnership law, but in one highly 
significant respect, the Act perpetuates a distinction between the 
taxation of S corporations and partnerships. As under prior law, 
the shareholders of S corporations are not permitted to increase 
the basis for their stock in the corporation by virtue of borrowing 
at the corporate level. As a result, losses incurred at the corporate 
level cannot be claimed by S corporation shareholders in an amount 
in excess of their basis in corporate stock and indebtedness, an 
amount approximating their investment in the corporation enlarged 
by the net amount of any income allocated to the shareholders 
but not distributed to them. 
This limitation upon the total loss that an S corporation 
shareholder may claim to the amount of his investment in the cor-
poration may have made eminently good sense under prior law 
because the entity characteristics of the Subchapter S corpora-
tion predominated. Since the deductibility of a loss sustained by 
a shareholder on an investment in a regular business corporation 
is limited to the amount of his investment in the corporation,313 
it may have seemed logical to impose a similar limit upon losses 
incurred by a shareholder in a corporation electing under Sub-
chapter S. In fact, it might seem logical in any context to limit 
the tax benefit of any loss attributable to an activity to the amount 
currently invested in that activity. Because by definition the tax-
payer cannot sustain a greater economic loss, there might seem 
little reason to extend a tax benefit with respect to a greater 
amount. Permitting taxpayers to claim a tax benefit attributable 
to the loss or expenditure of borrowed funds, however, does not 
create an artificial tax loss in excess of the taxpayer's actual 
economic loss. Rather, the question is one of the timing of claim-
ing tax deductions or losses. Under long established rules of in-
come tax accounting, the point in time at which an individual is 
entitled, indeed compelled, to claim the tax benefit of an expen-
diture is wholly unaffected by whether the funds used to make 
the expenditure were borrowed.314 Similarly, a taxpayer's basis in 
property is unaffected by the source of the funds used for the pur-
chase, even if those funds were borrowed under an arrangement 
that did not involve the personal liability of the taxpayer, for ex-
ample, a nonrecourse loan.315 Under normal circumstances, that is, 
313. I.R.C. § 165(b). 
314. The methods of accounting permitted by I.R.C. § 446(c) do not make 
that fact relevant. The Supreme Court applied this principle expressly in Crane 
v. United States, 331 U.S. 1 (1947), even though the borrowing was connected 
directly to the deductions in question by a mortgage on the property being 
depreciated. 
315. Crane so held. Id. 
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absent deliberate tax manipulation, these general principles pro-
duce a correct tax result. The economic detriment is suffered by 
the taxpayer at the time the expenditure is made or the purchased 
property depreciates and it is proper that this economic detriment 
should be reflected in a contemporaneous reduction in income tax 
liability. If the taxpayer were denied a tax benefit at the time the 
expenditure was made and required to defer claiming the deduc-
tion until the indebtedness was repaid, the computation of tax-
able income would become disassociated from the taxpayer's 
economic change in position. Moreover, the taxpayer would obtain 
a substantial measure of control over the timing of his tax deduc-
tions by choosing to repay the indebtedness in a year in which 
its tax consequences would be most advantageous. 
In a highly technical sense, the normal application of these 
general timing and basis rules is not affected by limiting the losses 
that may be claimed by a partner or S corporation shareholder 
to the basis of his investment. In reality, however, if the basis 
of that investment is not enlarged by borrowings at the entity 
level, the normal consequence of these rules will be altered. Deduc-
tions that could be claimed currently if the business were conducted 
as a sole proprietorship will be deferred because of the basis 
limitation. 
In the taxation of partnerships, this disruption of the normal 
timing and basis rules is avoided. The amount of any borrowing 
at the partnership level increases the basis of the partners' in-
terest in the partnership, thereby permitting a current tax benefit 
from losses and expenditures. Consequently, conducting a leveraged 
business operation in partnership form is not penalized. The 
possibility of a windfall tax loss might be created if the partner-
ship did not in fact repay the indebtedness. In that event, the 
ultimate economic loss would fall upon the creditor rather than 
the partners who claimed the tax benefit. That possibility is 
eliminated, however, by a proper application of the rules govern-
ing cancellation of indebtedness income. To the extent that the 
indebtedness is not repaid, the partnership, and thereby the part-
ners, become subject to tax on the amount not repaid. In effect, 
the tax benefit from the prior deductions is recaptured.316 
Admittedly, other systems for accounting for indebtedness could 
be devised; whether they would be superior is debatable. Until 
such a different system is generally adopted, however, the treat-
ment of indebtedness under the taxing system should be neutral 
with respect to the form of business enterprise. It is highly 
316. In the partnership context, the proper computation of this tax was 
confused by the decision in Stackhouse v. United States, 441 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 
1971). Nevertheless, it is clear that such a cancellation of indebtedness should 
produce income under I.R.C. § 61(a)(12). See McKEE, supra note 73, at , 9.06[2]. 
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undesirable for the taxing system to treat indebtedness differently 
depending upon whether the business is incorporated, if the tax 
is not computed at the entity level. Yet, that is the result reached 
by continuing the prohibition against adding the amount of bor-
rowings at the entity level tc the basis of S corporation stock. As 
a result of this disparity in treatment, a major difference remains 
between the taxation of partnerships and S corporations which 
is inconsistent with the general objectives of the Revision Act. 
The primary consequence of this restriction on the addition of cor-
porate borrowings to the basis of stock in S corporations is that 
the shareholders will not be entitled to obtain the benefits of the 
Accelerated Cost Recovery System provided by section 168 if their 
investment is materially leveraged at the corporate level. It is dif-
ficult to understand why Congress would wish to withhold that 
investment stimulation from S corporations while granting it to 
all others. 
The above described treatment of indebtedness under our tax-
ing system has not been subject to extensive criticism when the 
borrower incurred personal liability for the repayment of the loan. 
When the loan is without recourse to the personal assets of the 
borrower, however, the propriety of the normal timing and basis 
rules has been questioned. It is not entirely clear whether this 
reevaluation of the role of nonrecourse indebtedness is in response 
to a perceived difference in principle between loans for which the 
debtor is personally liable and those for which he is not, or is in 
response to the greater opportunities for abuse and tax manipula-
tion when personal liability does not exist.317 Regardless of the ra-
tionale, Congress and the Treasury view nonrecourse indebtedness 
with growing suspicion. Corporate shareholders, as a matter of 
state law, do not incur personal liability for corporate borrowings; 
from the perspective of the shareholder all such borrowings resem-
ble nonrecourse indebtedness. That view of corporate borrowings, 
however, does not justify treating the shareholders of S corpora-
tions differently from partners in partnerships that incur 
nonrecourse indebtedness. The ability of all taxpayers to obtain 
tax benefits attributable to the expenditure of funds obtained in 
a nonrecourse borrowing is restricted by the "at risk" rules of sec-
tion 465, which was adopted in response to growing abuses of 
317. See, e.g., Estate of Franklin v. Comm'r, 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976). 
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Tufts v. Comm'r, __ U.S. __ , 103 
S. Ct. 1826 (1983) eliminated one such tax abuse by holding that, for purposes 
of I.R.C. §§ 1001(b) and 752, the amount realized upon disposition of property 
subject to a nonrecourse mortgage is the full amount of the outstanding in-
debtedness, even though the fair market value of the property on the date of 
disposition was less than the indebtedness. 
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nonrecourse indebtedness by the tax shelter industry. While the 
"at risk" rules should be applicable to the shareholders of S cor-
porations to the same extent that they are applicable to partners, 
there is no justification for subjecting S corporation shareholders 
to an additional and far stricter rule. 
Moreover, it is not consistent with the financial realities of the 
closely held corporation automatically to regard corporate borrow-
ings as being in the nature of nonrecourse indebtedness. A substan-
tial amount of such borrowing is secured through the personal 
guarantees of one or more of the corporate shareholders. By vir-
tue of those guarantees, the shareholders incur personal liability 
that is not meaningfully distinguishable from the liability of a 
general partner. When such a guarantee exists, it is as appropriate 
to increase the basis of the shareholder for a proper proportion 
of the guaranteed corporate indebtedness as it is to increase the 
basis of a partner. While, of course, in most instances such a 
shareholder will not be called upon to perform this guarantee, 
general partners rarely are called upon to discharge partnership 
obligations from their personal assets. Even if Congress were un-
willing to conform the taxation of S corporations to the taxation 
of partnerships completely in this respect, it is unfortunate that 
Congress did not permit a basis adjustment when the personal 
liability of a shareholder in the form of a guarantee is present. 
3. Shareholder Guarantors 
To some extent, the harshness of failing to increase the basis 
of stock by corporate borrowings has been mitigated by other 
changes in the Revision Act that will operate to benefit shareholder 
guarantors. It is not uncommon for a corporation to sustain losses 
in years priQr to defaulting on its indebtedness. Under prior law, 
as under the Revision Act, a shareholder guarantor was not entitled 
to claim his allocable portion of those losses by virtue of the 
guarantee. While his subsequent payments under the guarantee 
would be treated as increasing the basis of his stock, thus entitling 
him to claim future losses incurred by the corporation, he could 
not obtain thereby the benefits of the losses previously incurred. 
Under prior law, such losses had to be claimed in the year incurred 
and could not be carried forward. As a result, many Subchapter 
S guarantors lost entirely the benefits of losses sustained by the 
corporation, notwithstanding their substantial investment under 
the guarantee on behalf of the corporation. Under present law, 
those losses can be carried forward and claimed by the guarantor 
for the year in which he discharges his obligations under the 
guarantee. The net effect of this relatively roundabout route to 
the claiming of S corporation losses is that, to the extent that an 
S shareholder in fact becomes personally liable for corporate obliga-
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tions, he will be entitled to claim losses originally attributable to 
a corporate borrowing. 
While the position of a shareholder guarantor thus is much 
improved under present law, the result remains far different from 
that under partnership taxation. The guarantor still is not entitled 
to claim losses in the year in which the loss or expenditure pro-
ducing the tax deduction was incurred.318 Rather, the tax benefit 
is deferred until the indebtedness is in fact repaid. In this respect, 
the treatment of a guarantor resembles the treatment of a partner 
subject to the "at risk" provisions; yet the guarantor does not 
benefit from the exceptions and refinements contained in section 
465. 
Under prior law, a guarantor could improve his position by 
substituting himself as the direct creditor of the corporation. The 
Commissioner has ruled that if a guarantor, by issuing his personal 
note to the S corporation's lender, caused the corporation to become 
directly indebted to the guarantor rather than to the original lender, 
the guarantor's basis for his investment in the S corporation would 
be increased by the face amount of the note.319 Through this device, 
the guarantor would be entitled to claim the S corporation losses 
currently rather than at the time he is required to discharge his 
obligations under the guarantee. While the necessity of the guaran-
tor's assumption of primary liability in order to obtain S corpora-
tion losses has been eliminated by carrying forward the corporate 
losses, the device still may be useful if a shareholder wishes to 
accelerate the deduction of such losses. 
4. Section 465 
Under section 465 certain taxpayers are barred from claiming 
any losses attributable to an activity to the extent that the 
aggregate amount of those losses exceeds the amount of the tax-
payer's investment in the activity that is "at risk." The "at risk" 
amount includes the .investment of the taxpayer's own funds as 
well as the investment of borrowed funds upon which the taxpayer 
has personal liability.320 Thus, in general effect, section 465 bars 
taxpayers from claiming deductions attributable to the expenditure 
of nonrecourse borrowings. The disallowed losses may be carried 
forward by the taxpayer and used at such future time as the tax-
payer's amount "at risk" increases.321 The section contains elaborate 
rules defining the separate activities to which the "at risk" rules 
318. Rev. Rul. 71-288, 1971-2 C.B. 319. 
319. Rev. Rul. 75-144, 1975-1 C.B. 277. 
320. I.R.C. § 465(b). 
321. I.R.C. § 465(a)(2). 
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are applicable322 and that exclude certain transactions from the pro-
vision, particularly investments in real property.323 
Under prior law, section 465 was expressly applicable to all 
Subchapter S corporations .. 324 The provision was not applicable, 
however, to partnerships; the limitations of the section were applied 
only at the partner level.325 As a result, a loss sustained by a 
partnership from engaging in tax sheltering activities or other 
activities financed by a nonrecourse borrowing passes through to 
its partners without limitation. Each partner is required to compute 
separately the amount of deductions so allocated that exceeds the 
partner's individual amount "at risk" in the partnership activity. 
For this purpose, nonrecourse borrowing, whether by the partner 
or by the partnership, does not constitute an amount "at risk." 326 
Thus, the limitation imposed by section 465 on a partner's deduction 
of such losses is significantly stricter than that imposed by the 
limitation upon claiming losses in excess of a partner's basis for 
his partnership interest. 
Prior law imposed upon Subchapter S corporations a third 
limitation on the claiming of losses. Section 465 not only was 
applicable at the shareholder level, but also was applicable at the 
corporate level.327 Thus, losses at the entity level that exceeded 
the S corporation's "at risk" investment were disallowed at the 
corporate level and did not pass through to the shareholders. Such 
losses could be carried forward by the S corporation and would 
be allowable to shareholders in future years as the corporate 
amount "at risk" increased.328 Somewhat oddly, taxpayers often 
benefited by having the limitation of section 465 apply rather than 
the basis limitation, because losses currently disallowed under 
section 465 could be carried forward while losses exceeding the 
shareholder's basis would be forfeited forever. 329 
Under the Revision Act S corporations no longer are subject 
to section 465 as such,330 but Congress has continued the application 
of that provision to corporations that meet the stock ownership 
322. E.g., I.R.C. §§ 465(c)(2) and (3)(B). 
323. I.R.C. § 465(c)(3)(D). 
324. Former I.R.C. § 465(a)(l)(B). 
325. I.R.C. § 465(a)(l)(A). See McKEE, supra note 73, at , 10.11[2). 
326. I.R.C. § 465(b)(2). 
327. Former I.R.C. § 465(a)(l)(B). 
328. I.R.C. § 465(a)(2). 
329. See the extensive analysis of the application of I.R.C. § 465 to S Cor-
porations in Bravenec, Subchapter S Corporations and Shareholders Under the At 
Risk Rules of Section 465, 36 TAX LAW. 93 (1982) and Bravenec, Subchapter S Cor-
porations and Shareholders Under the At Risk Rules-Revisited, 36 TAX LAW. 765 
(1983). 
330. I.R.C. § 465(a)(l). 
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requirements of a personal holding company.331 It is not at all clear 
from the Revision Act modifications to section 465 whether closely 
held S corporations continue to be subject to the provisions of sec-
tion 465 at the entity level. For the purposes of that provision, 
an S corporation is regarded as a corporation. Moreover, section 
465 clearly affects the computation of income; an S corporation 
must compute its income in the same manner as an individual.332 
Individuals, of course, are subject to section 465.333 However, if 
S corporations were regarded as subject to section 465 because 
they compute their income as individuals, then all S corporations 
would be subject to the provision regardless of whether their stock 
is so closely held that they meet the requirements of the personal 
holding company definition. It seems unlikely that Congress 
intended that result in view of its deletion of S corporations from 
the enumeration of taxpayers subject to section 465. Section 201(1)(1) 
of the TCB attempts to resolve this question by limiting the pro-
vision dealing with closely held corporations to non-electing cor-
porations. Although this proposed amendment to section 465(a)(1)(B) 
does not deal directly with the deemed individual rule, it seems 
to indicate clearly that section 465 was not intended to apply any 
longer to any S corporation at the entity level. 
Although the amended section 465 is ambiguous it probably 
no longer will be applied at the entity level to any S corporation. 
Whether section 465 should ever be applied at the entity level 
to either corporations or partnerships is debatable. The resulting 
triple restriction on the allowance of losses is unacceptably com-
plex and can produce irrational results.334 On the other hand, shelter-
ing income at the entity level through deductions attributable to 
nonrecourse indebtedness is difficult to justify because those deduc-
tions are not allowed to individuals. Regardless of the propriety 
of applying section 465 at the entity level, S corporations and 
partnerships should be treated similarly. Because the overriding 
objective of the Revision Act was to conform the taxation of S 
corporations to the taxation of partnerships to the extent possible, 
the Treasury Department most likely will resolve statutory 
ambiguities in favor of conformity. Accordingly, it seems probable 
that the regulations will construe the amendment to section 465 
as exempting S corporations from the application of that section 
at the entity level. 
331. I.R.C. § 465(a)(l)(c). 
332. I.R.C. § 1363(b). 
333. I.R.C. § 465(a)(l)(A). 
334. For a contrary opinion of the continuing applicability of I.R.C. § 465 
to closely held S corporations at the entity level, and a thorough discussion of 
the irrational results this application can cause, see Bravenec, supra note 329. 
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VI. CAPITAL GAINS AND "ONE-SHOT" ELECTIONS 
With the adoption of Subchapter S, Congress acknowledged 
that it was acceptable for a corporation and its shareholders to 
be subject to only a single level of tax. On the other hand, Con-
gress has remained wary of the ability of taxpayers to switch back 
and forth between the normal system for taxing corporations and 
Subchapter S. Presumably Congress is concerned that if taxpayers 
were able to elect their desired method of taxation annually, the 
judicious use of Subchapter S could result in a lower burden of 
taxation over a period of time than would be imposed upon the 
business under either system of taxation alone. As a result, Sub-
chapter S contains a variety of provisions designed to restrict such 
freedom of choice. If that is indeed Congress' concern, the striking 
feature of each of these provisions is its relative ineffectiveness. 
A corporation is free to elect Subchapter S for a single year only 
and, unless the corporation has an extraordinary amount of capital 
gains in that year, the only penalty incurred is the inability to 
again elect Subchapter S for a period of years.335 In essence, a corp-
oration can move freely in and out of Subchapter S- but only once 
in every five years. Somewhat inconsistently, perhaps, the reverse 
is not true; an S corporation may not terminate its election for 
a one-year period. Under the same five-year wait provision, unless 
the consent of the Commissioner is obtained, the corporation cannot 
reelect under Subchapter S for five years. In addition, if a cor-
poration attempts to pass through to its shareholders a substan-
tial amount of capital gains income in the course of a "one-shot" 
election, the capital gain becomes subject to tax at the corporate 
level. 
In the one provision of the Revision Act that is carried over 
unchanged from prior law, a corporation previously subject to the 
regular tax that elects Subchapter S treatment and, within three 
years, incurs a capital gain in an amount exceeding fifty percent 
of the corporation's taxable income for that year is subject to tax 
at the corporate level on the gain at the same rate that would 
have applied had Subchapter S treatment not been elected.336 This 
provision has no effect upon the taxation of the capital gain at 
the shareholder level except that, in computing the amount of gain 
taxable to the shareholder, a deduction is permitted for the tax 
paid by the corporation.337 Thus, the section addresses only the 
335. See text accompanying notes 146-47 supra. 
336. I.R.C. § 1374. 
337. I.R.C. § 1366(£)(2) reduces the amount of long-term capital gains passed 
through to the shareholders by the amount of any tax paid by the corporation 
under I.R.C. §§ 56 and 1574. 
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incurring of massive capital gains, such as might be incurred on 
a transaction falling just short of a partial liquidation. Moreover, 
even though the transaction does not amount to a partial liquida-
tion, the section imposes an overall burden of taxation similar to 
the tax imposed upon such a transaction.338 In many instances, the 
total capital gains taxes at the corporate and shareholder levels 
will be less than the taxes that would have been imposed had the 
corporation not made a Subchapter S election but had distributed 
the proceeds of the disposition as an ordinary dividend to its 
shareholders. 
If the ability to switch back and forth between the regular and 
Subchapter S system of taxation posed a serious threat of tax 
avoidance, Congress might have been more rigorous in foreclosing 
this device. For example, the entire benefit of a Subchapter S 
election could be denied retroactively if that election were 
terminated within two years. Such a provision could contain 
appropriate exceptions governing the death of a major shareholder, 
for example, or a disposition to unrelated persons of a majority 
of the corporation's stock. 
Clearly, the "one-shot" pass through of capital gain should not 
be permitted. The transaction that section 137 4 is designed to 
impede amounts to the extension of the exclusion from tax pro-
vided by section 337 to transactions that may not even qualify as 
partial liquidations. In addition, the ability to secure one level of 
tax on a capital gain might in some situations seriously undermine 
the collapsible corporation provisions of section 341339 (although in 
most instances in which the corporation would be eligible for capital 
gains treatment, the collapsible provisions may deserve to be 
undermined). It is not at all clear, however, that this tax avoidance 
use of a Subchapter S corporation is any more serious than other 
temporary uses of the option. It seems, for example, highly 
inappropriate to permit a substantial extraordinary loss to pass 
through to shareholders pursuant to a one-year Subchapter S 
election although no provision of either prior or present law 
prevents such a use of Subchapter S. Additionally, it seems 
somewhat peculiar to permit a corporation to elect Subchapter S 
338. See I.R.C. § 302(b)(4). 
339. I.R.C. § 341 is designed to prevent the conversion of ordinary income 
into capital gain through the device of causing a corporation to create value in 
property which then is realized by the shareholders through a transaction in the 
stock of the corporation rather than the exploitation of the value created. The 
capital gains pass through of an S corporation, however, is not a stock transac-
tion that triggers the collapsible provisions. However, the I.R.C. § 1374 tax only 
retards the avoidance of I.R.C. § 341 when the collapsible assets produce a capital 
gain upon a disposition. The application of I.R.C. § 341 in most such circumstances 
is questionable and often can be avoided under I.R.C. § 341(e). 
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only for its final year of existence in order to extend the benefits 
of section 337 to items of income not insulated from tax under that 
provision.340 In any event, the pattern of prior law has been con-
tinued: Except where substantial capital gains are incurred, the 
only sanction for making a "one-shot" election is the prohibition 
against reelection for five years. 
In light of the other changes made to Subchapter S, it appears 
unfortunate, if not erroneous, for the prior law version of the section 
1374 tax to have been continued without modification. The tax is 
imposed when the taxable income of the corporation exceeds $25,000 
and the capital gain exceeds $25,000 and exceeds fifty percent of 
taxable income. Section 137 4(d), as amended by the Technical 
Corrections Act of 1982, provides that the taxable income of the 
corporation, for purposes of applying these tests, shall be 
determined under section 63(a) with certain modifications.341 The 
cross-referenced provision defines taxable income of a corporation 
as gross income minus all deductions. Thus, for the purpose of 
determining whether the S corporation is liable for the special tax, 
the income of the S corporation must be computed in the same 
manner, with certain minor modifications, that it would be computed 
if the corporation had not elected under Subchapter S. The decision 
to require all calculations under section 1374 to be made by 
reference to taxable income computed as though the corporation 
were subject to the regular corporate income tax is unfortunate. 
Since an S corporation has no other occasion to compute its income 
in this manner, its normal computations of income and expense 
will not disclose whether it is approaching liability for the special 
tax on capital gains. In order to make that determination, the cor-
poration's accountants will be required to make this special and 
highly complex computation, at the corporation's expense. No useful 
purpose is served by determining the liability for the special capital 
gains tax by referring to the income as it would be computed for 
a co.rporation. Both the $25,000 and the fifty percent tolerances 
are entirely arbitrary. It is needlessly complex and expensive for 
taxpayers to be required to make complicated and precise computa-
tions in order to determine whether the amount of their capital 
gains exceeds a totally arbitrary floor. It would be preferable if 
the section were amended so that the taxable income concept used 
in the triggering definition was the same as the taxable income 
normally computed by the S corporation. 
As under prior law, an S corporation generally is not subject 
340. See text accompanying notes 439-41 infra. 
341. The corporation may not claim the net operating loss deduction or the 
special deductions allowed to corporations by I.R.C. §§ 241 to 250 (except the 
§ 248 organization expense amortization). I.R.C. § 1374(d)(2). 
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to the additional taxes imposed upon items of tax preference. Under 
section 58( d), however, as under prior law ,342 if a corporation 
becomes subject to the tax imposed on capital gains by section 
137 4, the S corporation also becomes subject to the add-on cor-
porate minimum tax imposed by section 56- but only with respect 
to capital gains subject to that tax. Under prior law, incidentally, 
the express exemption of the S corporation was contained in the 
preference tax provisions.343 In the Revision Act, the exemption 
is accomplished by the general rule of section 1363 that, unless 
otherwise provided, an S corporation is not subject to the taxes 
imposed by Chapter One of the Internal Revenue Code. 
VII. CORPORATE DISTRIBUTIONS 
A. Prior Law 
Without question, the greatest failure under prior law in the 
scheme of Subchapter S was the manner of taxing actual distribu-
tions from the corporation to its shareholders. Under the scheme 
of taxing partnerships, the distribution of cash or property from 
a continuing partnership rarely produces a tax to the distributee 
partner.344 Rather, taxation of gain on any appreciation in partner-
ship properties is deferred by reducing the basis of the partner's 
interest in the partnership by the amount of any cash distributed 
plus the adjusted basis to the partnership of any property 
distributed.345 The partner acquires a basis in the distributed 
property equal to its basis in the hands of the partnership.346 This 
rule is highly favorable to the conduct of business in partnership 
form. Partners can substantially reduce their level of investment 
in the partnership by exchanging a highly appreciated partner-
ship interest for partnership property and the transaction will not 
produce a tax until the partner receiving the distribution converts 
that property into cash or other property. While in some cases 
this liberal non-recognition rule permits an arguably improper 
deferral of gain, the rule obtains ample justification in the flex-
ibility it permits partnership operations. Because of this rule, part-
ners and partnerships are able to contribute and distribute cash 
and other property with relatively little fear of adverse or unan-
ticipated tax consequences. As a result, relatively unsophisticated 
taxpayers engaged in business in partnership form have been able 
342. Former I.R.C. § 1372(b)(l). 
343. Former I.R.C. § 58(d). 
344. I.R.C. § 731(a)(l). 
345. I.R.C. § 733. 
346. I.R.C. § 732(a). 
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to avoid the unfortunate predicaments in which shareholders in 
Subchapter S corporations found themselves. The drafters of the 
original Subchapter S provisions seemed to believe they were adopt-
ing a similar rule for Subchapter S corporation shareholders. The 
legislative history stated that "where a shareholder has been taxed 
on corporate earnings which were not at that time distributed, 
and then the corporation in a subsequent year distributes these 
earnings to such shareholders no further tax is required from the 
shareholder at that time,_ since these earnings have already been 
taxed to him in a prior year."347 That happy result, however, was 
not to be. 
Under prior law, as it was ultimately enacted (and interpreted 
by relatively unfriendly regulations), actual distributions from a 
Subchapter S corporation (with a minor subsequently enacted 
exception) were treated exactly like distributions from corporations 
subject to the regular income tax to the extent of the corporation's 
current earnings and profits.348 Only actual distributions in excess 
of current earnings, therefore, could be regarded as distributions 
of the taxable income of the corporation that had been taxed 
previously to the shareholders but not distributed. This amount 
was referred to as previously taxed income or PTI. 349 Moreover, 
the regulations, with some support in the legislative history, took 
the position that only cash distributions from the corporation could 
be regarded as distributions of PTJ.350 Of course, the distribution 
of cash in an amount equal to the current earnings and profits 
of the corporation did not increase the tax payable by shareholders; 
had that amount not been distributed, it would have been taxable 
as a constructive year-end dividend.351 Before a shareholder was 
able to withdraw the previously taxed income, however, an actual 
cash distribution equal to the amount of current earnings and profits 
was required. Moreover, the regulations took the position that any 
distribution of PTI must be pro rata to all shareholders; distribu-
tions in redemption of the Subchapter S stock did not qualify.352 
As a result, the cash burden of making distributions of PTI was 
more than most businesses could bear. Furthermore, if the corpora-
tion attempted to generate cash in order to make a distribution 
of previously taxed income, the conversion of the asset to cash 
would be a taxable event to the S corporation shareholders. In 
347. S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess. 68 (1958), reprinted in 1954 
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4791, 4876-77. 
348. Treas. Reg. § 1.1373-l{d) (1968). 
349. Treas. Reg. § 1.1375-4(b) (1968). 
350. Id. 
351. Former I.R.C. §§ 1373(b) and (c); see text accompanying notes 171 & 
177-80 supra. 
352. Treas. Reg. § 1.1375-4(b) (1968). 
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practice, therefore, many Subchapter S corporation shareholders 
were unable to obtain distributions of previously taxed income. 
This failure of expectations under Subchapter S led to a lengthy 
series of battles between taxpayers and the Commissioner as tax-
payers sought to secure the anticipated advantage of the Sub-
chapter S format through other means. Shareholders commonly 
caused their corporation to make annual cash distributions, either 
to prevent the build-up of PTI or to obtain a distribution of PTI, 
whereupon the distributed cash would be lent back to the 
corporation.353 It is indeed a sad commentary upon the structure 
of prior law that cash could be removed from a corporation free 
of tax far more easily through the traditional mechanism of the 
repayment of indebtedness than it could be removed as a distribu-
tion of PTI. Unfortunately, the Commissioner attacked this device 
with surprising vigor. Where possible, he argued that the 
distribution and reinvestment constituted a step transaction that 
amounted to the distribution of a corporate obligation.354 Since such 
an obligation constituted property, not cash, it did not constitute 
a distribution of PTI nor did it eliminate completely a taxable year-
end constructive dividend. When this attack was not available, the 
Commissioner argued that the indebtedness obtained by the 
stockholder should be recharacterized under the usual debt-equity 
analysis as stock, rather than debt.355 Furthermore, the Commis-
sioner took the position that the recharacterized indebtedness consti-
tuted a second class of stock and that, consequently, the Subchapter 
S election had been terminated retroactively.356 
The need to distribute PTI in order to secure the supposed 
advantages of operation as a Subchapter S corporation became 
particularly acute when stock in the corporation was to be sold 
or donated to another or the Subchapter S election was to be 
terminated. The regulations took the position that the PTI 
attributable to a shareholder's stock constituted an account that 
was personal to the shareholder to whom the income had been 
taxed and was not transferable by him.357 Thus, distributions from 
the Subchapter S corporation to the transferee could not be 
regarded as tax free distributions of PTI accumulated prior to the 
transfer. As a result, the little ability that existed under prior law 
to distribute PTI was lost permanently if the stock became the 
subject of a gift. In addition, the regulations stated that a 
distribution of PTI had to occur while the Subchapter S election 
353. See Bittker and Eustice, supra note 156, at , 6.08. 
354. Roesel v. Comm'r, 56 T.C. 14 (1971). 
355. Stinnett v. Comm'r, 54 T.C. 221 (1970). 
356. See text accompanying notes 61-62 supra. 
357. Treas. Reg. § 1.1375-4(e) (1968). 
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was in effect.358 Distributions following the termination of the elec-
tion would be treated as regular dividends and would thus be sub-
ject to ordinary income tax under section 301(c) to the extent of 
the corporation's accumulated earnings and profits for the year 
following the termination. When the termination was inadvertent 
and thus, under prior law, retroactive, the effect of this rule was 
extraordinarily harsh. 
B. Under the Revision Act 
1. In General 
Under the Revision Act, how S corporation distributions are 
treated depends upon whether or not that corporation has accumu-
lated earnings and profits. For corporations lacking earnings and 
profits, the new rules have been simplified considerably and brought 
substantially into line with the taxation of partnerships-although 
with a most significant catch.359 For other corporations, the rules 
have been changed but not much improved. Unfortunately, most 
S corporations will have earnings and profits and, thus, will not 
be eligible for these simplified rules. Nearly every corporation that 
elected Subchapter S treatment after having been subject to tax 
as a regular corporation will have an accumulated earnings and 
profits account. In addition, most corporations accumulated some 
amount of earnings and profits even when operating under the 
provisions of prior law because of the discrepancies between the 
computation of taxable income and the computation of earnings 
and profits.360 Thus, the simplified rules governing distributions 
will be applicable, in general, only to corporations formed after 
January 1, 1983, that elect to be taxed under Subchapter S·from 
the time of their initial organization. 
For such fortunate corporations, the old concept of previously 
taxed income has been discarded along with the concept of earnings 
and profits. Any distribution from an S corporation that, absent 
new section 1368, would be taxable as a dividend to the extent 
of corporate earnings .and profits, is treated in~tead as a return 
of capital.361 Thus, unless the amount of cash or the fair market 
value of property distributed exceeds the shareholder's basis in 
his S corporation stock, as increased under section 1367(a) (1) by 
any net profits allocable to him but remaining undistributed, the 
entire amount of the distribution will be free of tax. Any excess 
358. Treas. Reg. § 1.1375-4(a) (1968). 
359. See text accompanying notes 406-19 infra, for an analysis of the tax 
that may be accelerated by a property distribution. 
360. See text accompanying notes 183-85 supra. 
361. I.R.C. § 1368(b)(l). 
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is to be treated as gain from the sale or exchange of property, 
thus generally producing a capital gain.362 To the extent of the 
distribution, the shareholder's basis for his S corporation stock 
is reduced.363 For example, on a distribution of property, the basis 
of the S corporation stock will be reduced by the fair market value 
of the property distributed and the shareholder will have a basis 
for the property equal to its fair market value. 
If the S corporation does have accumulated earnings and profits, 
the taxation of corporate distributions can become substantially 
more complex. Moreover, in some instances, the pattern of taxation 
prescribed by the Revision Act seems improper. This added 
complexity stems from the legitimate desire of Congress to prevent 
the use of Subchapter S to avoid a tax at the shareholder level 
on distributions of earnings and profits accumulated prior to the 
Subchapter S election. If the simplified rules described above were 
applicable to such corporations, a corporation could elect S 
corporation status and commence tax free capital distributions even 
though the corporation had substantial accumulated earnings and 
profits that were the actual source of the distributions. To prevent 
that result, the Revision Act, like prior law, creates a somewhat 
awkward synthesis of the Subchapter C rules and the Subchapter 
S rules governing corporate distributions. These two very different 
patterns of taxation are coordinated by rules that establish a 
priority of distributions. The priority that Congress apparently 
intended to establish under the Revision Act is identical to the 
priority of distributions under prior law.364 However, under the 
Revision Act, that objective will not always be achieved. 
In general, section 1368 apparently contemplates that 
distributions from an S corporation are first governed by the 
concepts of Subchapter S and are free of tax to the recipient. Only 
if the amount of the distribution exceeds the accumulated net 
income earned by the corporation subsequent to the effective date 
of the Revision Act are distributions taxed as dividends to the 
extent of accumulated earnings and profits under the normal rules 
of Subchapter C. Distributions in excess of both accumulated 
Subchapter S income and earnings and profits are treated as 
returns of capital and thereafter as gain from the sale or exchange 
of the S corporation stock. 
Under prior law, the distinction between tax free distributions 
and distributions taxed as ordinary dividends was drawn by the 
computation of a shareholder's personal PTI account which 
362. I.R.C. § 1368(b)(2). 
363. I.R.C. § 1367(a)(2)(A). 
364. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 19; SENATE REPORT, supra note 22, 
at 20. 
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measured the net income that had been taxed to that shareholder 
while a Subchapter S election was in effect. The Revision Act 
discards the concept of a personal account and creates inst"ead an 
"accumulated adjustments account," defined in section 1368(e) (1) 
(A) as the- aggregate net post-1982 increase in the tax bases of 
all shareholders' stock prescribed by section 1367. The accumulated 
adjustments account roughly corresponds to the sum of the PTI 
accounts of all shareholders under prior law except that the account 
.is a single corporate account, not personal to any shareholder. The 
account is similar to the earnings and profits account that must 
be maintained by corporations subject to the corporate income tax. 
Thus, the accumulated adjustments account is increased by the 
total amount of income allocated to all shareholders (with one 
exception, noted below)365 and reduced by all losses and tax free 
distributions to shareholders (that is, distributions from the 
accumulated adjustments account). 
To the extent distributions from a corporation that has earnings 
and profits do not exceed the amount of the accumulated 
adjustments account (and do not exceed the shareholder's basis), 
the distributions are free of tax just as are distributions from a 
corporation that does not have earnings and profits.366 Distributions 
in excess of that amount are treated in the same manner as dividend 
distributions from corporations subject to the regular corporate 
tax.367 Thus, to the extent of the corporation's accumulated earnings 
and profits, such distributions are taxable as ordinary income to 
the S corporation. shareholders. Once the earnings and profits 
account has been exhausted, distributions are regarded as returns 
of capital; and, once the shareholder's basis is exhausted, .the 
distributions are regarded as capital gains.368 
This new method for distinguishing between tax free 
distributions and distributions of accumulated earnings and profits 
appears to operate properly only in the very simplest of 
circumstances. For example, assume that an S corporation has an 
accumulated adjustments account of $500 and accumulated earnings 
and profits of $600. The stock of the corporation is owned equally 
by two shareholders, A and B, each of whom has a basis of $350 
for his stock. Assume further that the corporation makes a pro 
rata distribution; not in exchange for its stock, in the amount of 
$700 each to A and B. To the extent of the $500, the amount of 
the accumulated adjustments account, the distribution is free of 
tax and reduces the shareholder's basis in hisS corporation stock. 
Although the statute does not specifically address the question, 
365. See text accompanying notes 386-89 infra. 
366. I.R.C. § 1368(c)(l). 
367. I.R.C. § 1368(c)(2). 
368. I.R.C. § 1368(c)(3). 
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presumably this tax free portion of the distribution is to be allocated 
ratably between A and B-at least in the case of a simultaneous 
distribution. Thus, the basis of the stock held by each of them is 
reduced to $100. In addition, A and B are treated as if they had 
each received a dividend distribution in the amount of -$300, their 
allocable share of the earnings and profits account, which would 
be subject to tax at ordinary income rates. To the extent that the 
distribution is so treated, it does not reduce the basis of stock 
in the S corporation.369 Further, A and B would receive a $100 tax 
free return of capital which would exhaust the basis of their stock, 
and $50 of capital gain. 
By converting the personal PTI account to a corporate 
accumulated adjustments account, Congress has simplified 
somewhat Subchapter S and has provided the mechanism for 
avoiding certain of the harsh results that prevailed under prior 
law, such as the nontransferability of the PTI account. In several 
common situations, however, the use of the corporate level account 
causes a reversal of the normal priority of distributions from S 
corporations. As a result, S corporation shareholders may become 
subject to unanticipated tax liabilities. It is not clear that all of 
these results were anticipated or desired by Congress and, at least 
in certain circumstances, those results are highly questionable. 
The accumulated adjustments account approach does not take 
into account the differences in the amount of the corporation's 
taxable income that has been previously taxed to a particular 
shareholder. That amount could be substantially less or greater 
than the shareholder's current pro rata share of the accumulated 
adjustments accounts. Thus, on the facts of the foregoing example, 
the tax consequences would not be altered if B had become a 
shareholder in the S corporation subsequent to the time that the 
accumulated adjustments account had been created. 
At least with respect to pro rata distributions, Congress 
intended this result. The Committee Reports explicitly state that 
the rules governing distributions will apply to the transferee of 
stock in an S corporation regardless of how he acquired his stock.370 
When S corporation stock is transferred by an existing shareholder, 
either by gift or in a transaction that produces a tax basis to the 
transferee in excess of the amount of the accumulated adjustments 
account, the result reached under section 1368 seems to be proper. 
The remaining shareholders are not prejudiced by the stock 
transfers because the accumulated adjustments account is 
369. I.R.C. § 1367(a)(2)(A) provides that only distributions not includible in 
income reduce basis. 
370. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 19; SENATE REPORT, supra note 22, 
at 20. 
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unaffected by the stock transfer and the existing shareholders 
retain an unaltered interest in that account. If, however, by issuing 
stock to new investors, the corporation increases the number of 
shares of stock outstanding, each shareholder's proportionate 
interest in the accumulated adjustments account will be diminished. 
Accordingly, pro rata distributions to shareholders will exhaust 
the accumulated adjustments account before an amount has been 
distributed to the old shareholders equal to the net amount upon 
which they have been subject to tax. If the aggregate of the dis-
tributions made to the shareholders exceeds the accumulated ad-
justments account, each of the shareholders will become subject 
to tax on the distribution at ordinary income rates. The. 
distributions will now be regarded as distributions of earnings and 
profits, even though the old shareholders will not have received 
distributions equal to the post-1982 increases in their basis for their 
S corporation stock. At the corporate level, the distribution has 
not been treated as a distribution out of earnings and profits until 
the entire amount of the accumulated adjustments account has been 
exhausted, but from the perspective of the old shareholders, their 
distributions have become taxable before the full amount of S 
corporation income upon which they have been taxed has been 
distributed to them. 
This effect of the corporate level accumulated adjustments 
account can be illustrated by assuming that B was not an old 
stockholder of the corporation but rather had purchased his stock 
from the corporation for $1000 immediately prior to the distribution. 
Prior to that purchase, A, as the sole shareholder, would have been 
entitled to receive a tax free distribution of $500, the entire 
accumulated adjustments account. Subsequent to the purchase, the 
corporation still can distribute $500 free of tax to the distributee 
shareholders but if the corporation makes a pro rata distribution, 
A cannot receive more than $250 tax free.371 Any further distribu-
tions will be subject to tax to both A and B at ordinary income 
rates until the earnings and profits account of the corporation has 
been exhausted. Consequently, A will not be able to obtain a tax 
free distribution of the amount of S corporation income that has 
been taxed to him until the corporation has eliminated its earn-
ings and profits account. Because of this "spreading out" of the 
accumulated adjustments account, S corporations may be inhibited 
from raising new capital through the issuance of additional stock. 
Should the Revision Act have that effect,372 it would be an unfor-
371. Non pro rata distributions are discussed in the text accompanying notes 
37 4-80 infra. 
372. At least insofar as the tax consequences to the new shareholder (B 
in our example) are concerned, the result may have been intended. One of the 
reasons given in the early stages of revision for making the accumulated ad-
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tunate by-product of legislation that was designed to enhance the 
flexibility and desirability of s corporations. 
While new shareholders in an S corporation can produce are-
versal of the normal priority of distributions to the old shareholders 
by accelerating the point at which a distribution of earnings and 
profits is deemed to occur, the new shareholders themselves may 
also be subject to a reversal of priorities. If the basis for a 
shareholder's stock is lower than his allocable portion of the ac-
cumulated adjustments account, distributions can produce a capital 
gains tax to the shareholder before the shareholder becomes sub-
ject to ordinary income treatment on a distribution of earnings 
and profits- a conceptually dubious result. In the above example, 
B might have purchased stock in the corporation for $100 if the 
properties of the corporation had contained large unrealized losses. 
Section 1368(b) and (c)(l) literally state that to the extent of the 
accumulated adjustments account, a distribution is free of tax to 
the extent of the shareholder's basis for his S corporation stock 
and, thereafter, is subject to capital gains taxation. Only distribu-
tions in excess of the accumulated adjustments account are treated 
as distributions of earnings and profits. Once the earnings and pro-
fits account is exhausted through further distributions, B again 
would be subject to tax at capital gains rates because his basis 
would have been exhausted. 
There are several problems, both practical and conceptual, with 
this pattern of taxation. Extending capital gains taxation to B to 
the extent the accumulated adjustments account exceeds his basis 
is arbitrary. That account is designed to discriminate between 
distributions that are to be treated as tax free returns of previously 
taxed Subchapter S income and distributions attributable to ac-
cumulated earnings and profits. Once B has received a return equal 
to the basis of his stock, he is not receiving a tax free distribution 
of accumulated S corporation income; he is harvesting the apprecia-
tion on his investment and, quite properly, he is being taxed on 
the amount of that appreciation at capital gains rates. The proper 
tax consequences to B in this circumstance are wholly unrelated 
to the level of the accumulated adjustments account. 
The irrelevance of the accumulated adjustments account to the 
taxation of B is underscored by the adjustments that are made 
to the account attributable to distributions to shareholders. Under 
section 1368(e)(l)(A), the accumulated adjustments account is to be 
adjusted in a manner similar to the adjustments to basis provided 
justments account a corporate level account was the desire to treat distributions 
to a new shareholder the same way whether the shareholder purchased the stock 
from the corporation or from an old shareholder. STAFF REPORT, supra note 6 
at 18. 
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by section 1367. Under section 1367(a)(2)(A), the basis of a 
shareholder's stock is to be reduced by distributions that are not 
includible in the income of the shareholder by virtue of section 
1368. Thus, and quite properly, the basis of S corporation stock 
is reduced by tax free distributions but is not reduced by distribu-
tions in excess of basis. The accumulated adjustments account 
should be computed similarly. Thus, to the extent that distribu-
tions to B exceed his basis, the accumulated adjustments account 
should not be reduced. Indeed, it plainly would be erroneous to 
reduce the account by virtue of such distributions. Because B will 
be taxed on distributions in excess of his basis, the account has 
not supported tax free distributions of accumulated S corporation 
income. Furthermore, since B is not regarded as receiving distribu-
tions from the accumulated adjustments account, the level of the 
accumulated adjustments account should be irrelevant to the tax 
consequences to B of distributions. 
In this and other situations, the level of the accumulated ad-
justments account will rationally identify the point at which 
distributions are to be regarded as distributions of earnings and 
profits. Because distributions in excess of basis do not reduce the 
accumulated adjustments account, the account will never be ex-
hausted so long as distributions in excess of basis are made only 
to a single shareholder. On the other hand, if distributions were 
made ratably between a high basis A and a low basis B, the full 
amount of the distributions to A would reduce the level of the 
accumulated adjustments account although the distributions to B 
would not. Thus, the account would not be exhausted until the 
aggregate of distributions to A and B totalled twice the amount 
in the account when the distributions commenced. Plainly, the use 
of the accumulated adjustments account to identify distributions 
of earnings and profits in this circumstance is totally arbitrary 
and, indeed, irrational. These irrational tax consequences could be 
ameliorated somewhat if section 1368 provided that distributions 
would be free of tax to the extent of the lesser of the accumulated 
adjustments account or a shareholder's basis for his stock. Further 
distributions might then be regarded as distributions of ac-
cumulated earnings and profits. However, that solution also could 
be subject to criticism. B would be regarded as receiving a distribu-
tion of earnings and profits while A was continuing to receive a 
tax free distribution from the accumulated adjustments account; 
therefore, B would be subject to tax at ordinary income rates on 
a greater proportion of the distribution than would A. Such a result 
would seem particularly inappropriate if the earnings and profits 
were accumulated before B became a shareholder in the S 
corporation. 
It may be that there is no ideal solution to the problem of syn-
thesizing the Subchapter S and Subchapter C rules governing 
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distributions; however, Subchapter S would be much improved if 
persons becoming shareholders in S corporations after 1982 were 
never regarded as receiving distributions of earnings and profits. 
Since by definition an S corporation cannot accumulate earnings 
and profits after 1982, there is no reason why a shareholder who 
has purchased his interest in an S corporation after that date should 
be subject to tax at ordinary income rates upon the distribution 
of accumulated earnings and profits. Of course, such a rule would 
require that those individuals who were shareholders on the ef-
fective date of the Revision Act must be taxed on their allocable 
share of corporate earnings and profits upon any disposition of 
their stock. While that approach would be highly radical from the 
perspective of the corporate income tax, it would be entirely con-
sistent with the partnership model upon which Subchapter S is 
presently based.373 
2. Non Pro Rata Distributions 
Since the accumulated adjustments account is a corporate rather 
than a personal account, the amount of that account quite com-
monly will exceed the basis of any shareholder's stock. Thus, the 
unsatisfactory pattern of taxing distributions when the amount of 
the accumulated adjustments account exceeds the basis of the 
distributee shareholder's stock frequently will arise in the context 
of a non pro rata distribution, such as a redemption that is treated 
as an ordinary section 301 dividend. However, through the use 
of non pro rata distributions, the shareholders of S corporations 
can use that pattern of taxing distributions to their advantage. 
Section 1368 is applicable to all distributions that, in the absence 
of Subchapter S, would be taxable as dividends under section 
301(c).374 Section 301(c), however, applies to all distributions by a 
corporation that are not governed by more specific Code sections, 
such as sections 302 and 303, which treat certain distributions in 
exchange for stock as sales or exchanges. Those sections, however, 
are not applicable to all purported redemptions of stock. Under 
section 302, for example, a redemption is entitled to sales treat-
ment, and thus is removed from the scope of section 30l(c) only 
if the redemption results in a meaningful reduction in the redeem-
ing shareholder's continuing proportionate interest in the corpora-
tion, or it meets one of the alternative tests for sales treatment 
provided by that provision.375 Accordingly, many redemptions of 
373. See text accompanying notes 344-47 supra. 
374. LR.C. § 1368(a). 
375. These tests often are particularly difficult to meet in the context of 
a closely held corporation because of the applicability of the I.R.C. § 318 attribu-
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stock by closely held corporations fall within the scope of section 
301(c) and if the redeeming corporation is an S corporation, the 
redemptions are governed by section 1368. 
Section 1368 provides that if the S corporation has accumulated 
a sufficient amount of post-1982 income so that the accumulated 
adjustments account exceeds the entire amount of the non pro rata 
distribution, then the entire amount of the distribution will be free 
of tax to the extent of the shareholder's basis and, thereafter, will 
be subject to tax only as gain· from the sale or exchange of the 
S corporation stock, presumably a capital gain. Although it is not 
entirely clear whether the tax free recovery will be limited by 
the basis of the stock redeemed or by the aggregate basis of all 
the shareholder's stock, it is clear that the shareholder will be sub-
ject to a very favorable pattern of taxation. Only if the amount 
of the distribution exceeds the entire balance in the accumulated 
adjustments account will the taxpayer be exposed to a tax at or-
dinary income rates. 
While this pattern of taxation produces favorable results to 
the first shareholder to redeem from an S corporation under sec-
tion 1368, the procedure can produce quite severe consequences 
to the remaining shareholders in the corporation. Returning to our 
illustrative S corporation, the corporation had an accumulated ad-
justments account of $500 and accumulated earnings .and profits 
of $600. The corporation had two equal shareholders, A and B, each 
of whom had a basis for his stock of $350. Assume that the cor-
poration redeems one-half of A's stock for $500 in a transaction 
that is not treated as a sale or exchange under section 302. Pur-
suant to section 1368(c)(1) and (b)(1), the distribution is free of tax 
to the extent that it does not exceed "the adjusted basis of the 
stock." Since the transaction as to A is treated as a section 301 
dividend, presumably the basis referred to in that provision is A's 
entire basis of $350 and not merely the basis of the stock pur-
portedly redeemed, $175. In any event, A will have a tax free 
distribution to the extent of his basis Oet us assume that the proper 
figure is $350) and a capital gain in the amount of the rest of the 
distribution, $150. Under sections 1368(e)(1)(A) and 1367(a)(2)(A), the 
accumulated adjustments account will be reduced by this trans-
action by the amount of the tax free distribution, $350, and thus 
will have a remaining balance of $150. 
Assume that in a subsequent year in which there has been no 
change in the level of the accumulated adjustments account, the 
corporation redeems the same amount of stock from shareholder 
B. Again, in a transaction that does not qualify for exchange treat-
tion rules, which treat the shareholder as owning stock actually owned by members 
of his family or other entities in which he has an interest. 
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ment under sections 302 or 303, the consequences to B will be very 
different. B will be entitled to a tax free distribution only to the 
extent of the remaining accumulated adjustments account, $150. 
The balance of the distribution will be treated under section 
1368(c)(2) as a distribution of accumulated earnings and profits and 
be subject to tax at ordinary income rates. 
Quite plainly, shareholder A will have benefited enormously 
at the expense of shareholder B. A will have been able to avoid 
dividend treatment by using the portion of the accumulated adjust-
ments account that was created by virtue of income allocated and 
taxed to B. As a result, A will be able to obtain capital gains taxa-
tion with respect to the distribution and will be able to shift the 
burden of ordinary income taxation to B. Even if A does not wish 
so to benefit at the expense of B, he cannot avoid that consequence. 
The rules of sections 1367 and 1368 are mandatory. As illustrated 
below, B can be protected from this result if the redemption can 
be brought within the scope of section 302. In many family owned 
corporations, however, qualifying a redemption under that section 
can be a difficult and uncertain matter. 376 Alternatively, the 
shareholders can attempt to negotiate a price for the redemption 
that reflects the tax consequences to the remaining shareholders. 
That process, however, will be difficult and imprecise even where 
the parties are acting in good faith. Accordingly, this aspect of 
the corporate level account may seriously impede the redemption 
of stock by S corporations when the transaction cannot be brought 
within the scope of sections 302 or 303. 
On the other hand, well-advised taxpayers may be able to use 
this pattern of taxation to their advantage. The planning 
possibilities of non pro rata distributions are discussed below.377 
No provision in the Revision Act addresses the point in time 
at which additions or subtractions are to be made to or from the 
accumulated adjustments account. Under prior law governing Sub-
chapter S corporations, the computations of earnings and profits 
and undistributed taxable income occurred on an annual basis as 
of the end of the corporation's fiscal year.378 Thus, the extent to 
which a distribution constituted a distribution of current earnings 
and profits could not be ascertained accurately until the end of 
the year. That approach conformed to the rules governing the cor-
porate income tax under which the computation of earnings and 
profits occurs as of the end of the corporation's year.379 By con-
trast, a partner's basis in his partnership interest is calculated on 
376. See note 375 supra. 
377. See text accompanying notes 392-98 infra. 
378. Former I.R.C. §§ 1373(c) and 1377(a); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1373-l(b)-(e) (1968). 
379. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.316-l(a)(1) (1963) and 1.1377-2(b) (1960). 
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a daily basis. Pursuant to section 731, distributions from the part-
nership are compared with a partner's basis of his partnership in-
terest "immediately before the distribution."380 While the Treasury 
Department in all likelihood will seek to conform to the greatest 
possible extent the taxation of S corporations to the taxation of 
partnerships, in this circumstance it appears clear that the annual 
computation of the corporation tax is better suited to the S cor-
poration than is the approach of section 731. The controlling con-
sideration is that, unlike partnership taxation, the accumulated ad-
justments account is a corporate level account. As illustrated above, 
to the extent that account is exhausted by distributions to one 
shareholder, the account cannot support tax free distributions to 
the remaining shareholders. Accordingly, some mechanism must 
be established for allocating the amount of the accumulated ad-
justments account among shareholders receiving distributions from 
the corporation at different times throughout the taxable year. 
While it might be technically possible to devise a rule strictly 
allocating the accumulated adjustments account in accordance with 
the chronological order of distributions, such a rule would be 
unavoidably unsatisfactory. Thus, because it would seem necessary 
in the event of simultaneous redemptions to allocate the account 
ratably, it would become necessary to create an arbitrary and dif-
ficult to administer definition of simultaneity. In addition, because 
non-simultaneous distributions might be taxed quite differently, 
contrary to the probable expectations of the parties, a major trap 
for less well-advised shareholders would be created. Accordingly, 
it would be vastly preferable if the accumulated adjustments ac-
count were adjusted annually at the end of the corporation's tax-
able year, at least with respect to reductions for distributions. If 
such a rule were adopted, there would be little reason to make 
more frequent adjustments to the account for any other purpose. 
3. Distributions of Pre-1983 Subchapter S Income 
The computation of the accumulated adjustments account is 
not retroactive; the account only includes income accumulated after 
1982.381 Accordingly, the general mechanism established by the Revi-
sion Act for defining tax free distributions does not permit the 
tax free distribution of previously taxed income accumulated prior 
to 1983 by a corporation having earnings and profits. While it seems 
reasonably clear that Congress did not intend to cause the retroac-
tive forfeiture of the benefits of PTI accounts existing on December 
380. I.R.C. § 731(a)(l). 
381. I.R.C. §§ 1368(e)(l)(A) and (2). 
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31, 1982, the Revision Act contains relatively little to indicate how 
those accounts will be treated under present law. Section 1379(c) 
provides that the rules of prior law governing the distribution of 
previously taxed income "shall continue to apply with respect to 
distributions of undistributed taxable income for any taxable year 
beginning before January 1, 1983." While that provision could be 
read as applying only to fiscal year corporations and only for the 
taxable year including January 1, 1983, the Committee Reports 
contain the more general statement that pre-1983 previously taxed 
income "can be distributed" under the provisions of present law.382 
The ability to distribute pre-1983 previously taxed income prior 
to a distribution of earnings and profits seems to have been 
preserved in principle, but the Revision Act contains no guidance 
whatsoever as to how such distributions may be accomplished. Most 
importantly, no provision in the Revision Act purports to coor-
dinate distributions of PTI with the distribution priorities 
established under section 1368.383 Under prior law, the regulations 
stated that distributions were regarded as distributions of PTI 
only after the corporation had distributed the entire amount o~ 
its current earnings and profits in cash.384 Under present law, 
however, there is no rational basis for requiring an actual distribu-
tion of current year additions to the accumulated adjustments ac-
count as a prerequisite to a PTI distribution. Accordingly, the 
Treasury Department seems to have virtually unfettered discretion 
in coordinating distributions of PTI with the provisions of existing 
law. There seem to be three obvious choices for accomplishing this 
coordination: (a) the earliest distributions could be regarded as 
distributions of PTI, (b) the earliest distributions could be regarded 
as distributions from the accumulated adjustments account followed 
by distributions of PTI, or (c) distributions of PTI could be at the 
election of the shareholder. 
Distributions of PTI will not reduce the balance in the ac-
cumulated adjustment account. If under either a mandatory or elec-
tive provision PTI is distributed first, all shareholders would be 
subject to the same tax on distributions from the S corporation 
regardless of the size of their PTI accounts. That is, the initial 
distributions to some shareholders would be regarded as tax free 
distributions of PTI, not the reduction of the accumulated ad-
justments account, while the distributions to shareholders lacking 
382. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 25; SENATE REPORT, supra note 22, 
at 26. 
383. Indeed, the legislative history of I.R.C. § 1368 contains no reference 
to the treatment of pre-1983 PTI in taxable years beginning after 1982. HousE 
REPORT, supra note 22, at 18-19; SENATE REPORT, supra note 22, at 19-20. 
384. Treas. Reg. 1.1375-4(b) (1968); and see text accompanying notes 348-50 
supra. 
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PTI accounts would be regarded as distributions from the ac-
cumulated adjustments account. Once the balance in any PTI ac-
count had been exhausted, further distributions would be free of 
tax to all shareholders to the extent of the remaining balance in 
the accumulated adjustments account. The difficulty with that ap-
proach is that it deprives shareholders having PTI accounts of a 
portion of the benefit to which they should be entitled from the 
accumulated adjustments accounts. Because a shareholder having 
a PTI account would have been previously subject to tax on both 
pre-1983 income and an allocable portion of post-1982 income, such 
a shareholder should be entitled to a larger tax free distribution. 
On the other hand, if the earlier distributions were regarded 
as attributable to the accumulated adjustments account, all 
shareholders would receive tax free distributions until the account 
was exhausted. Thereafter, shareholders having PTI accounts would 
receive further tax free distributions and other shareholders would 
be regarded as receiving distributions of earnings and profits. While 
such a ru1e would protect shareholders having PTI accounts, it 
could also produce an inequity because the shareholder having a 
PTI account may, in effect, shift the tax on the distribution of earn-
ings and profits to other shareholders. That result would seem 
particularly inequitable where the old shareholder owned his stock 
in the corporation at the time the accumulated earnings and profits 
accounts were generated but the shareholder lacking a PTI ac-
count invested in the corporation only after 1982. 
Neither priority of distributions will produce an equitable result 
in all circumstances; therefore, the Treasury Department should 
permit distributions to be regarded as distributions of PTI at the 
election of the corporation and, perhaps, upon the consent of all 
shareholders. The flexibility that such a provision would create 
would permit the shareholders in the S corporation to minimize 
the potential inequities produced by the amendments to Subchapter 
S and, through negotiation, to arrange for the compensation of pre-
judiced shareholders. 
The only statutory basis for permitting distributions of PTI 
appears in the transitional provisions of section 1379(c), which state 
that subsections (f) and (d) of prior law section 1375 will continue 
to apply. Therefore, at least certain of the restrictive and technical 
constructions of sections 1375(d) and (f) presumably continue to 
apply. Thus, the PTI account will remain a personal and non-
transferable account. On the other hand, the Treasury should not 
continue to insist that distributions of PTI be made in cash. The 
reason for that requirement has been eliminated under the Revi-
sion Act by the imposition of the section 1363(d) tax on the distribu-
tion of appreciated property. Since there is no basis for exempt-
ing distributions of PTI from the application of that tax, there is 
no reason to insist that the distribution of PTI be in cash. 
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4. Tax-Exempt Income 
The computation of the accumulated adjustments account varies 
in two respects from the computation of the adjustments to basis 
under section 1367. The reduction in the account produced by a 
section 302 or 303 redemption is explained below.385 In addition, 
the account is not to be increased by tax-exempt income or 
decreased by expenses that are neither deductible nor properly 
capitalizable.386 Surprisingly, this provision effectively bars tax free 
distributions to shareholders of amounts attributable to tax-exempt 
income. Should the amount of any distribution exceed the ac-
cumulated adjustments account as so computed, the excess will 
be treated as a distribution of accumulated earnings and profits 
rather than a distribution of non-taxable S corporation income. 
Thus, the character of tax-exempt interest passes through to the 
shareholder under the new income allocation rules, and shareholders 
are not subject to tax by virtue of the receipt of such amounts 
by the S corporation (regardless of whether the corporation had 
earnings and profits) but upon the distribution of tax-exempt in-
come, the shareholders of a corporation which has earnings and 
profits become subject to tax. On the other hand, if the S corpora-
tion lacks earnings and profits, distributions are not subject to 
tax regardless of their origin. In such a case, the distribution of 
tax-exempt income, like any other distribution, will simply reduce 
the shareholder's basis for the stock.387 This reduction produces 
a wash because the basis will have been increased previously pur-
suant to section 1367(a) by the amount of the tax-exempt income.388 
The rule directing the exclusion of tax-exempt income and the 
deductions attributable thereto from the accumulated adjustments 
account merely accelerates the taxable event rather than creates 
taxable income. Section 1367(a), governing increases in basis, makes 
no distinction between corporations that have accumulated earn-
ings and profits and those that do not. While the distribution of 
tax-exempt income in excess of the accumulated adjustments ac-
count will be taxable currently to the shareholders, it will not 
reduce the shareholders' basis for their stock.389 Thus, on the 
385. See text accompanying notes 397-98 infra. 
386. I.R.C. § 1368(e)(l)(A). Under I.R.C. § 1367(a)(2)(D), expenses that are 
neither deductible nor capitalizable reduce the basis of S corporation stock in 
order to prevent shareholders from obtaining a tax benefit from the expense 
on a disposition of stock. Thus, omitting that adjustment from the computation 
of the accumulated adjustments account is favorable to shareholders. 
387. I.R.C. § 1367(a)(2)(A). 
388. I.R.C. § 1367(a)(l)(A) refers to I.R.C. § 1366(a)(l) which in subparagraph 
(A) specifically includes tax-exempt income. 
389. Under I.R.C. § 1367(a)(2)(A), only tax free distributions reduce basis. 
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ultimate disposition of the stock, the shareholders' basis still will 
include an amount attributable to the tax exempt income and a 
portion of the tax free return of capital enjoyed by the shareholder 
on disposition of the stock will be attributable to the tax-exempt 
income. 
There is no explanation in the Committee Reports for the special 
treatment of tax-exempt income in the computation of the ac-
cumulated adjustments account. Section 1367, however, seems to 
be part of the general attack upon passive investment income of 
an S corporation that has earnings and profits attributable to 
periods when no Subchapter S election was in effect. Congress was 
concerned that taxpayers would dispose of all of the business assets 
of a corporation subject to the regular income tax but defer a 
substantial portion of the tax on the disposition by failing to li-
quidate the corporation, electing under Subchapter S, and investing 
the proceeds of the sale. Even in that context, however, this special 
treatment of tax-exempt income seems unnecessary and 
undesirable. For the purposes of both the tax on passive invest-
ment income and the termination of the S corporation election, 
tax-exempt interest is treated in the same manner as taxable 
interest.300 Accordingly, the tax and termination penalties cannot 
be avoided by investing in tax-exempt securities. Thus, the fur-
ther penalty on tax-exempt income imposed by this definition of 
the accumulated adjustments account does not serve a construc-
tive purpose. For the reasons set forth above, the tax and ter-
mination provisions adequately, if not excessively, bar tax avoidance 
attributable to the disposition of business assets followed by a Sub-
chapter S election.391 There is no reason to impose a further penalty 
upon the investment of those assets in tax-exempt securities. Should 
such an investment be undertaken, and neither the tax nor the 
termination sections be applicable, there is. no reason why the 
shareholders of the S corporation should not be entitled to an im-
mediate tax free distribution of the tax-exempt interest their cor-
poration earned. 
Moreover, this penalty on deriving tax-exempt income is over-
broad. Unlike the tax and termination penalties, this provision af-
fects not only corporations that have earnings and profits at-
tributable to years in which a Subchapter S election was not in 
effect, but also corporations that have accumulated earnings and 
profit's while under a Subchapter S election. In fact, no reason ap-
390. The definition of "passive investment income~· in I.R.C. § 1362(d)(3)(D), 
the termination provision, merely refers to "interest." I.R.C. § 1375, which im-
poses the special tax on excess passive investment income, incorporates by 
reference the definition in I.R.C. § 1362(d)(3). I.R.C. § 1375(b)(3). 
391. See text accompanying notes 120-26 supra_ 
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pears for so penalizing S corporations that have earnings and 
profits, not attributable to the disposition of a business, derived 
decades ago but prior to making a Subchapter S election. It is dif-
ficult to see why historical accumulation of earnings and profits 
are relevant to whether distributions of current income should be 
subject to tax. The provi~ion only inserts another point of distinc-
tion between S corporations having and lacking earnings and 
profits, and between S corporations and partnerships; it does lit-
tle to promote the integrity of the taxation of S corporations, and 
therefore, should be deleted. 
5. Planning for Shareholder Retirements 
A major aspect of the tax planning for closely held corpora-
tions has been to insure that shareholders withdrawing from the 
corporation, whether upon their retirement from active involve-
ment in the business or otherwise, obtain capital gains taxation 
upon the redemption of their stock under section 302. If other 
members of the shareholder's family also own stock in the cor-
poration, capital gains treatment usually can be obtained only if 
the withdrawing shareholder completely terminates his interest 
in the corporation. However, the favorable rule provided by sec-
tion 302(b)(3) is subject to a series of qualifications that cannot 
always be met.392 Furthermore, in a corporation subject to the cor-
porate income tax, the retention of income in contemplation of the 
redemption of stock can subject the corporation to the accumulated 
earnings tax.393 While the redemption of stock in an S corporation 
392. Because of the applicability of the attribution rules of I.R.C. § 318, 
which treat the redeeming shareholder as owning stock owned by members of 
his family, completely terminating the interest of a shareholder in a family cor-
poration generally is virtually impossible without making use of the special waiver 
provisions of I.R.C. § 302(c). Under that subsection, the family attribution rules 
will not apply to a redemption under I.R.C. § 302(b)(3) if immediately after the 
redemption the redeeming shareholder has no interest in the corporation other 
than as a creditor and does not acquire such an interest other than by inheritance 
for 10 years thereafter. The statute specifically lists the capacities of officer, direc-
tor, cand employee as prohibited interests. 
Compliance with this provision often will not comport with other family ob-
jectives. For example, the retiring shareholder cannot reduce his interest gradually 
in a series of redemptions. Furthermore, the Treasury Department generally has 
construed the word "interest" broadly against the taxpayer, and the courts usually 
have upheld the government's construction. See generally BITTKER AND EUSTICE, 
supra note 156, at , 9.23. 
I.R.C. § 318 also requires attribution to the redeeming shareholder of stock 
owned by entities in which the redeeming shareholder has an interest. These 
attributions cannot be waived under I.R.C. § 302(c). 
393. I.R.C. §§ 531-537. The accumulated earnings tax does not apply to S 
corporations. 
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is not entirely free of planning complexities, it will be far simpler 
to obtain capital gains taxation for a withdrawing shareholder under 
the Revision Act than it will be under the corporate income tax. 
Accordingly, when the current income tax consequences of a Sub-
chapter S election are not unfavorable and the qualification of a 
redemption under section 302 might be difficult, a Subchapter S 
election may provide an attractive solution. 
If the redemption of stock qualifies for capital gains treatment . 
under either section 302 or section 303, the consequences to the 
withdrawing shareholder in an S corporation are identical to the 
consequences to a shareholder withdrawing from a corporation sub-
ject to the corporate income tax. The shareholder will be subject 
to tax at capital gains rates on the difference between the amount 
distributed in exchange for his stock and his tax basis for the stock. 
If the corporation is an S corporation, however, it may be possible 
to achieve the same consequence even if the redemption does not 
qualify under section 302 and thus would be treated as an ordinary 
section 301 dividend if the corporation were subject to the cor-
porate income tax. 
The rules of section 1368 seem to be applicable to all section 
301 distributions, even though they are non pro rata or are distribu-
tions in exchange for stock. Thus, all such distributions are free 
of tax to the extent of the shareholder's basis and thereafter sub-
ject to capital gains taxation as long as the accumulated ad-
justments account exceeds the amount distributed to the 
shareholder in exchange for his stock. Even though the redemp-
tion does not qualify under section 302, the shareholder will not 
be subject to tax at ordinary income rates unless the amount 
distributed exceeds the accumulated adjustments account. 
Moreover, as noted above, the amount of the accumulated ad-
justments account is not reduced by distributions in excess of a 
shareholder's basis that are subject to tax at capital gains rates.394 
While it cannot be entirely clear how the Treasury Department 
will attempt to integrate the level of the accumulated adjustments 
account with non pro rata distributions, it may thus be that if the 
amount of the accumulated adjustments account exceeds by any 
amount the basis of the stock being redeemed, no amount of the 
distribution can be treated as a distribution of earnings and pro-
fits (provided that no other distributions are made by the corpora-
tion during the taxable year). In any event, the literal language 
of section 1368 provides that even though the redemption does 
not qualify under section 302, the shareholder can not be subject 
to tax at ordinary income rates until the amount of the distribu-
tion exceeds the amount of the accumulated adjustments account. 
394. See text accompanying notes 372-73 supra. 
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The prerequisite for this favorable treatment is that the ac-
cumulated adjustments account must exceed the shareholder's basis 
(and perhaps the entire amount of the distribution). Since the ac-
cumulated adjustments account is defined generally as the net ac-
cumulated income earned after 1982 while under a Subchapter S 
election,395 few corporations will be able to redeem stock under 
section 1368 at capital gains rates until they have operated as an 
S corporation for a substantial period of time. Accordingly, taking 
advantage of the S corporation provisions governing distributions 
will require long range planning. 
On the other hand, the amount that must be accumulated in 
the accumulated adjustments account to avoid ordinary income tax-
ation on any distribution under section 1368 can be minimized by 
the making of periodic stock redemptions. In a corporation sub-
ject to the regular corporate income tax, periodic stock redemp-
tions . almost invariably are treated as ordinary section 301 
dividends. However, under section 1368, a partial redemption of 
stock will always be treated as a capital transaction provided the 
amount distributed does not exceed the accumulated adjustments 
account. Accordingly, in a Subchapter S corporation there is no 
need to limit redemptions to complete terminations of interest. 
Periodic redemptions can obtain the same favorable treatment while 
imposing a smaller cash drain on the corporation. 
It was observed above that under the pattern of taxation 
created by section 1368, the first shareholders redeemed by an 
S corporation benefited at the expense of those remaining in the 
corporation.396 The initial redemption might exhaust the ac-
cumulated adjustments account and cause subsequent distributions 
to be treated as distributions of accumulated earnings and profits 
that are subject to ordinary income taxation. However, it is not 
uncommon in closely held corporations for the first redemptions 
by the corporation to be of stock held by older, and often higher 
bracket, members of the family. The ability of the second genera-
tion of stockholders to permit the withdrawing shareholder to use 
their portion of the accumulated adjustments account to produce 
capital gain taxation can produce a quite favorable consequence 
to the family as a whole. The transaction effectively shifts the in-
cidence of tax on the accumulated earnings and profits of the cor-
poration to the lower bracket members of the family. Moreover, 
the second generation family members may not intend to cause 
their stock to be redeemed for a substantial period of time. In the 
interim, the accumulated adjustments account may be replenished 
and can support capital gains taxation upon the next round of 
395. I.R.C. § 1368(e)(l)(A) and (2). 
396. See text accompanying notes 375-76 supra. 
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redemptions. With careful planning, it may not be necessary to 
subject any shareholder to taxation with respect to the earnings 
and profits accumulated prior to the Subchapter S election. 
To the retiring shareholder, the consequences of a non pro rata 
distribution that does not exceed the amount of the accumulated 
adjustments account are precisely the same as the consequences 
of a redemption that qualifies as a sale or exchange under section 
302 or 303; therefore, the shareholder may be indifferent whether 
the transaction qualifies under those sections. Careful taxpayers, 
however, generally will prefer to qualify their redemption under 
section 302. If a miscalculation has occurred in the computation 
of the accumulated adjustments account and a distribution in fact 
exceeds the amount of that account, that excess will be taxable 
at ordinary income rates to the redeeming shareholder to the ex-
tent of the accumulated earnings and profits account. Moreover, 
the effect upon the remaining shareholders in the S corporation 
of a redemption that qualifies under either section 302 or section 
303 is far less severe than the consequences of a non pro rata 
redemption governed by section 1368. 
As noted above, if the distribution does not qualify as a redemp-
tion under section 302 the accumulated adjustments account is 
reduced by an amount equal to the basis of the stock redeemed 
or, perhaps, by an amount equal to the basis of all of the stock 
owned by the withdrawing shareholder.397 On the other hand, under 
section 1368(e)(1)(B), if the redemption does qualify for sale or ex-
change treatment under either section 302 or 303, the accumulated 
adjustments account is reduced only by a fraction equal to the pro-
portion of the outstanding shares of stock in the corporation that 
are redeemed. In most instances, this ratable portion of the ac-
cumulated adjustments account will be less than the basis of the 
stock being redeemed. Indeed, if the redemption is of a substan-
tial proportion of the outstanding stock of the corporation, the basis 
of the stock redeemed may well equal the entire balance in the 
accumulated adjustments account. Accordingly, if the redemption 
qualifies under section 302 or 303, a far larger proportion of the 
accumulated adjustments account will be preserved for the remain-
ing shareholders without resulting in any prejudice to the withdraw-
ing shareholder. For example, in the illustration used above, the 
accumulated adjustments account of $500 would have been reduced 
at the time of the first redemption of the stock of A by twenty-
five percent or $125 if the redemption had qualified under section 
302. If the redemption failed to qualify under that provision, the 
accumulated adjustments account would have been reduced by $350 
(or $175). Obviously, the importance of qualifying a redemption 
397. See text accompanying notes 372-73 supra. 
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under section 302 or section 303 increases as the basis of the stock 
increases relative to the value of the stock. Thus, it remains as 
important as ever to qualify the redemption of stock of a deceased 
shareholder under section 303 or section 302. Conversely, in the 
relatively uncommon situation where the basis of a shareholder's 
stock is less than his allocable portion of the accumulated adjust-
ments account, a smaller reduction in the amount of the account 
will be produced by a redemption that does not qualify under sec-
tion 302 or 303. However, as long as the amount of the redemption 
remains less than the entire amount of the accumulated adjustments 
account, such a redeeming shareholder will avoid ordinary income 
taxation. 
The net result of the pattern of taxing non pro rata distribu-
tions from S corporations is that the normal planning assumptions 
for small business corporations are not altered if the corporation 
is an S corporation. In almost every instance, the tax· consequences, 
for both withdrawing and remaining shareholders, of a redemp-
tion qualifying under section 302 or 303 will be superior to the 
consequences of a redemption that does not so qualify. On the other 
hand, the disparity in tax consequences between qualifying and 
nonqualifying redemptions is not as great under Subchapter S as 
in the case of a corporation subject to the corporate income tax. 
Thus, the consequences of failing to qualify under section 302 are 
not as severe if the corporation is an S corporation. Moreover, the 
S corporation is permitted substantially greater flexibility in the 
timing of redemptions than a regular corporation is permitted. In 
a Subchapter S corporation, periodic redemptions can produce tax 
consequences to the withdrawing shareholder that are at least as 
favorable as complete terminations of interest. In addition, under 
Subchapter S, income may be accumulated to fund a redemption 
with no adverse tax consequences unless the limitations on passive 
investment income imposed upon S corporations that have accum-
ulated earnings and profits are exceeded.398 
6. Critique 
While the general congressional design in enacting the Revi-
sion Act was to bring the taxation of S corporations more closely 
into line with the taxation of partnerships, the accumulated ad-
justments account represents a change from prior law towards the 
corporate model. In shifting from the personal PTI account to the 
corporate level accumulated adjustments account for the purpose 
of establishing the priority of distributions from an S corporation, 
the drafters of the Revision Act moved in a direction directly con-
398. See text accompanying notes 114-26 supra. 
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trary to the primary objective of the Act. That judgment may have 
been faulty. 
Evidently, the adoption of a corporate level account was 
designed to eliminate some of the difficulties experienced with PTI 
accounts under prior law. However, the difficulties under prior law 
did not stem from the personal nature of the PTI account, rather, 
they were attributable to the various characteristics, such as its 
nontransferability, that the Treasury Department assigned to the 
PTI account. Those difficulties could have been solved without 
shifting to a corporate level account. There is no reason that a 
personal PTI account could not be transferable even to a purchaser 
of S corporation stock; upon the transfer of less than all of a share-
holder's stock, a personal account could be allocated arbitrarily. 
Had Congress continued the use of a personal account, many of 
the problems described above would have been avoided and, in 
general, the taxation of S corporations would have resembled more 
closely the taxation of partnerships. 
C. Eliminating Accumulated Earnings and Profits 
The complexities, and potential tax liabilities, created by the 
presence of an accumulated earnings and profits account in S cor-
porations undoubtedly will cause the managers of many corpora-
tions to seek to eliminate that account. Unless the account is quite 
small, however, its elimination may prove to be difficult. The most 
straightforward procedure for eliminating an earnings and profits -
account is to make a distribution to shareholders in a sufficient 
amount to exhaust accumulated earnings and profits. That distribu-
tion will be subject to tax at ordinary income rates and thus, in 
many instances, would be prohibitively expensive. Even if the 
shareholders were willing to bear the burden of an accelerated 
income tax, many corporations will not have available sufficient 
assets to fund an adequate distribution. The response to this cir-
cumstance will precipitate a replay of the difficulties posed under 
prior law in attempting to distribute previously taxed income. 
Under prior law, taxpayers were seriously disadvantaged by the 
inability to distribute PTI pursuant to a property distribution. 
However, there is no such limitation under present law upon the 
ability to distribute accumulated earnings and profits. As a result, 
there does not appear to be any reason why an S corporation may 
not distribute its own obligation to its shareholders in an amount 
sufficient to exhaust its accumulated earnings and profits account. 
Such a distribution constitutes a dividend under generallaw399 and 
399. I.R.C. § 312(a)(2). Another possibility is the distribution of a taxable 
stock dividend. A pro rata distribution would not suffice, but if each shareholder 
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no reason appears for a different rule under Subchapter S. Of 
course, when making such a distribution the managers of an S cor-
poration must carefully avoid the prohibition contained in section 
1361(b)(l)(D) on two classes of stock. 
As originally enacted, the Revision Act contained a further 
obstacle to the voluntary elimination of accumulated earnings and 
profits. Under the distribution priority rules of section 1368(c), 
distributions by an S corporation that has accumulated earnings 
and profits are treated first as distributions of accumulated Sub-
chapter S income and only thereafter as distributions of accumu-
lated earnings and profits. While that provision is favorable to tax-
payers wishing to avoid tax on distributions from S corporations, 
it substantially increases the amount that must be distributed by 
a corporation wishing to eliminate its earnings and profits account. 
In order to facilitate the elimination of accumulated earnings and 
profits accounts, Congress added a new section 1368(e)(3) as part 
of the Technical Corrections Act of 1982.400 This provision stipulates 
that if all of the shareholders to whom a distribution is made by 
an S corporation during a taxable year so elect, the distribution 
will not be treated as a tax-free distribution of Subchapter S in-
come; rather, it will be treated as an ordinary dividend to the ex-
tent of the accumulated earnings and profits of the corporation. 
Section 1368(eX3) indicates that Congress recognized the value 
of an elective elimination of earnings and profits; it is regrettable 
that Congress did not go further and deal with the two greatest 
deterrents to this elimination: the need to make an actual distribu-
tion and the risks of a subsequent determination on audit that the 
corporation incorrectly calculated its earnings and profits. There 
are great hazards in attempting to eliminate an accumulated earn-
ings and profits account through actual distributions. The computa-
tion of earnings and profits is far from an exact science and even 
with professional assistance, taxpayers may remain uncertain that 
the account has been eliminated completely. During the congres-
sional hearings on the Revision Act, the suggestion was made that 
shareholders of S corporations be permitted to elect to treat an 
amount equal to the corporation's entire accumulated earnings and 
profits account as having been constructively distributed and 
reinvested.401 That suggestion, obviously, has great merit. On the 
had a bona fide election between cash or stock, the stock dividend should be tax-
able and, thus, should accomplish a distribution of earnings and profits. I.R.C. 
§ 305(b)(1). 
400. Pub. L. No. 97-448, 96 Stat. 2365, 2399. 
401. Hearings on S. 2350 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 97th Cong., 
2nd Sess. 109-10 (1982) (statement of David G. Glickman, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary, Tax Policy, Department of the Treasury). A similar approach was recom-
mended by the Section of Taxation of the American Bar Association; see testimony 
of M. Bernard Aidinoff, id., at 161. 
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one hand it would eliminate the need to deplete the liquid assets 
of. the corporation, while on the other, it could be drafted to 
eliminate computational uncertainties. If, as a result of a subse-
quent audit, it was determined that the amount taken into income 
did not equal the entire amount of accumulated earnings and pro-
fits, a deficiency inclusion could be made available. Regrettably, 
this provision was not contained in the Revision Act; it should be 
added. 
For some purposes merely substantially eliminating the ac-
cumulated earnings and profits account will be sufficient. For ex-
ample, the concern that distributions will exceed the amount that 
may be distributed tax free will be sufficiently eliminated even 
if some small amount remains in the account. The shareholders' 
exposure to further tax, by definition, is limited to the amount 
that they were willing to include in income as an actual dividend 
distribution. On the other hand, the restrictions and tax on passive 
investment income in excess of twenty-five percent of gross receipts 
are applicable if the S corporation has any amount of accumulated 
earnings and profits. Apparently, the tax is applicable even though 
it is determined subsequently that the corporation retained as lit-
tle as one dollar of earnings and profits- a result of doubtful ra-
tionality. Accordingly, in eliminating the accumulated earnings and 
profits account, it may be advisible to select a technique that 
automatically eliminates the entire account. 
The elimination of an accumulated earnings and profits account 
through any means that will subject the S corporation shareholders 
to an immediate ordinary income tax on the full amount of the 
account will be prohibitively expensive for many S corporations. 
Thus, if a corporation wishes to attempt the elimination of its earn-
ings and profits, it should consider one of the devices employed 
by corporations subject to the regular tax for accomplishing that 
objective. One common technique for eliminating earnings and pro-
fits is the liquidation of the corporation, followed by the reincor-
poration of a portion of its assets in a newly formed corporation.402 
While the liquidation-reincorporation device subjects the 
shareholders of the corporation to tax on the entire amount of the 
appreciation in their stock and not merely the amount of the cor-
porate earnings and profits, the tax is imposed at capital gains 
rates. Moreover, the transferee corporation obtains a step-up in 
basis for the corporate assets equal to their fair market value and 
the entire earnings and profits account of the predecessor corpora-
tion is eliminated. The advantages sought by such a transaction 
will fail if the overall transaction can be reconstructed by the Com-
402. For a recent treatment see Robinson, Tax Interpretation: Lessans From 
the Reincorporation Cases, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 1 (1981). See also BITTKER AND 
EUSTICE. supra note 156, at 1 14.54. 
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missioner as a reorganization within the meaning of section 368 
and will largely fail if the transaction can be reconstructed as fall-
ing within section 351. However, the Commissioner has not had 
much success in recharacterizing carefully planned liquidation-
reincorporations as reorganizations. In fact, where twenty percent 
of the stock of the new corporation is owned by individuals who 
neither owned any stock in the old corporation nor are related 
to shareholders of the old corporation, no case has held that the 
transaction constituted a reorganization.4°3 While there is some in-
dication in the case law that the Commissioner's chances of suc-
cessfully attacking such a transaction may be improving,404 the 
managers of an S corporation in which accumulated earnings and 
profits constitute a substantial handicap might seriously consider 
such a device. 
For someS corporations, particularly those that have an uncer-
tain but not substantial amount of accumulated earnings and profits, 
the tax imposed on a complete liquidation would substantially ex-
ceed the tax that would be imposed upon a distribution of ac-
cumulated earnings and profits. If that corporation also does not 
have a substantial investment portfolio, it might be desirable for 
the shareholders to liquidate the corporation under the provisions 
of section 333 of the Code. The relationship between section 333 
and the Subchapter S provisions is considered below.405 
D. Distributions of Appreciated Property 
The reason that the Treasury Department insisted that 
previously taxed income could be distributed under prior law only 
by a cash distribution, and not by a property distribution, was that 
a property distribution of previously taxed income could result 
in the avoidance of tax at both the corporate and the shareholder 
level on any element of appreciation in the property.406 Under the 
rule attributed to the Supreme Court in General Utilities, 407 a 
distribution of property with respect to stock does not constitute 
a taxable event to the corporation. While that rule has come under 
403. See Coven, The Relevance of Fresh Investment to Corporate Distribu-
tions and Adjustments, 38 TAx L. REV. 419, 456-72 (1983), in which one of the 
authors has argued that these results are wrong and that the transaction sug-
gested in the text should be treated as a reorganization. 
404. Id. at 470-72. 
405. See text accompanying notes 446-49 infra. 
406. See De Treville v. United States, 445 F.2d 1306 (4th Cir. 1971). See also 
Oberst, Reform of the Subchapter S Distribution Rules: Repudiation of Section 311(a}, 
38 TAX L. REV. 79, 90-94 (1982). 
407. General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Comm'r, 296 U.S. 200 (1935). 
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increasing attack408 and has been modified widely for redemptions,409 
it has not been altered for distributions in complete liquidations410 
or dividend distributions. Thus, under prior law, the distribution 
of property by a Subchapter S corporation did not produce a tax 
to the corporation. If such a property distribution had been per-
mitted to qualify as a distribution of PTI, the shareholder would 
not be subject to tax upon the receipt of the property although 
the property would obtain a tax basis in the shareholders' hands 
equal to its fair market value.411 Accordingly, in lieu of selling 
property at the corporate level and incurring an immediate tax 
that must be borne by the S corporation shareholders, the cor-
poration would be inclined to distribute the property in kind to 
the shareholders because a sale at that level would a void any tax 
on the disposition. The benefit of such a device would be a defer-
ral of taxation, not a permanent exemption. The shareholder's basis 
in his stock would be reduced by the fair market value of the 
property distributed.412 Accordingly, on a subsequent disposition 
of the stock, the shareholder would be subject to tax with respect 
to the element of appreciation that had escaped tax at the time 
the property was distributed to him and sold. However, that defer-
ral could be indefinite, or even permanent, should the shareholder 
die without previously disposing of his stock.413 In general effect, 
the Subchapter S corporation and its shareholders, as a group, could 
obtain a step-up in basis to fair market value of any corporate asset 
at any time merely by distributing the asset. 
The obvious solution to this unwarranted result is the one 
adopted in the taxation of partnerships. A distribution of property 
from a partnership to a partner is, in effect, a nonrecognition trans-
action providing for a carryover basis. The partner takes a basis 
in the distributed asset equal to the basis that the asset had in 
the hands of the partnership414 and the basis in his partnership 
interest is reduced by the same amount.415 Thus, should the part-
ner dispose of the distributed asset, he would be subject to tax 
on exactly the same amount as the partnership would have been 
had it sold the asset. This rule prevents the unnecessary accelera-
tion of tax and prohibits an unwarranted deferral of tax. 
In practice, however, the taxation of partnership distributions 
408. See, e.g., ALI. FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, SUBCHAPTER C (Tent. 
Draft No. 1, 1977), and Oberst, supra note 406. 
409. See I.R.C. §§ 3ll(b)-(d). 
410. I.R.C. § 336(b) does contain an exception concerning certain inventory. 
411. I.R.C. § 30l(d)(l). 
412. Treas. Reg. § 1.1375-4(a) (1968). 
413. I.R.C. § 1014. 
414. I.R.C. § 732(a)(1). 
415. I.R.C. § 733. 
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is not as simple as this generalization suggests. In order to pre-
vent the conversion of ordinary income that would otherwise be 
received at the partnership level into capital gains at the partner 
level, Congress enacted the "collapsible partnership" provisions 
of section 751, which override all of the rules of partnership taxa-
tion. In the case of distributions to partners, the provisions of sec-
tion 751(b), which one commentator has described as "awesomely 
complex,"416 are brought into play. When the Treasury Department 
began its study of the revision of Subchapter S, the carryover basis 
rule of partnership taxation was considered but rejected because 
of the complexity of adapting the collapsible partnership rules to 
S corporations.417 In addition, the Treasury Department was con-
cerned that providing for tax-free distributions and a carryover 
basis would create too large a contrast between the rules applicable 
to S corporations and those applicable to corporations subject to 
the regular tax.418 It was feared that such a pattern of taxation 
would create too great an incentive to abuse the purposes of Sub-
chapter S by electing S corporation status for brief periods of time 
in order to execute tax-free distributions. 
The General Utilities rule, as applied to corporations subject 
to the regular tax, also has come under increasing attack. In 
TEFRA, enacted only weeks before the Revision Act, Congress 
again reduced the scope of that rule by expanding section 311(d) 
and imposing a tax at the corporate level on the element of ap-
preciation contained in distributed property in an expanded class 
of redemptions.419 In addressing the distribution of appreciated prop-
erty under the Subchapter S rules, Congress adopted the same 
approach. Thus, section 1363(d) provides that upon the distribu-
tion of appreciated property by an S corporation, gain shall be 
recognized as if the property had been sold to the distributee at 
its fair market value "notwithstanding any other provision of this 
subtitle." While the Subchapter S rule appears far stricter than 
the rule applicable under section 3ll(d) to corporations subject to 
the regular tax, its effect is very different. If a corporation is sub-
ject to the corporate income tax, the reversal of the General Utilities 
rule produces two levels of taxation and the desirability of that 
reversal is a function of the propriety of that double taxation on 
particular corporate transactions. Under Subchapter S, however, 
normally no issue of double taxation is presented. Taxing the gain 
on distributed property merely affects the timing of the realiza-
tion of that gain and its allocation among the S corporation 
shareholders. 
416. MCKEE, supra note 73, at , 20.01. 
417. STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 17. 
418. Id. 
419. TEFRA, Pub. L. No. 97-248, §§ 222, 223, 96 Stat. 324, 478, 483 (1982). 
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Because of this reversal of the General Utilities rule for S 
corporations, the gain in appreciated property of the S corporation 
cannot escape tax upon the distribution of the property. 
Accordingly, in a sharp and favorable contrast to prior law, the 
Revision Act does not distinguish between the distribution of cash 
and the distribution of property. 
This new aspect of S corporation taxation, however, creates 
an unfavorable difference between the pattern of taxing 
partnerships and the pattern of taxing S corporations. While both 
patterns of taxation produce the same ultimate burden of tax, under 
the Subchapter S rules a distribution of appreciated property 
accelerates the tax on the gain in the property to the time of the 
distribution rather than permitting the deferral of the tax until 
the distributed property is disposed of by the shareholders. Such 
lack of conformity between these two forms of business organization 
generally is undesirable. In this instance, however, Congress seems 
to have achieved the correct result. Whether properly or not, the 
Revision Act did not adopt the partnership approach of permitting 
the special allocation of items of corporate income and expense 
to particular shareholders. If the partnership basis rule had been 
adopted for distributions of property by S corporations, such a 
rule would permit the corporation to shift the burden of tax on 
the element of appreciation in the distributed property away from 
the other shareholders in the corporation and to the distributee 
shareholder. Such special allocations generally are not permitted; 
therefore, it would have been inappropriate to permit the same 
result to be achieved through the device of distributing appreciated 
property. Section 1363(d) provides that the gain attributable to 
the distributed appreciated property is allocated to all of the S 
corporation shareholders under the usual rules allocating S cor-
poration income. 
This new aspect of S corporation taxation seems appropriate 
where the property distribution to the shareholder is free of tax 
because it represents a distribution of S corporation income; 
however, the application of the new provision is not limited to such 
distributions. Thus, even though the property distribution is 
regarded as a distribution of accumulated earnings and profits and, 
thus, will be fully subject to tax at ordinary income rates to the 
distributee shareholder, gain on the distributed property remains 
includible in the income of the S corporation. As a result, the S 
corporation and its shareholders become subject to a form of double 
taxation in a circumstance in which a regular corporation is sub-
ject to only a single level of taxation. The appreciation in distributed 
property is taxed twice, once as a capital gain allocated to all of 
the shareholders and again as ordinary income to the distributee 
shareholder. That result is plainly erroneous. Since Congress delib-
erately has perpetuated the General Utilities rule with respect to 
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ordinary dividends from corporations subject to the regular tax, 
it is inappropriate to subject the shareholders of an S corporation 
to double taxation on distributions out of accumulated earnings 
and profits. It is not at all clear that Congress appreciated this 
interrelationship between new sections 1363(d) and 1368(c). Sec-
tion 1363(d) was designed to accomplish a different objective en-
tirely: preventing the complete avoidance of tax on the apprecia-
tion in distributed property. Accordingly, the provision should be 
amended to prevent this double taxation. 
As originally enacted section 1363(d) was also applicable to 
distributions in complete liquidation, although that result did not 
appear to have been intended by Congress. Under the TCB, gain 
is not to be recognized upon such distributions.420 The proper appli-
cation of section 1363(d) to complete liquidations, and the relation-
ship of that provision to the Subchapter C rules governing liqui-
dations, is considered below.421 
E. The "Post-Termination Transition Period" 
The harshness of the inability to withdraw amounts of 
previously taxed income following the voluntary or involuntary 
termination of a Subchapter S election has been softened greatly 
by new section 1371(e). Under that provision, any distribution of 
cash during the post-termination transition period (PTTP) by a cor-
poration that was previously an S corporation, rather than being 
treated as a taxable dividend, is treated as a return of capital which 
reduces the basis of the shareholder's stock in the corporation. 
The adoption of such a grace period is highly desirable and the 
relief it extends is a welcome addition to the S corporation rules. 
However, at present the provisions contain serious ambiguities. 
The PTTP suffers from the attempt to make one concept 
accomplish too much. This grace period is used to accomplish two 
very different functions: to fix the date upon which losses unused 
upon the termination of a Subchapter Selection may be claimed,422 
and to provide a period of time within which tax-free distributions 
may be made from a corporation following the expiration of its 
election. The definition of the PTTP that may be most rational 
for one of these purposes may not be rational for the other. Section 
1377(b) defines the PTTP as (a) the period beginning the day 
following the termination of the S corporation election and 
continuing for the longer of one year or until the due date for the 
filing of the final S corporation tax return, including any extensions 
420. TCB § 201(a). See note 9 supra. 
421. See text accompanying notes 439-447. 
422. I.R.C. § 1366(d)(3). 
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thereof, and as (b) the 120-day period beginning on the date of a 
determination that the corporation's election has terminated. For 
this purpose, a determination means a final court decision, a closing 
agreement, or an agreement between the corporation and the 
Commissioner that the corporation has failed to qualify as an S 
corporation. 423 
Thus, the PTTP seems to consist of two discrete periods of 
time, the one-year period immediately following termination and 
a 120-day period that may occur years later. Obviously, the two 
separate periods are addressed to two different types of termination 
of S elections. The one-year period following termination will be 
useful to corporations when the termination, whether intentional 
or inadvertent, is at least known to the managers of the corporation 
when it occurs. The alternative 120-day period will be beneficial 
when the termination of the S election is not known to the managers 
of the corporation at the time it occurred, or at least is not conceded. 
Because the possible loss of S corporation status often is raised 
on an audit that occurs more than one year after the alleged 
termination, the one-year period of time will provide no relief for 
inadvertent terminations. Nevertheless, the availability of the 
PTTP is not so limited. The alternative definitions are connected 
by the word "and;" therefore, regardless of the nature of the 
termination of the S corporation election, the corporation apparently 
is entitled to both such periods. In addition, the proper definition 
of the PTTP is confused further because the description of the 
PTTP in the legislative history does not correspond to the statutory 
language. Both the House and Senate Reports state that the PTTP 
is to extend from the actual termination of the S corporation 
election until the expiration of the tatter of the two described 
periods.424 That language seems to indicate that the grace period 
constitutes a single continuous period expiring after one year in 
the event the termination does not precipitate a "determination" 
or, if a determination occurs, 120 days after it is rendered. 
When the grace period is used to identify the time at which 
unused losses may be claimed, the preferable construction of the 
PTTP would be that it consisted of two discrete periods. In that 
situation, the Code must specify the date upon which the loss is 
deemed to be sustained. Indeed, section 1366(d)(3)(A) provides 
that the loss may be claimed on the last day of "any" PTTP, thus 
suggesting that more than one PTTP may be available. If the ter-
mination is inadvertent, the corporation may pass through the first 
one-year period before the shareholders are aware of the 
423. I.R.C. § 1377(b)(2). 
424. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 16-17; SENATE REPORT, supra note 
22, at 18. 
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termination. Congress, therefore, provided the alternative post-
determination PTTP. In the case of an inadvertent termination, 
however, a corporation m·ay sustain losses that some of its 
shareholders cannot claim because of an absence of basis at the 
end of its actual final year as an S corporation, yet the shareholders 
may obtain an increase in their stock basis during the following 
year attributable to contributions to capital or the discharge of 
obligations as the guarantor of corporate indebtedness. In that 
event, the shareholders will have claimed the carried over losses 
under the normal Subchapter S rules. If the S corporation status 
is contested subsequently and a determination rendered that a 
termination in fact occurred, the shareholders should be entitled, 
under PTTP rules, to retain that loss in the year following the 
termination. Requiring the deferral of losses would be far less 
favorable, not only because of the extended deferral of the tax 
benefit, but also because of the complexity introduced by potential 
changes in stock ownership. No useful purpose would be served 
by requiring the shareholders to suffer the deferral of their loss 
until, after many years, a final determination is issued. However, 
that deferral can be avoided only if the PTTP includes two discrete 
periods, both of which have a last day upon which losses can be 
claimed pursuant to section 1366(d)(3)(A). 
If this more favorable rule is not adopted, the managers of S 
corporations will be faced with a difficult choice when it is possible 
that a termination has occurred. If the termination is conceded, 
the carried over losses may be claimed at once- under the one 
year PTTP. However, if the termination is contested, the 
· shareholders will face the possibility that the tax benefit of those 
losses must be deferred until an adverse determination is rendered. 
That pressure to concede debatable terminations is improper. 
Rather, as long as a sufficient basis for the stock has been created, 
the shareholders should be permitted to claim losses at the end 
of either the one-year or the 120-day period and losses claimed 
erroneously under the normal Subchapter S rules should be treated 
as losses claimed on the last day of one-year PTTP. 
When the PTTP concept is employed to permit tax-free 
distributions from corporations that have terminated their 
Subchapter S status, regardless of how the PTTP is defined the 
relief seems to be somewhat less than rational. Under section 
1371(e), the relief extended is mandatory. Thus, any distribution 
during the PTTP is treated as a return of capital. There seems 
to be no purpose whatsoever for this "relief' in the event of a 
deliberate and known termination of a Subchapter S election. In 
that event, no relief is warranted and the normal pattern for taxing 
corporations subject to the regular income tax should have been 
left undisturbed. In fact, it is doubtful that Congress intended a 
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one-year moratorium on taxable dividends distributed by 
corporations subject to the corporate income tax simply because 
the corporation was subject to Subchapter S during the preceeding 
year. Nevertheless, there does not appear to be any basis in the 
statute for excluding distributions by such corporations from the 
mandatory grace period. 
Where the termination of the S election is inadvertent, the 
corporation may have made actual distributions to its shareholders 
in several years following the inadvertent termination but before 
it was aware that the termination had occurred. If the PTTP 
consists of two discrete periods of time, distributions during the 
first year following the inadvertent termination will constitute tax-
free returns of capital while distributions thereafter will be subject 
to tax as normal dividends to the extent of the corporation's 
earnings and profits. Because corporations rarely are subject to 
audit within one year following the conclusion of their taxable year, 
the relief extended by the one-year period seems incomplete and 
relatively arbitrary. 
Furthermore, the creation of a 120-day window through which 
additional tax-free distributions may be made seems excessively 
restrictive. Before a final determination is made that a Subchapter 
S election has been terminated inadvertently, a substantial 
inhibition against making dividend distributions will exist. If the 
Subchapter S status of the corporation has terminated, the 
distributions will be taxable as ordinary dividends. However, if 
the corporation defers making distributions until a final 
determination is rendered, the distribution will be tax-free. One 
hopes that the shareholders of such a corporation have other means 
of support. Regardless of whether the corporation remains subject 
to a Subchapter S election, a tax-free distribution will be permissible 
at some point; therefore, it seems unduly restrictive to require 
that distribution only during a brief period of time many years 
later. Thus, from both these perspectives, a more rational 
construction of the PTTP is a single continuous period ending 120 
days following a determination that the Subchapter S election has 
terminated. 
In addition to granting relief to known voluntary terminations 
of S elections, the application of the PTTP concept to corporate 
distributions seems overbroad in a second respect. The relief 
extended by section 1371(e) apparently is available without regard 
to the ownership of the stock of the corporation during the PTTP. 
Thus, a corporate distribution during the grace period to a 
shareholder who acquires his stock after the Subchapter S election 
has in fact terminated will be free of tax even though the 
shareholder, at the time of purchase, was fully aware that the 
corporation was subject to the regular income tax. By virtue of 
the increased basis that he is able to offset against the proceeds 
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of the sale, the seller of the stock already will have received a 
tax-free recovery of the amount of S corporation income that 
previously had been taxed to him; therefore, there is no justification 
for granting relief to the purchaser of that stock. Indeed, section 
1371(e) effectively converts what otherwise is a dividend subject 
to ordinary income taxation into a deferred capital gain. Providing 
grace period relief to a transferee of S corporation stock who 
acquires that stock by gift or in another transaction producing a 
carryover basis is appropriate, but the statute should be amended 
to bar such relief to a purchaser of stock. 
Two further aspects of distributions during the PTTP should 
be observed. First, the relief provision of section 1371(e) applies 
only to distributions of cash. Presumably, Congress so limited the 
grace period relief to prevent the avoidance of tax on any gain 
in appreciated property distributed during the grace period. At 
the time of the distribution, the corporation does not in fact 
constitute an S corporation; therefore, the new rule of section 
1363(d) imposing a tax on the element of appreciation in distributed 
property will not be applicable. For a corporation subject to the 
regular corporate income tax, the exemption from tax on the 
appreciation in distributed property continues to apply to ordinary 
dividend distributions. As a result of this limitation, property 
distributions following an unknown termination cannot be regarded 
as tax free under the grace period relief provision. Moreover, 
corporations short of cash and unwilling or unable to borrow will 
have difficulty taking advantage of a PTTP distribution, even if 
the property that they wish to distribute has not appreciated in 
value. An alternative would have been to apply the rule of section 
1363(d) to all property distributions treated as returns of capital 
under section 1371(e). That approach would have prevented the 
avoidance of tax and substantially increased the flexibility of PTTP 
distributions. It is regrettable that Congress did not pursue that 
alternative. 
Secondly, the amount that may be distributed by a corporation 
tax free pursuant to this provision may not exceed the amount 
of its accumulated adjustments account. That account, it will be 
recalled, generally corresponds to the net accumulated income of 
the S corporation since January 1, 1983.425 This limitation effectively 
prevents the tax-free distribution during the PTTP of earnings 
and profits accumulated after the termination of the Subchapter 
S election (as well as of pre-election or pre-1983 earnings and 
profits). The objective is entirely reasonable but it illustrates a 
minor flaw in the Revision Act. The only reason S corporations 
that do not have any earnings and profits are required to maintain 
425. I.R.C. §§ 1368(e)(l)(A) and (e)(2). 
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an accumulated adjustments account is that they may obtain 
earnings and profits. However, such corporations can acquire 
earnings and profits in only two ways, neither of which is likely 
to occur: by the acquisition of another corporation in a transaction 
in which earnings and profits carry over, and during the PTTP.426 
It is highly unfortunate that all S corporations will be subjected 
to the burden of currently maintaining such accounts when that 
expense will have significance for only a very few. Requiring this 
largely wasted effort is inconsistent with the objective of 
simplifying Subchapter S. Congress should seek an alternative 
solution.427 
VIII. RELATIONSHIP OF SUBCHAPTER S TO SUBCHAPTER C 
The integration of the new S corporation with the rules of 
general application governing corporate distributions and 
adjustments, contained in Subchapter C of the Code, was one of 
the most complicated aspects of revising Subchapter S. 
Unfortunately, few of the complex issues raised are addressed 
directly by the Revision Act and the legislative history offers only 
the slimmest guidance as to how this integration was intended to 
be accomplished. In addition, while the TCB would remove some 
doubts, it seems probable that other aspects of the application of 
Subchapter C to S corporations will require legislative revision. 
As a result, the relationship between Subchapter S and Subchapter 
C remains quite uncertain and the following observations must be 
regarded as highly tentative. 
The relationship between Subchapter S and Subchapter C is 
governed largely by three rules: (a) an S corporation is a corporation 
and, except to the extent inconsistent with Subchapter S, 
Subchapter C applies to an S corporation,428 (b) for the purposes 
of Subchapter C, an S corporation "in its capacity as a shareholder 
of another corporation" is treated as an individual,429 and (c) the 
income of an S corporation is computed in the same manner as 
an individual computes income.430 The problem, t_hen, is determining 
when the deemed-individual rule and, to a lesser extent, the income 
computation requirement should be regarded as inconsistent with 
426. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 19. 
427. There are many other uncertainties concerning the PTTP that the 
regulations, or Congress, must address. For example, if any PTTP is available 
when a deliberate termination occurs, it is unclear whether the corporation by 
subsequently agreeing with the Commissioner that the termination in fact oc-
curred may create an additional PTTP for claiming losses or making distributions. 
428. I.R.C. § 1371(al(l). 
429. I.R.C. § 1371(a)(2). 
430. I.R.C. § 1363(b). 
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the general rules of Subchapter C. The only illustration of the 
relationship among these three rules contained in the Committee 
Reports concerns the receipt of dividends of property by S 
corporations.431 However, the breadth of the deemed-individual rule 
clearly indicates that Congress intended the scope of that provision 
to encompass far more than merely subjecting S corporation 
shareholders to tax on the full fair market value of property 
dividends received by their corporation. 
A. Dividend Equivalence and Stock Attribution 
It seems relatively clear that whenever an S corporation 
receives a distribution with respect to stock from another 
corporation, the deemed-individual rule should prevail. Therefore, 
the consequences of the distribution to the S corporation and its 
shareholders should be determined in the same manner as if the 
distributions were received by an individual. Accordingly, it seems 
safe to assume that in applying section 302 for the purpose of 
determining the character of a distribution received by an S 
corporation, the S corporation should be regarded as an individual. 
The treatment of an S corporation in this context will be primarily 
of significance under section 302(b)(4). Pursuant to that provision, 
redemptions incident to the partial liquidation of a corporation are 
entitled to capital gains taxation but only when the stock is 
redeemed from a shareholder other than a corporation. Evidently, 
S corporations are entitled to the benefits of section 302(b)(4) by 
virtue of the deemed-individual rule. 
In many circumstances, the characterization of a purported 
redemption under section 302 requires the application of the stock 
attribution rules of section 318. Section 318 contains rules governing 
the attribution of stock ownership to and from individuals, cor-
porations, and other entities. Under the Revision Act, it was not 
entirely clear whether an S corporation was to be regarded as an 
individual for the purpose of section 318 which would have pro-
duced absurd results, or as a corporation. The TCB would resolve 
this doubt by treating an S corporation as a partnership, and its 
shareholders as partners, for the purpose of attributing stock owner-
ship in another corporation between the S corporation and its 
shareholders.432 Under section 318, stock ownership in a second cor-
431. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 14; SENATE REPORT, supra note 22, 
at 15. 
432. TCB § 201(i). See note 9 supra. Technically, the amendment would treat 
an S corporation as a partnership for all purposes of attributing the stock of 
another corporation. However, for the purpose of attributing stock between the 
S corporation and another entity in which it holds an interst, it is irrelevant 
whether the S corporation is treated as a corporation or as a partnership. New 
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poration is attributed between a corporation and a shareholder 
only if the shareholder actually or constructively owns fifty per-
cent or more of the stock in the corporation;433 attribution between 
a partnership and its partners is not so limited by a threshold 
ownership requirement. Thus the effect of the proposed amend-
ment is to expand materially the potential for attributing the owner-
ship of stock in a second corporation between an S corporation 
and its stockholders for the purposes of those sections of the Code 
that employ the attribution rules of section 318.434 The TCB amend-
ment would not alter the treatment of an S corporation for the 
purpose of attributing the ownership of the stock in the S cor-
poration itself. · 
Similar confusion surrounds the proper construction of section 
304. That provision, among other things, requires that certain sales 
of stock in a corporation to a second corporation controlled by the 
same persons be reconstructed and treated as if the purchasing 
corporation had redeemed its own stock from the controlling 
shareholders. The constructive redemption is tested for dividend 
equivalence under section 302. A Subchapter S election will be 
terminated if another corporation acquires stock in the S 
corporation; therefore, a section 304 transaction involving an S 
corporation can occur only when the S corporation acquires stock 
in a sister corporation (or a subsidiary). If the S corporation is 
regarded as an individual for the purposes of section 304, the 
provision would not be applicable. While the S corporation, as a 
result of its purchase of stock, will become a shareholder in another 
corporation, the purpose of reconstructing the sale as a redemption 
by section 304 does not concern the S corporation in its capacity 
as a shareholder. The basic transaction addressed by section 304 
is the attempt by the controlling shareholders to extract funds 
from a controlled corporation at capital gains rates by purporting 
to enter into a sale of stock. The section does not address the 
participant corporations in their capacity as shareholders; rather, 
it addresses them in their corporate capacity. Thus, the Treasury 
I.R.C. § 1373(a) also provides that an S corporation will be treated as a partner-
ship for purposes of the attribution rules of I.R.C. § 958 dealing with controlled 
foreign corporations. 
433. I.R.C. §§ 318(a)(2)(C) and (3)(C). 
434. The pattern of the attribution rules spread throughout the Code is 
so chaotic that it is not possible rationally to critize the TCB amendment. Treating 
an S corporation in the same manner as a partnership for this purpose makes 
more sense than treating it as a corporation. However, the 50% threshold re-
quirement for back attribution, i.e., attribution from an owner to an entity, is 
a desirable limitation that probably should be extended to partnerships, rather 
than withdrawn from S corporations. See Coven, Affinity Provisions of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code: A Case Study in Nonsimplification, 45 TENN L. REV. 557, 695-97 
(1978). 
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Department probably will take the position that an S corporation 
is to be regarded as a corporation for the purposes of section 304. 
If section 304 does apply to the purchase of stock in a sister 
corporation by an S corporation, the consequences of that 
application of section 304 often will be very different from the 
consequences of its application to corporations subject to the 
corporate income tax. In the latter context, the application of section 
304 is almost invariably unfavorable to the taxpayer. The section 
reconstructs a purported sale at capital gains rates into a 
redemption that may fail the test of section 302 and thus be subject 
to ordinary income tax to the full extent of the proceeds received 
by the controlling shareholder. When the purchasing corporation 
is an S corporation, however, the taxable sale instead may be 
converted into a tax-free distribution from the accumulated 
adjustments account. The consequences of such non pro rata 
distributions from S corporations are treated above.435 
B. Redemptions Subject to Section 311(d) 
Under section 311(d) the distribution of appreciated property 
by a corporation in redemption of its stock is treated as a realiza-
tion of the gain in the distributed property, thus subjecting the 
distributing corporation to tax on the element of appreciation. That 
general rule, however, is subject to a series of exceptions including 
a redemption incident to a partial liquidation of "qualified stock." 
Under section 311(e)(l), qualified stock is defined as stock held by 
a person other than a corporation, who for the five year period 
preceding the redemption (or the lesser period of corporate ex-
istence), owned at least ten percent of the value of the stock of 
the distributing corporation. Under the Revision Act as enacted 
and the deemed-individual rule of section 1371(aX2), stock redeemed 
from an S corporation would be eligible for this exemption from 
the tax imposed under section 311(d). 
Congress evidently became concerned that the scope of this 
exemption could be unduly broadened through the use of conduit 
entities. Several stockholders, each of whom owned less than ten 
percent of the stock of a corporation, could combine their holdings 
through the formation of an S corporation, a partnership or a trust. 
If the ten percent test of section 311(e) were applied at the entity 
level, an exemption from tax beyond that intended by Congress 
could be achieved. To bar that result, the TCB would amend sec-
tion 311(e)(l) to provide that the definition of qualified stock shall 
435. See text accompanying notes 37 4-80 supra. 
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be applied at the shareholder, partner or beneficiary level.436 The 
provision apparently contemplates that the ownership of the stock 
of the distributing corporation be attributed to the S corporation 
shareholders (or partners or beneficiaries) for the five year period 
in accordance with their interests in the S corporation, which, of 
course, will have varied over time. If that attributed ownership 
meets both the ten percent and the five year tests, the exemption 
will be available. Presumably this attribution of ownership should 
be made even though during a portion of the five year period, the 
S corporation was not an electing corporation. Similarly, an S cor-
poration shareholder should be entitled to tack onto this period 
of attributed ownership any prior period of his actual ownership 
of the stock in the distributing corporation. However, the amend-
ment is silent on all such questions. 
In addition, the proposed amendment provides that the distribu-
tion is to be treated as made directly to the shareholders, part-
ners or beneficiaries in proportion to their interests in the entity. 
Presumably this language is not to be read literally. It seems most 
unlikely that Congress intended that the S shareholders be taxed 
directly on the gain attributable to the distributed property or 
treated as if they had received a constructive distribution from 
the S corporations. Rather, this second provision appears intend-
ed to confirm that the distributing corporation will be subject to 
tax with respect to stock deemed owned by less than ten percent 
shareholders and will not be subject to tax with respect to stock 
deemed owned by shareholders that are treated as meeting the 
test of section 311(e)(l)(A). 
C. Liquidation of S Corporations 
The provisions of the Code governing the consequences of a 
liquidation do not address the liquidating corporation in its capacity 
as a shareholder. Accordingly, the deemed-individual rule should 
not be applicable. On the other hand, it does not necessarily follow 
that the general rules of Subchapter C are therefore applicable 
to the liquidation. The provisions of Subchapter C that govern the 
consequences to a corporation of its liquidation address the 
computation of the income of the liquidating corporation. In 
particular, section 336 provides that, generally, no gain or loss shall 
be recognized to the liquidating corporation on the distribution 
of property in complete liquidation, and related section 337 provides 
that no gain or loss will be recognized by the corporation on a 
sale of property pursuant to a plan of liquidation if the corporation 
436. TCB § 102(f) .. 
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is, in fact, liquidated within one year following the adoption of the 
plan. Under prior law, both of these non-recognition provisions ap-
plied to Subchapter S corporations. However, as the Revision Act 
was originally adopted, it was not fully clear whether either con-
tinued to apply. S corporations are required to compute their in-
come in the same manner as an individual and individuals, of course, 
are not entitled to the benefits of either section 336 or 337. 
Moreover, although the result appeared contrary to the legislative 
history,437 section 1363(d) literally required the recognition of gain 
on any distribution of appreciated property by an S corporation, 
even in complete liquidation. That specific provision appeared to 
supplant section 336 and, since section 336 and 337 are related 
provisions, suggested that section 337 also might not be applicable 
to the liquidation of an S corporation. 
Under the TCB, section 1363(d)438 would not apply to distribu-
tions in complete liquidation. While that exemption from the tax 
imposed on other distributions of appreciated property falls short 
of a specification that section 336 does apply to S corporations not-
withstanding that they are to compute their income as individuals, 
the congressional intent seems reasonably clear. And, if section 
336 is to apply, it might be surmised that Congress also intended 
that section 337 apply to the liquidation of S corporations. However, 
that conclusion is far from certain. 
1. Section 337 
Under prior law, one of the specialized uses for Subchapter 
S corporations was to minimize the tax consequences of a disposition 
of the property of a corporation before its complete liquidation. 
Although section 337 eliminates a tax at the corporate level on 
most of the gain inherent in business property, the list of exceptions 
to that rule is lengthy and expanding.439 In addition, the ordinary 
business income of the corporation remains subject to tax for its 
final year of operation even though the profits derived will be 
distributed immediately to the shareholders and again subject to 
tax. Accordingly, many closely held corporations engaged in a 
complete liquidation have elected under Subchapter S for their 
final year. 440 The Commissioner endorsed this use of Subchapter 
437. Both the House and Senate Reports state that I.R.C. § 1363(d) was 
not applicable to distributions in complete liquidations. HOUSE REPORT, supra 
note 22, at 19; SENATE REPORT, supra note 22, at 20. 
438. TCB § 201(a). See note 9 supra. 
439. See Midland-Ross Corp. v. United States, 485 F.2d 110 (6th Cir. 1973); 
and Tennessee-Carolina Transportation, Inc. v. Comm'r, 582 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1978), 
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979). 
440. In addition, I.R.C. § 337 is not available to collapsible corporations as 
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Sunder prior law and ruled that the tax imposed on capital gains 
derived by a Subchapter S corporation in certain circumstances 
is not applicable to gain protected from tax by section 337.441 A 
corporation so proceeding could avoid double taxation on items 
of income not sheltered by section 337 without incurring any 
unfavorable consequences. Although this technique was well known, 
there is no indication in the legislative history to the Revision Act 
that Congress intended to alter the availability of this tax reduction 
technique and the TCB seems to confirm that conclusion. However, 
the new Subchapter S rules were not integrated properly with 
section 337 and as a result, if that section is applicable on the li-
quidation of an S corporation, the gain in the corporation's prop-
erties will be relieved of tax at both the corporate and shareholder 
levels. Such a result could not possibly have been intended by 
Congress. 
If section 337 does apply to a disposition of properties by an 
S corporation, the S corporation shareholders would not be subject 
to tax. However, the basis of their stock in the S corporation would 
be increased by the amount of gain realized but not recognized 
on the disposition. Under section 1367(a)(1), the basis of a 
shareholder's stock in an S corporation is increased by his allocable 
share of items of income attributed to him under section 1366(a) 
(1). Under that provision, the allocation includes all items of income 
"including tax-exempt income." Because section 337 clearly exempts 
gain from tax, sections 1366 and 1367 apparently require an increase 
in the shareholder's basis for that amount of gain. As a result, 
when the proceeds of that corporate sale are distributed to the 
shareholders in liquidation, the gain in the shareholder's stock that 
corresponds to the gain exempted from tax under section 337 will 
again be free of tax. Thus, gain attributable to the disposition of 
the property of the corporation in preparation for a liquidation 
will be exempt from tax at both the corporate and the shareholder 
level. Such a result is plainly wrong because the purpose of sec-
tion 337, like the purpose of Subchapter S, is to eliminate double 
taxation and not to eliminate all taxation upon the appreciation 
in value of corporate property. 
There apparently are two possible solutions to this problem. 
Either by a most aggressive regulation or through further correc-
tive legislation, it could be provided that the basis of a shareholder's 
stock shall not be increased by the amount of any gain unrecognized 
under section 337. Alternatively, S corporations could be barred 
from obtaining nonrecognition under section 337. Somewhat surpris-
defined in I.R.C. § 341(b). I.R.C. § 337(c)(1). Thus, electing under Subchapter S 
in the year a collapsible corporation is to be liquidated frequently will be desirable. 
441. Rev. Rul. 78-89, 1978-1 C.B. 272. 
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ingly, perhaps, a superior tax result would be achieved if section 
337 were not applicable to the liquidation of an S corporation. In 
contrast to the consequence of failing to apply section 337 to a 
corporation subject to the corporate income tax, withdrawing the 
availability of that section from S corporations would not produce 
double taxation. The income recognized on a disposition of the cor-
porate properties would cause an increase in the basis of the stock 
in the corporation which would shelter the distribution of the pro-
ceeds of the corporate level sale from further tax.442 Rather, the 
application of section 337 to S corporations merely affects the 
characterization of that gain. If section 337 is not applicable gain 
on the appreciation in the corporate properties will be characterized 
at the corporate level and thus will yield ordinary income to the 
extent that properties are not eligible for capital gains treatment. 
Conversely, if section 337 is applicable but no adjustment to the 
basis of the corporate stock results from the income excused from 
tax, the gain in the corporate properties will be converted into 
a capital gain under section 331 upon the distribution in complete 
liquidation.443 There is no obvious reason why the gain on the final 
disposition of the property of a corporation should be converted 
into a capital gain. On the contrary, entity level characterization 
would be more consistent with the pattern of taxing partnerships444 
and would retard the use of S corporations to avoid the collapsi-
ble corporation provisions of section 341. 
It would seem, therefore, that the preferable approach would 
be to resolve the ambiguity concerning the application of section 
337 in favor of its unavailability. However, if section 337 were not 
applicable to S corporations, it would be intolerable for section 
336 to apply when the shareholders will be subject to tax under 
section 331. The application of section 336 to an S corporation pro-
duces precisely the same result as would the application of sec-
tion 337. Thus if section 336 were to apply but section 337 did 
not, S corporation shareholders would be subject to different tax 
consequences depending upon whether the corporation assets were 
sold at the corporate level or distributed and, likely, sold at the 
shareholder level- the very inconsistency that section 337 was 
enacted to eliminate. As a result, if Congress wishes to bar S cor-
porations from the benefits of section 337, the TCB must be 
amended to limit the scope of the exclusion of distributions in 
complete liquidation from section 1363(d). If the shareholders will 
442. I.R.C. § 1367(a)(l)(A). 
443. Of course, even if I.R.C. § 337 is applicable, some ordinary income may 
be generated on a disposition of the properties of the corporation. See, e.g., I.R.C. 
§§ 337(b)(l) and 1245. See note 439 supra. 
444. See I.R.C. §§ 735 and 751. 
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be subject to tax under section 331, section 336 should not apply 
and gain should be recognized under section 1363(d).445 On the other 
hand, even if section 337 is not available to S corporations, section 
336 must apply if the shareholders are subject to tax under sec-
tion 333. In any event, prompt further amendment of the Revision 
Act to coordinate section 337 with the new provisions seems re-
quired regardless of the approach taken. 
2. Section 333 
Under prior law, one of the relatively few circumstances in 
which it was desirable to liquidate a corporation pursuant to the 
provisions of section 333 was when the corporation was a 
Subchapter S corporation. If the shareholders of a liquidating 
corporation elect to be subject to tax pursuant to section 333, they 
are not subject to tax with respect to the entire amount of gain 
inherent in their stock in the corporation. Rather, individual 
shareholders are subject to tax at ordinary income rates on an 
amount equal to their allocable portion of the earnings and profits 
of the liquidating corporation (but not on an amount in excess of 
the gain realized on the liquidation).446 The liquidating distribution 
is not subject to any further tax except to the extent that the 
properties distributed consist of cash and certain investment 
securities. Thus, if a corporation having a relatively small amount 
of earnings and profits, such as an S corporation, distributes its 
assets in kind to its shareholders, the liquidation may be virtually 
free of tax consequences. The shareholders will obtain a basis for 
the distributed assets equal to the basis that they had in their 
stock in the corporation.447 Thus, s.ection 333 is a form of 
nonrecognition provision that roughly mirrors a tax free 
incorporation under section 351. There are strong policy reasons 
for desiring to retain the application of section 333 to the liquidation 
of S corporations. The pattern of taxation produced by the provision 
more nearly resembles the consequences of dissolving a partnership 
than it resembles the normal consequences of liquidating a 
corporation. In operation, the provision permits the shareholders 
of an S corporation to revert to partnership form without immediate 
tax consequences. Thus, the provision is entirely consistent with 
the underlying philosophy of the Revision Act. 
445. If the gain so recognized was large enough, it might attract the cor-
porate level capital gains tax imposed by I.R.C. § 1374. The resulting double tax-
ation plainly would be erroneous. Accordingly, if I.R.C. § 1363(d) was to be made 
applicable to distributions in complete liquidation, the gain so recognized should 
be exempt from tax under I.R.C. § 1374. 
446. I.R.C. § 333(e). A slightly different rule, discussed in the text below, 
is applicable to corporations. 
447. I.R.C. § 334(c). 
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If the liquidating S corporation were subject to tax on the 
appreciation inherent in properties distributed to its shareholders, 
the benefits of section 333 would be eliminated substantially. While 
the shareholders technically would remain free to elect section 333 
treatment, in fact they would be subject to tax on the entire amount 
of the appreciation in the corporate properties distributed to them. 
While in many instances the appreciation in the shareholder's stock 
would be greater than the appreciation in the corporation 
properties, and thus some amount of gain may remain deferred, 
in most situations little advantage would remain to electing under 
section 333. Although under the Revision Act it appeared that 
distributions in complete liquidation might be subject to tax under 
section 1363(d), the TCB would bar that result. Accordingly, elect-
ing under section 333 upon the liquidation of an S corporation re-
mains as desirable as under prior law. Indeed, since S corporations 
will not accumulate any earnings and profits after 1982, the at-
tractiveness of section 333 has been enhanced. 
D. S Corporations as Stockholders in Liquidating Corporations 
When the S corporation is a shareholder in the corporation that 
is being liquidated, the deemed-individual rule clearly controls the 
tax consequences to the S corporation and its shareholders. While 
the consequences of such liquidations seem relatively unambiguous, 
those consequences nevertheless can be somewhat surprising. 
Under the relatively complex scheme of Subchapter C, the 
shareholders of liquidating corporations may be subject to tax under 
one of three separate provisions. Under the general rule of sec-
tion 331, shareholders, whether corporate or individual, are sub-
ject to tax in the same manner as if they had sold their stock in 
the liquidating corporation. Thus, the shareholders are subject to 
tax on the amount by which the value of the cash or property 
distributed exceeds the basis in the S corporation stock. As a result, 
the shareholders obtain a basis in any property distributed equal 
to its fair market valu~.448 
The alternative elective treatment under section 333 is available 
to both corporations and individuals although with slightly differ-
ing tax consequences. While the amount subject to tax does not 
depend upon the nature of the shareholder, corporate shareholders 
are subject to tax at capital .gains rates on the entire amount 
recognized.449 Furthermore, under section 333(b), a corporation that 
at any time after January 1, 1954 owned fifty percent of the voting 
stock of the corporation to be liquidated is excluded from section 
448. I.R.C. § 334(a). 
449. I.R.C. § 333(£). 
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333 treatment. Since an S corporation is treated as an individual 
for the purposes of section 333, neither of these rules applicable 
to corporations should be applicable to S corporations -at least 
those formed after 1982. On the other hand, it is not entirely clear 
that an S corporation will be regarded as eligible to elect section 
333 treatment if it owned over fifty percent of the stock of the 
corporation being liquidated either prior to the making of an S 
election or while it was a Subchapter S corporation prior to 1983. 
In such instances, the corporation might be treated as one that 
owned over fifty percent of the stock of the corporation being li-
quidated even though it is treated as an individual today. 
Finally, under section 332, no gain or loss is recognized to a 
corporation upon the liquidation of another corporation in which 
it owns eighty percent or more of the stock. Under the deemed-
individual rule, section 332 apparently will not be available to S 
corporations. 
One context in which an S corporation will be a stockholder 
in a liquidating corporation is where the S corporation has pur: 
chased all or substantially all of the stock of another corporation 
with a view to the immediate liquidation of that corporation and 
the acquisition of all of its assets. Technically, an S corporation 
is prohibited from acquiring eighty percent or more of the stock 
of another corporation.450 However, under prior law the Treasury 
Department recognized that an overly literal application of that 
prohibition would serve no useful purpose but would interfere with 
the conduct of legitimate business transactions. One common 
technique for acquiring the assets of another corporation is to pur-
chase the stock of that corporation and to liquidate it immediately. 
Between the time of purchase and the time of liquidation, the S 
corporation momentarily would violate the prohibition against the 
ownership of over eighty percent of the stock in another corpora-
tion. If that prohibition had been enforced literally, Subchapter 
S corporations would have been barred from acquiring assets in 
this manner. Recognizing that this technique was not inconsistent 
with Subchapter S, the Commissioner ruled that the momentary 
ownership of more than eighty percent of the stock of another cor-
poration would not cause a termination of the Subchapter S 
election.451 None of the amendments to Subchapter S produced by 
the Revision Act have any bearing on the desirability of waiving 
literal compliance with this aspect of the definition of an S cor-
poration. Presumably, therefore, the flexibility shown by the 
Treasury Department in this respect will be continued under pres-
ent law. 
450. I.R.C. § 1361(b)(2)(A). 
451. Rev. Rul. 73-496, 1973-2 C.B. 312. See also Rev. Rul. 72-320, 1972-1 C.B. 
270. 
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When a corporation subject to the regular income tax acquires 
eighty percent or more of the stock of another corporation during 
a one-year period, it is entitled under section 338 to elect to in-
crease the basis of the assets of its newly acquired subsidiary to 
their fair market value on the date of the stock acquisition. It is 
not entirely clear whether an S corporation is entitled to make 
this section 338 election. Technically, the election does not affect 
the acquiring corporation, rather, it alters the basis of the assets 
of the subsidiary. However, because of its position as a stockholder 
in the newly acquired subsidiary, the acquiring corporation makes 
the election. Thus, the deemed-individual rule might be regarded 
as barring S corporations from making this election. That disability, 
however, apparently is not significant. Since an S corporation can 
own eighty percent or more of the stock of another corporation 
only momentarily, at best, any such acquired subsidiary must be 
liquidated promptly. The liquidation will be subject to section 331; 
thus, the acquiring S corporation will obtain a basis for any assets 
distributed in the liquidation equal to the fair market value of the 
assets on the date of liquidation. This value should not vary 
materially from the amount paid for the S corporation stock. 
IX. OIL AND GAS AND OTHER NATURAL 
RESOURCE ACTIVITIES 
Under prior law, a Subchapter S corporation was not a par-
ticularly attractive vehicle for conducting extensive oil and gas 
exploration or development.452 The depletable character of the cor-
poration's income would not pass through to its shareholders and 
if losses attributable to intangible drilling or percentage depletion 
exceeded the basis of the shareholders' stock, the tax benefit of 
those deductions was lost forever. 453 More importantly, because 
earnings and profits are reduced only by cost and not by percentage 
depletion,454 the corporation normally would have current earnings 
and profits in excess of taxable income and, thus, would tend to 
accumulate a substantial earnings and profits account. As a result, 
distributions of previously taxed income could not be made without 
completely sacrificing the benefits of percentage depletion for that 
year. In addition, the income from some types of mineral exploita-
tion constituted passive investment income.455 For these and other 
452. See generally MILLER'S OIL AND GAS FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 1 27-2 
(J. Houghton 21st ed. 1983). 
453. Former I.R.C. § 137 4(c). 
454. I.R.C. § 312(k) and Treas. Regs. §§ 1.312-15 (1972). Earnings and profits 
of a Subchapter S corporation were computed in essentially the same manner 
as those of a non-electing corporation. Treas. Regs. §§ 1.1377-2(b) (1960). 
455. Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-4(b)(5)(v) (1976). 
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reasons, the use of a Subchapter S corporation was rarely desirable 
when a substantial portion of the corporation's activities consisted 
of oil and gas investments. 
The Revision Act has eliminated many of these prior law pro-
visions that made oil and gas activity unattractive for Subchapter 
S corporations. For new corporations, there is no restriction on 
passive investment income.456 The depletable character of the cor-
porate income passes through to its shareholders457 and the distinc-
tion between income and earnings and profits is no longer relevant. 
When a corporation without pre-1983 earnings and profits makes 
distributions in excess of accumulated S corporation income, they 
are treated as a return of capital.458 Such treatment preserves the 
benefit of the special tax allowances for this industry. While the 
ability of a shareholder to claim losses remains limited to the basis 
for his stock and that basis is not increased by any indebtedness 
incurred at the corporate level, unused losses at least may be car-
ried over and deducted in future years.459 However, as noted below, 
under current law, it is far less likely that losses will exceed the 
shareholders' bases. 
In addition, Congress has made the use of an S corporation 
more attractive to taxpayers engaged in oil and gas activities in 
ways that go beyond changes in prior law of general application. 
The Revision Act has adopted many of the features of partner-
ship taxation that are designed specifically to favor the extractive 
industries in general and oil and gas operations in particular. In 
several respects, these special rules are inconsistent with the 
general structure of the revised Subchapter S and will increase 
materially the complexity of the taxation of S corporations for tax-
payers taking advantage for these special provisions. While those 
incongruities are regrettable, it was entirely proper for Congress 
to have conformed the taxation of S corporations to the pattern 
of taxing partnerships in these respects. 
In general, the computation of depletion occurs at the partner-
ship or S corporation level and the amount so computed is allocated 
to the owners as a separately stated item. For both entities, 
however, a markedly different rule is applicable to the computa-
tion of percentage depletion on oil or gas properties under the 
independent producers exemption to the general denial of that tax 
preference. Under section 613A(c)(13), the S corporation is required 
456. I.R.C. § 1362(d)(3), the new provision dealing with termination of the 
election because of excess passive investment income is applicable only to those 
S corporations that have accumulated earnings and profits remaining from a year 
in which they were non-electing corporations. 
457. I.R.C. § 1366(b). 
458. I.R.C. § 1368(b). 
459. I.R.C. § 1366(d). 
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to allocate to each shareholder a pro rata share of the corpora-
tion's adjusted basis in each oil or gas property. The shareholders 
are then required to compute their own depletion allowance with 
respect to the oil or gas property just as they would for individually 
owned properties. As a result of this provision, oil and gas deple-
tion does not enter the computation of S corporation income; thus, 
it is not a separate item allocable to its shareholders. In order 
to prevent a double deduction for these losses, section 1367(a)(2)(E) 
provides that the basis of a shareholder's stock in an S corpora-
tion is to be reduced by the amount of the depletion deduction 
claimed with respect to oil and gas wells. 
Since the Revision Act continues the limitation on S corpora-
tion losses to the shareholders' bases for theirS corporation stock, 
the benefit of percentage depletion still could be lost by S cor-
poration shareholders because the amount of such depletion is not 
limited to the basis for the depletable property. In order to pre-
vent that result, section 1367(a)(1)(C) provides that the basis for 
a shareholder's stock is to be increased by the amount by which 
deductions for depletion exceed the basis of the depletable property. 
As a result, shareholders in S corporations normally will be able 
to obtain a current benefit with respect to the entire amount of 
percentage depletion even though the depletion allowance has ex-
ceeded the shareholder's investment in the corporation. 
For the purpose of computing eligibility for the independent 
producer exemption, production is attributed to the shareholders 
ratably and the limitation is applied at the shareholder and not 
at the corporate level. Similar treatment is extended to an S cor-
poration for the purposes of the windfall profits tax. Thus, for the 
purpose of determining whether oil production constitutes inde-
pendent producer oil for the purposes of the lower rate of tax im-
posed by section 4987(b)(2) upon such oil, section 4942(f) provides 
that an S corporation shall be treated as a partnership and its 
shareholders as partners. As a result, the independent producer 
amount is calculated for each shareholder separately. 
On a disposition of property subject to section 613A(c)(13), each 
shareholder is required to compute his gain or loss separately. 
Under section 1254, deducted intangible drilling expenses are sub-
ject to recapture and, thus, on a disposition of property with respect 
to which such deductions have been claimed, the proceeds of sale 
are subject to tax at ordinary income rates to the extent of the 
prior deduction. Under partnership taxation, all such recapture pro-
visions are brought within the scope of the collapsible partner-
ship provisions of section 751. Thus, if a partner disposes of his 
interest in the partnership and the underlying partnership proper-
ties include an element of section 1254 recapture, some portion 
of the gain on the disposition of the partnership interest similarly 
would be subject to tax at ordinary income rates. In general, S 
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corporations, like corporations subject to the regular tax, are not 
subject to the bifurcation approach of section 751; rather, they are 
subject to the collapsible corporation provisions of section 341. 
Under the collapsible corporation approach, ordinary income treat-
ment is imposed only, as a general proposition, when the corporate 
assets viewed as a whole consist, in substantial part, of ordinary 
income assets and, even then, ordinary income taxation is imposed 
only if the corporation or its shareholders attempt to dispose of 
those assets before having realized a substantial part of the in-
come to be derived from those properties.460 However, if section 
341 is applicable, the entire amount of gain from the disposition 
of stock in the corporation is subject to tax at ordinary income 
rates.461 Presumably because S corporation shareholders are treated 
as if they individually owned oil and gas properties, in the one 
instance of section 1254, the Code applies the partnership collapsi-
ble provision of section 751 rather than the collapsible provisions 
of section 341. Thus, under section 1254(b)(2), upon a disposition 
of S corporation stock where the corporation holds oil and gas prop-
erties with respect to which an intangible drilling deduction has 
been claimed, an allocable portion of the gain on the sale is sub-
ject to tax at ordinary income rates. 
For the purpose of the anti-transfer rules under the independent 
production exemption, either the making or the termination of a 
Subchapter S election is treated as a transfer. Thus, shifting 
between electing and non-electing status causes a loss of the ability 
to claim percentage depletion on oil or gas properties owned at 
the time of the shift. Moreover, under section 613A(c)(13)(C)(i), an 
S corporation- is treated as a partnership, and its shareholders as 
partners, for the purpose of the anti-transfer provisions. Under 
section 613A(c)(9)(A), the transfer of an interest in a partnership 
is treated as a transfer of the oil or gas property and such a transfer 
bars percentage depletion to the transferee. Apparently a similar 
rule is intended to be applicable to transfers of stock in an S 
corporation. 
Although the election to deduct intangible drilling expenses 
must be made at the partnership level, the somewhat similar elec-
tion to deduct the cost of exploring for hard minerals is made at 
the partner level.462 Under section 1363(c)(2)(C), this pattern has 
been extended to S corporations. That pattern is relatively com-
plex. Because that election will affect the basis of the property 
with respect to which the election was made, the proportion of 
the basis in such property attributable to the S corporation 
shareholders should vary from their general ownership interest 
460. I.R.C. § 341(e). 
461. I.R.C. § 341(a). 
462. I.R.C. § 703(b)(4). 
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in the S corporation. In addition, section 617 contains elaborate 
and complex recapture provisions which, to some extent, are elec-
tive and those elections are also made at the shareholder level. 
Thus, on an event producing recapture, different S corporation 
shareholders should be subject to different amounts of recapture. 
It is not entirely clear, however, that this individualized treatment 
of S corporation shareholders can be achieved under section 617. 
In contrast to the more elaborate provisions of section 613A, which 
were designed expressly to achieve such a complete aggregate ap-
proach for partnerships and S corporations, section 617 does not 
treat property subject to the election as if it were owned by the 
S corporation shareholders individually. If this individualized treat-
ment of S corporation shareholders cannot be achieved under sec-
tion 617, providing for a shareholder level election under that sec-
tion is inappropriate. Either all shareholders will make the election 
or the non-electing shareholders will bear an increased tax burden 
attributable to the election by others. Congress should either con-
form section 617 to section 613A or should require the section 617 
election to be made at the corporate level. 
X. OTHER CHANGES AFFECTING S CORPORATION STATUS 
The desirability of electing to be taxed under Subchapter S 
has been altered both by the Revision Act and by other recent 
legislation in ways unrelated to the definition or taxation of such 
corporations. The nature and availability of fringe benefits to the 
shareholders of an S corporation have been revised and the contin-
uing reductions in the rates of tax applicable to individuals, and 
thus S corporations, have affected the attractiveness of the S cor-
poration. As under prior law, the extent to which these changes 
favor the making of an S election remains complex and will vary 
in individual cases. 
Under prior law, qualified plans providing deferred compensa-
tion benefits to employees of Subchapter S corporations were sub-
ject to special restrictions, the general design of which was to ex-
tend the relatively severe limitations imposed on partnership plans 
to Subchapter S corporations.463 Thus, the limitation on contribu-
tions to plans benefiting employees of Subchapter S corporations 
were far lower than the ceilings applicable to plans adopted by 
corporations subject to the regular income tax. On the other hand, 
Subchapter S corporations were treated as corporations under prior 
law. Accordingly, employee-shareholders of such corporations were 
entitled to the broad range of fringe benefits that corporations 
traditionally have been able to provide their employees. The treat-
463. Former I.R.C. § 1379. 
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ment of many of these ancillary benefits of incorporation has been 
changed radically by the combined effect of the Revision Act and 
TEFRA. 
A. Qualified Deferred Compensation Plans 
-
TEFRA eliminated the special limitations imposed by former 
sections 1379(a) and (b) upon qualified deferred compensation ar-
rangements adopted by S corporations for years beginning after 
December 31, 1983.464 Moreover, TEFRA completely revised the 
treatment of various categories of employers. As a result, part-
nerships, regular corporations and Subchapter S corporations are 
all entitled to adopt qualified deferred compensation arrangements 
that generally are subject to the same ceilings and other restric-
tions on benefits. However, Congress did not produce this conform-
ity by simply eliminating all restrictions which previously applied 
only to certain employers. Rather, the amendments added by 
TEFRA are a mixed bag, some of which entirely eliminate former 
restrictions while others extend to all employers restrictions which 
previously applied only to certain entities and still others add en-
tirely new restrictions. A number of these provisions likely will 
have greater impact on the deferred compensation plans of close-
ly held businesses than on those of more widely owned 
enterprises.465 In general, these new rules will increase the costs 
and reduce the benefits of qualified plans relative to the effect 
of the former rules applicable to non-electing closely held corpora-
tions. Thus, while the shareholders of S corporations no longer 
are prejudiced by their S election and generally will benefit from 
the conformity of treatment among entities, they will have to deal 
with these new restrictions. 
Among the limitations imposed by TEFRA that particularly 
will affect closely held businesses are the restrictions upon "top-
heavy" plans. New section 416(g) defines a top-heavy plan as one 
in which more than sixty percent of the present value of the accrued 
benefits, if the plan is a defined benefit plan, or of the account 
balances, if the plan is a defined contribution plan, have been accu-
mulated for the benefit of key employees. A "key employee" is 
an officer of the employer,466 one of the ten employees with the 
greatest ownership, an owner of five percent of the employer, or 
464. TEFRA, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 238(c), 96 Stat. 324, 513 (1982). 
465. For a more detailed description and analysis of these provisions, see 
Sirkin and Sirkin, The Effect of the TEFRA Pension Provisions on Closely Held 
and Professional Businesses, 7 REV. TAX'N INDIVIDUALS 99 (1983). 
466. However, in no event will more than 50 employees, or if less, the greater 
of three employees or 10% of all employees, be treated as officers. I.R.C. § 
416(i)(1)(A) (flush language). 
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a one percent owner of the employer whose annual compensation 
from the employer is in excess of $150,000.467 A five percent owner 
and a one percent owner of a corporation are defined as one who 
owns five percent and one percent, respectively, of the corpora-
tion's outstanding stock or of the total combined voting power of 
all of its stock. The attribution rules of section 318 apply for pur-
poses of determining who is a five percent owner and who is a 
one percent owner. 
If the plan is "top-heavy" it must provide certain special benefits 
to non-key employees and meet additional vesting requirements 
not generally imposed upon non-top-heavy plans.468 These provi-
sions apply to plan years beginning on or after January 1, 1984.469 
Among the other provisions of TEFRA which will be of par-
ticular interest to the owners of closely held businesses are the 
new general limits upon the maximum annual benefit payable per 
participant in a defined benefit plan and the maximum annual contri-
bution per participant in a defined contribution plan,470 new special 
limitations for defined benefit plans upon benefits that commence 
before the participant reaches the age of sixty-two,471 and the 
restrictions the new provisions place upon the amounts that can 
be loaned to plan participants from plan funds.472 The loan limita-
tion provisions apply to any loan made after August 13, 1982.473 
In addition to these provisions dealing with administration of 
qualified plans, TEFRA adds new section 2039(g) to the estate tax 
provisions of the Code, which limits to $100,000 the amount of plan 
proceeds payable to a deceased participant's beneficiaries that is 
excluded from the participant's gross estate for federal estate tax 
purposes. 
B. Other Employee Benefits 
Consistent with the general treatment of S corporations under 
the Revision Act, section 1372 provides that the S corporation shall 
be treated as a partnership for the purpose of applying the provi-
467. I.R.C. § 416(i). 
468. I.R.C. §§ 416(a)-(d). 
469. TEFRA, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 241(a), 96 Stat- 324, 520 (1982). Although 
the statute uses the word "years" without modification, Prop. Reg. 1.416-1, , G-2 
[1983] STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH), 8972 states that amendments necessary 
to bring existing plans into compliance with the top heavy provisions must be 
effective on the first day of the first plan year that begins after 1983. 
470. I.R.C. §§ 415(b) and (c). 
471. I.R.C. § 415(b)(2)(C). 
472. I.R.C. § 72(p). For a discussion of the relationship of this new provision 
to other provisions of the Code dealing with qualified deferred compensation plans, 
see Sirkin and Sirkin, supra note 465, at 113-17. 
473. TEFRA, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 236(c), 96 Stat. 324, 513 (1982). While 
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sions of the Code which "relate to employee fringe benefits." While 
the result Congress attempted to achieve with this section appears 
correct, the imprecise drafting of this provision creates needless 
ambiguity. The term "fringe benefits" is colloquial; it is not a defined 
term under the Code. As a result, it is not clear what provisions 
are intended to be affected by new section 1372. The Committee 
Reports enumerate five examples of benefits that Congress 
intended the new provision to curtail:474 the$5,000 death benefit 
exclusion provided by section 101(b); the exclusions from income 
of amounts paid for accident and health plans provided by sections 
105 and 106; the exclusion of the cost of up to $50,000 of group 
term life insurance provided by section 79; and the exclusion of 
meals and lodging furnished for the convenience of the employer 
provided by section 119. 
Unfortunately, the list does not entirely clarify the intended 
scope of the provision. On the one hand, it scarcely exhausts all 
of the items commonly referred to as fringe benefits available under 
current law to employees. On the other hand, the enumeration ex-
tends to items that do not fall within the traditional notion of a 
fringe benefit. Apparently, the purpose of this provision is to pre-
vent the shareholder-employees of an S corporation from receiving 
tax-free certain employment-related benefits that are excluded from 
the income of shareholder-employees when received from a non-
electing corporation, but are taxable to partners when received 
from the partnership. By using the imprecise term "fringe benefit," 
Congress has left to the Treasury Department the task of imple-
menting the legislative purpose by regulation. Regrettably, sec-
tion 1372 contains neither a definition of the term fringe benefit 
nor a list of all of the provisions intended to be affected. 
The application of new section 1372 is made somewhat more 
complex by the further provision that in applying the section, only 
a shareholder owning two percent of the stock of the corporation, 
after the application of the stock attribution rules of section 318, 
. is to be regarded as a partner.475 Presumably, lesser shareholders 
are to be regarded as nonpartner employees. Thus, to the extent 
that partnerships are able to provide fringe benefits to their 
non partner-employees under these and other provisions of the Code, 
those benefits will continue to be available to minor S corporation 
shareholder-employees. 
this provision does not require repayment of loans outstanding on that date in 
excess of the limitations, it does apply to any outstanding loan that is renegotiated, 
extended, renewed, or revised after August 13, 1982; furthermore, it requires 
aggregation of pre-August 13, 1982 loans with later loans for purposes of apply-
ing the limitations to the new loans. 
474. SENATE REPORT, supra note 22, at 22; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, 
at 21. 
475. I.R.C. § 1372(b). 
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Congress, undoubtedly, was justified in treating an S corpora-
tion as a partnership for these purposes. The effect of permitting 
the S corporation a deduction for a section 105(b) medical expense 
reimbursement plan, for example, would be to permit the 
shareholders of the corporation to deduct directly the entire costs 
of their medical care without regard to the ceilings imposed by 
section 213. On the other hand, it must be recognized that Congress 
merely has replaced one disparity in treatment for another. While 
S corporations now are treated similarly to partnerships, they are 
treated quite differently from corporations not subject to an S elec-
tion. Moreover, the special treatment of fringe benefits injects a 
further consideration into the already complicated question of 
whether Subchapter S should be elected. Shareholders con-
templating such an election now will have to calculate the costs 
of the loss of such forms of nontaxable income that the Treasury 
may determine are included within the scope of new section 1372. 
Section 1372 generally is effective for the years beginning after 
December 31, 1982, but if the corporation was a Subchapter S cor-
poration on September 28, 1982, then section 1372 is not effective 
until after December 31, 1987 with respect to "existing fringe 
benefits."476 An "existing fringe benefit" is defined as any employee 
fringe benefit "of a type" provided by the corporation to its 
employees on September 28, 1982. The phrase "of a type" will re-
quire some regulatory clarification; it may mean that the benefit 
must merely be similar to one provided on that date. The 
availability of this grandfather provision ceases on the date that 
the corporation's S election is terminated; the date the corpora-
tion fails to meet the passive investment income percentage test 
under former section 1372(e)(5); or more than fifty percent of the 
corporation's stock becomes newly owned within the meaning of 
section 1378(c)(2), the special provision dealing with noncalendar 
fiscal years, discussed earlier. 
This grandfather provision seems unduly complex. While Con-
gress quite justifiably might have wished to avoid imposing a new. 
income tax liability on previously existing benefits which previously 
were not subject to tax, it should have accomplished this goal with 
a simpler provision. Moreover, the five year grace period is ex-
cessive. It would have been preferable for Congress to have pro-
vided that the fringe benefits enjoyed by shareholder-employees 
of S corporations in existence when the Revision Act was passed 
were to continue to be tax free for a relatively short statutory 
grace period, for example, one year, and that thereafter all such 
benefits would be subject to tax. 
476. Revision Act§ 6(d), Pub. L. No. 97-354, § 6(d), 96 Stat. 166a, 169a (1982). 
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C. Tax Rates 
While not a part of the 1982 legislation, the continuing reduc-
tion in the rates of tax applicable to upper income individuals has 
affected materially the desirability of electing to be taxed pursuant 
to Subchapter S. Indeed, while the reduction of the individual tax 
rates relative to the corporate tax rate has reduced the desirability 
of incorporating businesses in the first instance, it has enhanced 
the desirability of electing Subchapter S treatment for those 
businesses that are incorporated. 
Of course, no simple test exists for determining whether it 
would be advantageous for a corporation to be taxed under Sub-
chapter S. Whether the business is projected to be profitable or 
unprofitable, individual comparisons of the consequences under the 
regular tax and under Subchapter S must be made in every case. 
Nevertheless, some general principles are apparent. If the corpora-
tion has earnings and profits and if, for any reason, the corpora-
tion must distribute a substantial part of its earnings currently 
to its shareholders, the overall burden of taxation on the business 
enterprise almost always will be less if the corporation elects to 
be taxed under Subchapter S. Regardless of the relationship be-
tween individual and corporate rates, incurring a current double 
taxation on a material portion of the corporate profits will almost 
always be more expensive than incurring the single level tax under 
Subchapter S. The relative unattractiveness of the regular tax can 
be diminished through a variety of techniques. If the corporate 
profits subject to tax at the corporate level can be reduced through 
expensing techniques, the burden of double taxation is correspond-
ingly reduced. Methods for accomplishing such a reduction of the 
double tax include using shareholder debt, high (but reasonable) 
compensation packages including qualified plans, and leasing of 
property from a shareholder to the corporation. If, after the ap-
plication of these techniques, substantial profits remain to be 
distributed, Subchapter S must be examined as an alternative. 
If the corporation is either unable to distribute profits because 
of the expanding needs of the business, or is not required to do 
so because sufficient profits can be expensed, the equation becomes 
more complex. While the ultimate extraction of those accumulated 
corporate profits ultimately may be subject to double taxation, the 
potential for infinite deferral of that tax and the possibility that 
it may be avoided by death or otherwise, often justified ignoring 
that feature of the regular corporate tax structure. Accordingly, 
a comparison may be made between the regular corporate tax 
payable and the tax payable by shareholders if Subchapter S is 
elected. That comparison is influenced by two factors; the number 
of shareholders of the corporation and their average income tax 
brackets. Obviously, the more shareholders an S corporation has, 
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the greater the income splitting advantage provided by a Sub-
chapter S election. Assuming that at least some of the shareholders 
are not in the highest individual tax brackets, the aggregate tax 
payable will be reduced by distributing the corporate income over 
the number of such shareholders. By contrast, all income derived 
by a corporation subject to the regular tax is taxable to a single 
entity. 
It is in connection with the second branch of the comparison 
that the recent changes in individual rate structure significantly 
have affected the desirability of a Subchapter Selection. Although 
the maximum corporate tax rate has remained relatively stable, 
currently at forty-six percent,477 the maximum individual rates have 
dropped from a maximum of seventy percent to a maximum of 
fifty percent on all sources of income.478 At the same time, the level 
of income at which the maximum bracket becomes effective has 
been increased materially. As a result, the amount of tax to be 
saved by causing the business to be subject to the regular cor-
porate income tax rather than the individual tax has been 
diminished greatly. For this reason, it may be anticipated that many 
more businesses will find it desirable to elect to be taxed under 
Subchapter S. 
The interrelationship of these taxes can best be understood 
through an illustration. Although such an illustration has no ap-
plication beyond the facts assumed, it can establish a framework 
for evaluating the desirability of a Subchapter S election. Under 
the rates in effect for 1983, a corporation having taxable income 
of $500,000 will be subject to a corporate tax of $209,750. Assume 
that the corporation is owned by one married individual who files 
a joint income tax return with his spouse, and who has taxable 
income other than corporate profits, in excess of all deductions, 
in the amount of $30,000. That income is subject to a tax of $5,064. 
If the corporation elected to be taxed under Subchapter S, and 
that election did not affect the manner in which it computed its 
income, the individual would become subject to an additional tax 
payable in the amount of $243,938, producing a total tax to the 
shareholder of $259,002. As a result, the business would be sub-
ject to an additional income tax liability of $34,188 because it made 
the Subchapter S election. On the other hand, if the corporation 
were owned by ten equal shareholders, all of whom had the same 
noncorporate income and the same tax return filing status as the 
individual in our first example, dividing the corporate income of 
$500,000 among them would produce an additional tax liability to 
each of $19,750, for an aggregate increase in tax liability of $197,500. 
477. I.R.C. § ll(b). 
478. I.R.C. § 1. 
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As a result of the splitting of income among the shareholders, the 
overall tax liability to which the business is subject would be re-
duced by over $12,000. 
Apparently, in a closely held corporation that is retaining all 
of its income, Subchapter S status frequently will produce an in-
crease in tax liability, but the reverse quickly becomes true if the 
corporation is required to distribute a material amount of its profits. 
Thus, if the corporation described above was subject to the cor-
porate tax, was owned by a single shareholder, and distributed 
a dividend equal to fifteen percent of its earnings, $75,000, the 
tax liability of the shareholder would increase to $36,590. When 
this liability is added to the amount of corporate tax, $209,750, 
the total tax on the business, $246,340, approximates the tax burden 
under a Subchapter S election. Thus, if larger dividends are re-
quired, the aggregate tax burden can be reduced by electing Sub-
chapter S status. 
XI. ENTITY AUDITS 
The Revision Act extended the "entity audit" procedure 
previously applicable to partnerships to S corporations. New sec-
tions 6241 through 6245 provide for binding determination in an 
audit of the S corporation's return of the tax treatment at the 
shareholder level of all "subchapter S items," defined by section 
6245 as any item the tax treatment of which is determined by the 
Commissioner to be more appropriately determined at the corporate 
level than at the shareholder level. New section 6244 states that 
all provisions of subtitle F of the Code (sections 6001 through 7852) 
dealing with partnership items479 shall be applicable to Subchapter 
S items unless modified or made inapplicable by regulations. Thus, 
sections 6221 through 6232, the new partnership entity audit pro-
cedures added to the Code by TEFRA, generally will apply to S 
corporations. 
A. Prior Law 
Under prior law, a Subchapter S corporation was exempt from 
the income tax; nevertheless, it was required to file an informa-
tion return similar in form to the ordinary corporate income tax 
return!80 The Subchapter S corporation return also included items 
of income and loss allocated to the shareholders. However, prior 
law lacked any provision requiring a shareholder to treat any item 
479. A "partnership item" is defined by I.R.C. § 6231(a)(3) as any item the 
tax treatment of which is determined by the Commissioner to be determined 
more appropriately at the partnership level. 
480. IR.C. § 6037 prior to amendment by the Revision Act. 
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on his personal income tax return consistently with this schedule. 
Thus, even though the proper characterization of an item could 
be determined only at the corporate level, the shareholders were 
free to disregard the characterization determined by the corpora-
tion's tax advisors and to make their own determinations in prepar-
ing their individual returns. Furthermore, since the individual 
shareholders, not the corporation, were the taxpayers, the Inter-
nal Revenue Service could not collect any deficiency due to ad-
justments on the corporation's income tax return without also 
auditing returns of the individual shareholders and assessing a defi-
ciency against them. Moreover, there was no procedure by which 
the IRS could make such deficiencies binding upon all shareholders 
of the corporation without auditing each one individually before 
the statute of limitations ran for the audit of the individual return. 
Not surprisingly, as the series of amendments to Subchapter S 
increased the permissible number of shareholders, the Treasury 
Department began to consider ways to decrease the administrative 
burden of these shareholder-by-shareholder audit and assessment 
procedures.481 
A similar problem arose under the prior law governing part-
nership income tax returns. Partnerships also were exempt from 
income tax at the entity level, but were required to file an infor-
mation return, including a schedule of items of income and loss 
allocated to each partner.482 However, since the partners, rather 
than the partnership, were the taxpayers, matters affecting the 
partners' tax liabilities could be determined definitively only by 
audit of the return of each individual partner. The administrative 
burden with respect to partnerships was even greater than that 
of Subchapter S corporations for two reasons: first, there has never 
been any limit upon the number of partners a partnership may 
have, and second, partnerships are permitted to make special alloca-
tions of certain items of income and loss to particular partners. 
B. The New Entity Audit Provisions 
The new provisions appear to ameliorate substantially the ad-
ministrative procedures for audit of S corporation income tax 
returns. New section 6241 states that the tax treatment of any 
Subchapter S item shall be determined at the corporate level, and 
section 6037 has been amended to require that the S corporation's 
information income tax return must include each shareholder's pro 
rata share of each item.483 Furthermore, new section 6242 now re-
481. STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 25. 
482. I.R.C. § 6031 prior to amendment by TEFRA. 
483. I.R.C. § 6031, dealing with partnership information income tax returns, 
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quires that each shareholder treat each Subchapter S item on his 
or her personal income tax return in a manner consistent with 
the treatment of that item on the corporate return unless the 
shareholder notifies the Commissioner of an inconsistent treatment. 
The provisions dealing with audit of partnership income tax 
returns, made applicable to S corporations by section 6244, set out 
in considerable detail the procedures to be followed.484 In summary, 
the partnership is required to furnish on the partnership tax return 
the names, addresses, and share of taxable income of all persons 
entitled to a distributable share.485 In addition, the partnership may 
designate a "tax matters partner" (TMP) whose role is to act as 
representative of the partnership in all audit proceedings should 
the partnership return be selected for audit. If the partnership 
fails to designate such a person, the statute provides that the Com-
missioner will treat the general partner who is entitled to the 
largest share of partnership profits as the TMP, or if there is more 
than one such partner, the one whose name appears first 
alphabetically. 486 
Upon receiving notice from the Service that the partnership's 
return has been selected for audit, the TMP must then provide 
the Service with the name, address, profits interest and taxpayer 
identification number of everyone who was a partner during the 
year to be audited.487 Section 6223 sets out in considerable detail 
the time, manner and extent to which the Service must notify all 
other partners, both of the fact of the commencement of the audit 
and of its final result (called the "final partnership administrative 
adjustment" or FPAA). Generally, all partners are entitled to notice, 
except those who own less than one percent of a partnership hav-
ing more than one hundred partners and those who fail to provide 
the Commissioner with their name, address and profits interest 
to enable him to determine that they are entitled to notice. Since 
a partner of a partnership can be another entity, such as another 
partnership or ·a trust, the owners or beneficiaries of any such 
entity-partner also are entitled to notice, if, because of the con-
duit nature of the entity, the income tax liability of its owners 
or beneficiaries may be affected by the determination of a part-
nership item.'88 Section 6223(g) also requires the TMP to keep all 
as amended by TEFRA, requires that every person who was a partner at any 
time during the tax year be provided with a copy of the return. Curiously, I.R.C. 
§ 6037 contains no such provision. 
484. For a thorough analysis of the partnership entity audit provisions, see 
Caplin and Brown, Partnership Tax Audits and Litigation After TEFRA, 61 
TAXES 75 (1983). 
485. I.R.C. § 6031. 
486. I.R.C. § 6231(a)(7). 
487. I.R.C. § 6230(e). 
488. I.R.C. §§ 6223(c)(3) and (h). 
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partners informed of all administrative and judicial proceedings 
affecting partnership level adjustment of partnership items. While 
the TMP represents the partnership in its dealings with the Ser-
vice, any partner may participate in any administrative or judicial 
proceeding in which his tax liability could be affected.489 If settle-
ment is reached, a partner who is entitled to notice under section 
6231 will be bound by the settlement only if he consents to it, but 
the TMP may bind all non-notice partners without their consent.490 
When the administrative audit proceeding has terminated, the 
IRS must send notice of the FP AA to all partners entitled to 
notice.491 During the 90-day period following issuance of the FPAA, 
only the TMP may commence a proceeding for judicial redeter-
mination; thereafter, any partner entitled to notice may commence 
such a proceeding if the TMP has not.492 The TMP or any partner 
who is entitled to notice may appeal an adverse judicial decision.493 
A deficiency with respect to any partnership item cannot be 
assessed against any partner until 150 days after notice of the 
FPAA was sent to the TMP, if it is not contested, or until a court 
decision becomes final, if the FPAA is contested judicially.494 In 
addition, new section 6229 sets the statute of limitations for assess-
ing such a deficiency against a partner with respect to a partner-
ship item at three years after the later of the date the partner-
ship return was filed, or the last day on which it could have been 
filed timely without regard to extensions. The new provisions also 
contain a procedure by which the partnership may amend its return 
(filing of a request for administrative adjustment) and procedures 
for judicial review of the denial of such a request.495 
A partner who is entitled to notice of administrative pro-
ceedings pursuant to section 6223 and fails to receive it may, if 
the proceeding is still pending, elect to have the partnership items 
for the taxable year which is the subject of the proceeding become 
nonpartnership items as to him.496 The result of such an election 
is that the tax consequences to the partner of the partnership items 
will be unaffected by the determination made at the entity level; 
the tax consequences to him will have to be determined, as under 
prior law, in a separate audit of his personal income tax return. 
Moreover, if the period for applying for judicial review of the FP AA 
already has expired when he receives notice, the partnership items 
489. I.R.C. §§ 6224(a) and 6226(c). 
490. I.R.C. § 6224(c). 
491. I.R.C. § 6223(a). 
492. I.R.C. § 6224. 
493. I.R.C. § 6226(g). 
494. I.R.C. § 6225. 
495. I.R.C. §§ 6227 and 6228. 
496. I.R.C. § 6223(e)(3). 
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will be treated as nonpartnership items with respect to him unless 
he elects to have the final outcome of the audit apply to him.497 
The Commissioner is granted general authority under section 
6244 to modify these rules for audit of S corporation returns. The 
committee reports indicate that this authority is intended to be 
quite broad in order to allow modification of the procedures to 
take into consideration all differences between the two entities 
whether or not the differences are tax related. 
In general, it appears that the entity audit procedures for S 
corporations can be simpler than those for partnerships. For ex-
ample, new section 6243 provides that each shareholder shall be 
given notice of and opportunity to participate in any administrative 
or judicial proceeding for the corporate level determination of any 
Subchapter S item. This provision, and the restriction of eligible 
shareholders to individuals except in very limited circumstances, 
renders unnecessary for S corporation entity audits many of the 
technical rules governing who must receive notice of partnership 
entity audits. 
This requirement of section 6243 also should render relatively 
simple the solution to a problem the committee reports specifically 
direct the Commissioner to address. In a somewhat confused state-
ment, the committee reports indicate that Congress believed the 
procedures for selecting a person to act for the S corporation as 
the TMP acts for the partnership would have to be different 
because, unlike general partners, shareholders are not agents for 
each other or the corporation under state law.498 Since every 
shareholder must receive actual notice of all proceedings and be 
given the opportunity to participate, it would seem the problem 
of appointing a spokesperson can be solved fairly easily by requir-
ing the shareholders to designate one of their number to serve 
in that capacity according to rules similar to those by which S 
corporation status is elected. Indeed, such a designation could be 
required as part of the consent form for new elections. Should the 
shareholders fail to designate a spokesperson, the regulations could 
provide that the shareholder with the largest percentage of stock-
and therefore the largest stake in the tax proceeding- was to be 
the spokesperson until the shareholders filed a designation. 
The regulations under section 6243 will have to supply rules 
for the effect of final determination in an entity audit as to which 
a shareholder failed to receive notice. There seems to be no reason 
why the statutory provisions applicable to a partner who fails to 
receive notice should not apply. 
497. I.R.C. § 6223(e)(2). See SENATE REPORT, supra note 22, at 25. 
498. SENATE REPORT, supra note 22, at 25; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, 
at 24. 
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One area which will require considerable clarification through 
regulations is the scope of the term "subchapter S item." As noted 
above, this term is defined by section 6245 as any item "to the 
extent regulations ... provide that, for purposes of this subtitle, 
such item is more appropriately determined at the corporate level." 
The legislative history of the Revision Act contains no guidance 
as to Congress' intent in drafting this section, nor does the 
legislative history of TEFRA elaborate upon section 6231(a)(3), 
which contains an analogous definition of "partnership item." 
Clearly, Congress intended to give the Commissioner broad discre-
tion in defining these terms, in light of the general purposes of 
these provisions to treat items derived from the entity consistently 
as to all owners of the entity and to increase administrative 
efficiency by determining as much as possible in one audit pro-
ceeding. It would be "more appropriate" to determine any item 
at the entity level if it must be determined by resort to the books 
and records of the entity, or if determination of its amount or 
character with respect to one partner or shareholder will affect 
the tax liability of another partner or shareholder as to that item 
or any other item. In other words, most tax determinations will 
be made at the entity level. In accordance with this analysis, pro-
posed regulations issued under the partnership audit provisions 
define "partnership item" quite broadly.499 First, they contain a 
list of items which will be considered partnership items. This list 
is quite extensive, and includes, in addition to each partner's share 
of each item of income, gain, loss, deduction or credit of the part-
nership, such other items as guaranteed payments and amounts 
necessary to enable the partners to compute their amounts at risk 
under section 465, and their depletion allowances under section 
613A. In addition, it includes a group of items that will be con-
sidered partnership items for purposes of some determinations but 
not others. For example, a partner's contribution to the partner-
ship will be a partnership item for purposes of determining its 
character as a contribution to capital or a loan or a loan repay-
ment, its basis, its amount, if it is money, and the applicability 
of the investment company rules of section 721(b), but it will not 
be considered a partnership item for purposes of determining 
whether the contribution causes recapture under the investment 
tax credit provisions of section 38 to the extent that the recap-
ture is irrelevant to the partnership. The Commissioner clearly, 
and quite properly, interprets the language of the statute broadly 
to favor determination at the entity level. Similar regulations likely 
will be forthcoming for S corporations under section 6245. 
499. Prop. Reg. § 1.6231(a)(3)-l [1983] STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 1 8956. 
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The regulations under section 6245 must be drafted consistently 
with those under sections 1363(b) and 1366, the sections dealing 
with computation of an S corporation's taxable income and the con-
sequences thereof to the shareholders. Thus, the ambiguities in 
the language of those sections discussed earlier in this paper,500 
such as the scope of the word "could" in section 1366(aX1)(A) and 
the relationship to other sections of the Code of the statement 
that an S corporation must be treated as an individual for pur-
poses of computation of its taxable income, must be resolved before 
the task of drafting regulations under section 6245 can be 
completed. 
An item may become a nonpartnership item as to a particular 
partner, and, therefore, its tax consequences for that partner will 
not be determined in the entity audit, if a partner notifies the Com-
missioner that he will treat the item differently on his personal 
return; or if he files a request for administrative adjustment under 
section 6227 which, if favorably acted upon by the Commissioner, 
would result in treatment of an item on the partner's return in-
consistently with its treatment on the partnership return; or if 
a partner fails to receive notice of a proceeding under the entity 
audit provisions as described earlier, or in a series of five "special 
enforcement areas" enumerated in section 6231(c) to the extent 
the regulations so provide.501 
The S corporation audit provisions contain no such explicit 
statutory rules. The legislative history authorizes regulations 
prescribing treatment of the corporate items "as other than cor-
porate items, . . . where special enforcement problems arise;"502 
however, this seems to refer only to the last of the categories 
enumerated in the partnership provisions. Thus, it is not clear 
whether Congress intended to give the Commissioner authority 
to create by regulation a class of "nonsubchapter S items" analogous 
to the statutory nonpartnership items. However, because the situa-
tions where items are classified nonpartnership items are all situa-
tions in which deviation from the entity's return is anticipated and 
the situations can arise in the course of proceedings dealing with 
the audit of an S corporation's income tax return it seems likely 
that the Commissioner does have such authority under the general 
language of section 6245; such items simply are not more ap-
propriately determined at the corporate level. 
Section 6231(a)(i)(B) of the partnership audit provisions contains 
an exception from the definition of "partnership" for partnerships 
500. See text accompanying notes 219-33 supra. 
501. I.R.C. § 6231(b). 
502. SENATE REPORT, supra note 22, at 25; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, 
at 24. 
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with ten or fewer partners as long as no partner's share of any 
partnership item is different from his share of any other partner-
ship item. This exception exempts such partnerships from the en-
tity audit provisions, but the partnership may elect to have these 
provisions apply. This exception is intriguing because it excepts 
from the partnership entity audit provisions those partnerships 
that most closely resemble S corporations. However, there is no 
similar exception to the S corporation provisions. This disparity 
injects another difference in the treatment of S corporations and 
partnerships. 
No reason for this exception appears in the legislative history 
of TEFRA. Apparently, it is simply an exemption from the new 
entity audit procedures of those partnerships which pose the least 
administrative burden to the Internal Revenue Service. The owners 
of most small entities that do not make use of special allocations 
are likely to elect to have the entity audit provisions apply because 
they will find the procedure more efficient and less expensive than 
multiple individual audits. Occasionally, however, the owners will 
disagree among themselves about how to treat a particular item 
and might find it more advantageous to treat the item differently 
on their personal returns rather than to notify the Commissioner 
of their inconsistent treatment pursuant to the new entity audit 
requirements. Because the procedure for notifying the Commis-
sioner of inconsistent treatment is available for both partnerships 
and S corporations, the additional exemption seems unnecessary 
for both entities. Furthermore, if such an exemption were extended 
to small S corporations, the entity audit procedures would be elec-
tive for the vast majority of S corporations.503 
Clearly, the provision dealing with S corporations is preferable 
for both entities and, if any change is to be made, it ought to be 
the elimination of the exemption for small partnerships rather than 
the extension of the exemption to small S corporations. 
XII. CONCLUSION 
The Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982 represents the culmina-
tion of a substantial effort by Congress to rationalize one area of 
the Code that had not achieved its promise. The results of that 
effort are mixed. In revising those aspects of prior law that relate 
to corporations that are solely subject to Subchapter S taxation, 
the Revision Act has accomplished major and praiseworthy im-
provements. While the restrictions on eligibility to elect Subchapter 
503. The Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation reported in 1980 that 
recent statistics showed 97% of all S corporations had seven or fewer shareholders. 
STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 9. 
1983] SUBCHAPTER S REVISION ACT 741 
S remain more restrictive than necessary, particularly with respect 
to the number and character of S corporation shareholders, the 
definition of an eligible corporation has been liberalized substan-
tially in several significant respects. The creation of a safe harbor 
indebtedness should defuse substantially the nonproductive one 
class of stock controversy, and the elimination of passive invest-
ment income restriction on newly formed Subchapter S corpora-
tions will increase materially the flexibility of an S corporation 
without creating an unfair advantage for S corporation 
shareholders. In addition, the rules governing the election and ter-
mination of Subchapter S status have been rationalized and 
liberalized and represent a substantial improvement over prior law. 
Similarly, in the computation of S corporation income and the 
allocation of that income to shareholders, the Revision Act largely 
was successful in disconnecting the pattern of taxing S corpora-
tions from corporate tax concepts and then conforming the taxa-
tion of S corporations to the taxation of partnerships. While the 
computation of income of a Subchapter S corporation may not have 
become more simple, substantial simplification has been achieved 
by eliminating a third system for the tax~tion of business entities. 
On the other hand, the congressional unwillingness to conform com-
pletely the taxation of S corporations to the taxation of partner-
ships was an unfortunate retreat from the broader objectives of 
the Revision Act. The tax avoidance potential in Subchapter S cor-
porations is no greater than that in partnerships; thus, the more 
restrictive approach taken in the Revision Act than is permitted 
in the taxation of partnerships cannot be justified. A rational ap-
proach to the tax avoidance potential inherent in special alloca-
tions and basis adjustments attributable to entity level borrowing 
should be applied uniformly to all conduit taxation entities. By ar-
bitrarily failing to provide for S corporation shareholders the special 
allocations and basis adjustments that are available to partners, 
Congress simply refused to confront several significant issues in 
the conduit pattern of taxation. 
The provisions of the Revision Act that integrate the taxation 
of S corporations with the taxation of corporations subject to the 
regular income tax are far less successful than provisions that solely 
affect Subchapter S corporations. The treatment of corporations 
that had accumulated earnings and profits prior to electing to be 
taxed under Subchapter Sis particularly unsatisfactory. While some 
mechanism must be established to prevent the improper avoidance 
of tax on distributions by imposing different rules on S corpora-
tions depending on whether the corporation has accumulated earn-
ings and profits, Congress has effectively created two classes of 
Subchapter S corporations, and has needlessly complicated the task 
of managing S corporations. This undesirable disparity in treat-
ment is particularly unsatisfactory because the penalties imposed 
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upon corporations that have accumulated earnings and profits is 
an overbroad, second-best solution. The Revision Act would have 
been much improved if Congress had addressed more directly the 
tax avoidance potential of the making of a Subchapter S election 
for a corporation that has recently accumulated a substantial 
amount of earnings and profits, for example, by the sale of its 
business assets. 
Given the policy decision made in 1958 and continued in 1982 
to permit corporations having accumulated earnings and profits 
to elect Subchapter S status, the need to identify distributions at-
tributable to those accumulated earnings and profits becomes 
unavoidable. Under prior law, the PTI account mechanism was one 
of the least satisfactory aspects of Subchapter S. Under the Revi-
sion Act, the mechanism has been revised radically but not im-
proved. The adoption of an entity level accumulated adjustments 
account was inconsistent with the general movement towards con-
formity to partnership taxation and can produce serious inequities 
in the taxation of S corporation shareholders. The shareholder level 
account of prior law, stripped of the needless restrictions imposed 
under prior law, would IJ.ave been a preferable solution. 
In summary, the Revision Act could have been better and it 
should be improved. The substantial improvement in the conduit 
taxation of S corporations brought about by the Revision Act 
represents only a major first step towards fulfilling the objectives 
of the drafters of the original 1958 legislation and of the Revision 
Act. It can only be hoped that an additional quarter of a century 
will not pass before Subchapter S again becomes the object of con-
gressional scrutiny. 
